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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to enhance understanding of offsets and the 
determinants of United States Government (USG) policy and practice towards offsets.  In 
particular, this thesis will examine how and why US policy on offsets developed as it did.  
After first defining offsets and placing them in the context of international trade, this 
study will examine in detail the extent of both legislative branch and executive branch 
involvement in offset activities and policy development.  Additionally, offset-related 
linkages and discontinuities within and between the legislative and executive branches of 
the USG will be explored.  These areas will be examined to identify and explain the 
critical factors that have determined USG policy and practice towards offset. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Offsets are international, compensatory countertrade practices that require a seller 
in an exporting country to provide concessions to (or compensate) the buying government 
as a condition of sale.  Offset practices include counterpurchase, co-production, licensed 
production, and technology transfer.1  Some researchers in this field regard offsets 
holistically as part of a complex transaction.  However, most practitioners look upon 
offsets as secondary transactions independent of the price or quality of the goods or 
services sold as part of a primary contract.  Most governments throughout the world 
require some form of offsets as a matter of trade policy.  Though worldwide efforts such 
as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and other regional trade 
agreements have attempted to restrict the use of offsets, governments continue to employ 
offsets in varying degrees for public purchases (largely defense items) that exceed 
specified monetary thresholds.  
In addition to the buying government and seller, a number of stakeholders are 
involved in varying degrees with offsets and offset implementation, to include unions, 
                                                 
1 The Department of Commerce (DOC) delineates various offset practices as Technology Transfer, 
Subcontractor Production, Co-production, Licensed Production, Purchases, Training, Investment, 
Marketing, and Countertrade.  Descriptions of these practices are provided in numerous government 
documents and not repeated in this thesis. 
2 
trade associations, and government personnel.  Not surprisingly, involved stakeholders 
hold different views regarding offsets.  Some strongly support offsets as an essential 
advantage to conducting business in an increasingly global marketplace.  Others view 
offsets as a “necessary evil.”  Still, others view offsets as unfairly impacting domestic job 
markets as well as distorting world markets.   
Given these many viewpoints, offsets are considered quite controversial.  One 
area of controversy includes the transactional costs to implement an offset since offsets 
are not free.  The cost to implement an offset transaction must either be borne by the 
seller as a cost of doing business or passed along to the buying government in the form of 
higher costs for the purchased goods or services.  Some offset critics argue that greater 
economic benefits would accrue and costs would be less if the purchasing government 
made two separate transactions:  the first for the desired article based solely on price and 
quality of the primary sales agreement and the second for the article or service that would 
be delivered as a result of the offset agreement.   
Another area of controversy includes the negative effects on employment.  While 
work (i.e., jobs) may be gained in the selling country by winning a foreign contract, the 
seller may transfer certain jobs or skills to industries in the buying country to satisfy 
foreign government offset demands.  Coupled with this employment controversy is the 
concern raised by some economists pertaining to the negative effect of offsets on the 
economy.  These take the form of distorted trade patterns and uneconomic price 
increases, particularly within the aerospace sector.  Finally, many within selling countries 
are concerned with the level of technology transfer that results from offsets and the 
potentially deleterious effects such transfer may have on national security. 
In 1990, the USG instituted a “hands off” policy regarding offsets, particularly 
with respect to government-to-government transactions.  Prior to this, the USG was 
directly involved in a number of offset transactions.  However, since 1990, indirect USG 
involvement has increased significantly:  US businesses that provide offsets to foreign 
governments must report certain information to the USG for inclusion in an annual report 
to Congress; USG agencies involved in government-to-government transactions must 
notify Congress and provide information pertaining to the inclusion of potential sales 
3 
including offsets; the Department of Defense (DOD) has determined in the defense 
supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) that the costs to implement 
offset transactions are allowable and may be passed on to foreign governments as part of 
these government-to-government agreements; DOD contracting officers working with 
businesses must determine whether offset implementation costs are allocable and 
reasonable; finally, USG personnel, though allowed to acknowledge that offset costs are 
embedded in a government-to-government agreement if asked, are prohibited from 
discussing specific offset information with foreign governments. 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research is to identify the determinants of USG policy and 
practice towards offsets in international trade.  This study will discuss the early 
development of offset-related practices shortly after World War II and the introduction of 
offsets as a burden-sharing tool used by the US to help maintain a positive balance of 
payments with West Germany during the 1960s to mid-1970s.  This research traces the 
initial appearance of offset within the US as a trade practice in the mid-1970s and 
continues by examining DOD involvement with offset agreements and subsequent 
development of offset-related policy and regulations within DOD through 1980.  This 
thesis traces the development of a US offset policy, along with the emergence of 
congressional involvement with offsets through 1990.  Finally, this study examines the 
refinement of offset related policies through 2003. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Principal Research Question 
What are the determinants of USG policy and practice towards offsets in 
international trade? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What are offsets?   
• How do offsets “fit” within the context of international trade? 
• When, why, how, and where are offsets employed? 
• What is the history of USG participation in offsets? 
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• What statutes, policies, and regulations govern USG involvement regarding 
offsets?  
• Which USG offices participate in offsets and what is the nature of their 
participation? 
E. SCOPE 
This thesis establishes a framework for understanding offsets in the context of 
international trade.  It uses the areas of defense preparedness, industrial competitiveness, 
economics, trade, employment, technology transfer, and national security to explore the 
reasons for the formulation of USG policy and practice towards offsets in international 
trade since post World War II.  The thesis will largely confine discussion of offsets to 
those occurring as part of a sale of defense-related materials.  Offsets may take place 
outside the realm of defense sales; however, the principal US policy and practices 
involving offsets are related to the export of military goods. 
This research does not attempt to analyze the effect of offsets on the areas of 
defense preparedness, industrial competitiveness, economy, trade, employment, 
technology transfer, or national security.  Research conducted in 1998 highlights job 
losses due to offset agreements. (US House, 1998)  However, numerous studies published 
between 1986 and 1992 by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and between 
1996 and 2003 by the Department of Commerce (DOC) find that the effects of offsets in 
these areas, though somewhat inconclusive, do not appear to be negative.  Also, 
additional studies on the effect of offsets on employment (Gilman and Shea (1987)) and 
on the industrial base (Woodward (1995) and McCord (1998)) provide results similar to 
those published by OMB and DOC. 
In identifying the determinants of USG offset policy this thesis will touch on a 
number of other points relating to offsets, to include identifying countries that participate 
in offsets, listing advantages and disadvantages of offsets, analysis of various types of 
offset arrangements, and an understanding of offset transaction costs.  However, this 
thesis does not provide a thorough review of individual country policies and rationale for 
pursuing offsets.  (For further information on country policies, see Verzariu and Mitchell, 
1992, and US DOC, BIS, 2003, “Sixth,” Appendix E.)  Nor does this research provide an 
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exhaustive analysis of the advantages or disadvantages of offsets.  (For further 
information on advantages and disadvantages, see US GAO, 1984, “Trade Offsets,” and 
US GAO, 1994, “Military Exports.”)  This thesis also does not provide an analysis or 
example of various types of offset arrangements or a study of transaction costs.  (For 
further information on different types of offset arrangements along with an example, see 
US DOC, BIS, 2003, “Sixth,” Appendix F.  For an analysis of offset transaction costs see 
Taylor, 2000.) 
F. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis includes literature reviews and a review of 
documents produced by the US Government and international organizations related to 
offsets.  These documents will be analyzed to identify and characterize the determinants 
of US Government policy towards offsets in international trade. 
US Government documents include congressional reports and testimony from the 
General Accounting Office (GAO), the Congressional Record (CR), and reports from 
various congressional committees.  Documents from offices within the executive branch 
of the US Government include the Federal Register (FR), Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR), studies or regulations issued by OMB, the Department of Labor (DOL), DOC, 
Department of State (DOS) archives, DOD policy and regulations relating to acquisition 
and foreign sales, and an interim report produced by the US Presidential Commission on 
Offsets in International Trade [hereinafter referred to as “the Offsets Commission”]. 
Documents from the World Trade Organization (WTO), North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were also 
consulted. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II establishes a basic framework for understanding offsets in the context 
of international trade.  A working definition of offsets for this thesis is provided, 
characteristics of offsets are identified, and various terms and definitions applied to 
offsets are reviewed.  The underlying principles of trade are outlined and a model of 
international trade that includes offset agreements within the global marketplace is 
introduced. 
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Chapters III through VI discuss offset-related activities during four separate 
periods that have been organized around five historical events observed throughout the 
literature that mark a shift in USG practice and policy towards offset in international 
trade.  The author of this study culled these milestones from the literature and suggests 
their use as a mechanism to aid understanding of the development of offsets policy and 
practice within the USG.  These milestones include initiation of an offset arrangement 
with West Germany (1961), establishment of an offset agreement with Australia (1973), 
publication of the “Duncan Memorandum” regarding DOD participation in offsets 
(1978), issuance of the President’s Policy on Offsets in Military Exports (1990), and 
creation of the Offsets Commission (2000).  Each chapter examines the economic 
environment during the periods selected, using data on US Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), US employment growth, and, where available, employment data from the 
aerospace sector2.  Using data from three separate studies, Chapters IV through VI also 
offer some perspective on the volume of transactions and the number of countries 
involved in offsets.3  Finally, each chapter discusses the various USG participants in 
offsets, examines activities and events that influenced the development of offset-related 
policy, and details the offset-related statues, policies and regulations that emerged during 
each period. 
1. Post World War II To Mid-1970:  Early Offset Development 
Chapter III describes offsets during the period from the end of WW II to the mid-
1970s.  The term “offset” was not used in a conventional sense during this period.  The 
licensed production and coproduction arrangements between the US and several foreign 
governments that began in the late 1950s were not referred to as offset arrangements until 
the 1970s.  Within international trade, the initial use of the term “offset” occurred with 
the establishment of a series of offset arrangements between the US and the Federal 
Republic of Germany that began in 1961 and extended through the mid-1970s.4 
                                                 
2 Both academic literature and government documents highlight the effect of offsets on aerospace. 
3 During the post World War II to mid-1970s period, offsets were not employed in the conventional 
sense; therefore, similar data are not provided in Chapter III, which covers that period. 
 4 The earliest reference in the literature to US participation in offsets per se is recorded by Dr. Bernard 
Udis, a longtime observer of offsets, in a 1994 study conducted for NATO (Udis, 1994).  Along with 
Maskus, Udis also mentions this particular application in a 1996 review of US offsets policy. 
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2. Developing a Department of Defense Offset Policy (1973-1980) 
Chapter IV begins with a description of the 1973 US offset agreement with 
Australia.5  This is the first offset agreement, as defined in this study, in which the US 
participated.  A number of other influential offset agreements in which the DOD 
participated are reviewed.  DOD policies and regulations that emerged from these 
agreements are further discussed.  The final point of discussion during this period, is the 
decline in direct DOD participation in offset arrangements with the incorporation of the 
May 1978 Duncan Memorandum as part of defense procurement regulations in 1980.   
3. USG Offset Policy Evolution (1981-1990) 
By 1981, offsets were used with increasing frequency by foreign governments 
purchasing defense articles and services.  All countries involved in trade as defense 
exporters incurred offset obligations; however, because the US had the largest share of 
defense exports, it incurred the largest number of offsets.  Concerns within the US about 
the effect of offsets began to increase as unemployment increased and economic growth 
declined.  The US Congress began to take an active interest in understanding, examining, 
and countering the negative effects of offsets.  Numerous agencies within the USG began 
to publish reports pertaining to the effects of offsets on the US relating to technology 
transfer, the economy and employment, particularly aerospace employment.  The 
“Duncan Policy” provided a starting point for developing an offsets policy within the 
                                                                                                                                                 
In July, 1961 the US and West Germany signed the first of seven so-called “offset” 
agreements, designed to minimize the impact of the American balance-of-payments of 
maintaining US military forces in Germany.  German procurements from the US offset 
roughly 80 per cent of the balance-of-payments costs of maintaining US forces in 
Germany. (Udis and Maskus, 1996, p. 358) 
 
The use of the term “offsets” here does not exactly fit the working definition of offsets established in 
Chapter II.  In this instance, the US provided defense services to Germany, and Germany reciprocated by 
purchasing defense goods from the US.  A case closer to the working definition would have had Germany 
purchasing US defense goods on the condition that the US provide defense services.  In any event, this 
initial use of the term in an international context helps the reader understand another factor contributing to 
the confusion pertaining to the use of the term “offsets.” 
5 Matt Schaffer, Senior Vice President for Policy at the US Export-Import Bank in the Carter 
Administration and a student of offsets writes, “The first consciously structured offset sale took place… 
…with Australia.”  The Memorandum of Discussions between Australia and the DOD was signed on 10 
April 1973.  This transaction was actually a broad agreement by the DOD to “facilitate Australian exports 
[to the US of] up to 25 percent of the value of military exports from the United States into Australia.” 
(Schaeffer, 1989, pp. 49-50)  This does appear to be the earliest reference to an offset as defined in this 
study that involves the USG.  This agreement sets the stage for future, USG participation in offsets.  The 
author will discuss indications of a US-British offset agreement introduced in the mid-1960s as part of US 
efforts to sell the F-111 to the UK; however, the sale was never consummated. 
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USG.  Congressional hearings, executive branch reports, legislation, executive orders, 
and regulations pertaining to offsets emerged.  This period culminated during the Bush 
Administration with publication of the “USG Policy on Offsets in Military Exports” in 
April 1990.   
4. Refining US Offset Policy (1991-2003) 
A decade after the Bush policy on offsets in military exports and in response to 
another statutory mandate, President William J. Clinton formed the Offsets Commission 
in December 2000 to examine the use of offsets in defense trade and, in parallel, issued 
an executive order to expand the scope of this commission to include a concurrent review 
of the use of offsets in commercial trade.  The Offsets Commission consisted of 11 
members representing industry (from the defense, nondefense, and investment sectors), 
labor, academia, and USG departments and agencies.  After meeting once on 4 December 
2000, the Offsets Commission issued an interim status report in January 2001. (US 
Presidential Commission, 2001)  Although the work of the Offsets Commission remains 
unfinished (US GAO, 2003, p. 2), the status report produced in January 2001 provides a 
baseline for further understanding of USG offset policy and practices.  
Chapter VII provides a summary and conclusions regarding the determinants of 
US offset policies and practices developed during each period.  This chapter will also 
provide an overall summary of offset policy development.  This summary will offer 
insight into the primary and secondary causes and the roles played by participants in 
offset policy development.  Recommendations regarding changes in USG policy and 





II. OFFSETS IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Chapter II establishes a basic framework for understanding offsets in the context 
of international trade and is subdivided into three sections.  The section entitled 
“Defining Offsets” identifies the characteristics of offsets, reviews various terms and 
definitions applied to offsets, and develops a working definition of offsets for this thesis.  
The section entitled “Trade in the Global Marketplace” outlines the underlying principles 
of trade and introduces a model of international trade within the global marketplace.  The 
section entitled “Offsets in International Trade” demonstrates how offsets “fit” in the 
context of international trade.  This chapter concludes with a summary, 
A. DEFINING OFFSETS 
Offsets are an international trade practice employed by both buyers (e.g., 
governments) and sellers (e.g., industry) involved in transactions of goods and services.  
This section begins by identifying the characteristics of offsets, examines the various 
definitions applied to offsets, and develops a working definition of offsets for use 
throughout this thesis. 
1. Characteristics of Offsets 
According to a 2000 report authored by a long-time observer of offsets, Dr. 
Pompiliu Verzariu,6 three important characteristics distinguish offsets as compensatory 
transactions: purchasing government involvement, supplier reciprocity, and preferential 
treatment. (Verzariu, 2000, p. 2)  The Offsets Commission also recognized the 
involvement of the purchasing government as the predominant characteristic pertaining to 
offsets in its January 2001 Status Report. (US Presidential Commission, 2001, p. ii)  
These three principal characteristics of offsets are described below. 
a. Purchasing Government Involvement 
The purchasing government may intervene through laws or public policy 
as well as seek to scrutinize offset transactions during approval processes.  Scrutiny of 
offset transactions is normally conducted by an agency within the purchasing 
                                                 
6 Dr. Verzariu is the Director of the Financial Services and Countertrade Division of the US 
Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration.  He has written extensively on the subject 
of offsets since 1985. 
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government.  This may include a review of the offset arrangement to ensure that specific 
types of offsets (e.g., co-production versus marketing services) are pursued or that 
particular agreements are made in the case of non-fulfillment (e.g., payment of liquidated 
damages). 
b. Supplier Reciprocity   
The purchasing government requires that the supplier contractually 
provide some form of additional, secondary compensation as a prerequisite to contract 
award of the primary good or service, per se, which is to be purchased.  This reciprocity 
may be either an explicit statement or implicit understanding by a purchasing government 
that a contract award for goods or services will be based upon cost, schedule and 
performance as well as additional factors unrelated to the goods or services that the seller 
must provide as a condition of sale. 
c. Preferential Treatment   
The purchasing government extends preferred treatment to the supplier as 
a result of agreement by the supplier to provide reciprocal compensation.  Preferential 
treatment may appear in a variety of forms, for example, as decreased tariffs, lower taxes, 
or favorable financing. (Verzariu, 2000, p. 2) 
The literature points to other areas such as dollar value threshold and 
sector of the related primary sale as other defining characteristics of offsets.  Regarding 
dollar value threshold, the DOC requires that US suppliers report offset agreements 
exceeding a $5 million threshold; however, the DOC reports that numerous countries 
either require offset agreements for contracts significantly below this threshold (e.g., 
Israel requires a 35 percent offset for contracts with a minimum value of $100 thousand, 
the Philippines requires a 50 percent offset for contracts with a minimum value of $1 
million) or have unspecified threshold values for requiring offsets. (US DOC, BIS, 2003, 
“Sixth,” Appendix E)   
With regard to characterizing offsets by sector, the Offsets Commission, in 
examining defense trade, recognized that nearly 90 percent of all offsets involve the 
aerospace industry.  The commission also acknowledged that offsets occur in other areas 
of commercial trade, but specific data is lacking. (US Presidential Commission, 2001, pp. 
14-17)  Therefore, using dollar value and industrial sector as identifying characteristics of 
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offsets, while acceptable in certain circumstances, proves impractical for use in this 
study. 
2. Offsets:  Terms and Definitions 
Another commentator observed that the field of offsets is “cluttered with a babel 
of terms” and definitions. (Brauer, 2002, p. 1)  This observation applies to the jargon 
used by those who operate within the realm of offsets, as well as to the use of higher-
level terms employed in international trade to describe offsets programs.  For example, 
countries avoid using the word “offsets” by substituting a wide variety of terms (e.g., 
“benefits, “cooperation,” “participation,” etc.) to describe their offsets policies and 
programs.  The academic literature and government documents also reveal a variety of 
meanings to define offsets.  Definitional ambiguities and inconsistencies continue to exist 
in describing what constitutes an “offset,” and the literature lacks a common definition of 
the various practices that constitute offsets. (Verzariu, 2000)  Therefore, a brief 
examination of the various terms from a government perspective and definitions of 
offsets from both academic and government perspectives is warranted. 
a. Government Terms for Offsets   
The DOC reports that countries use a wide-variety of terms to describe 
their offset programs.7  Examples of such terms include “Strategic Industry Development 
Activities (SIDAs)” (Australia), “Industrial Benefit” (Belgium) “Industrial & Regional 
Benefits” (Canada), “Industrial Participation” (Finland and the United Kingdom), 
“Industrial Cooperation Benefits” (Israel), “Industrial Cooperation” (Spain), and 
“Industrial Cooperation Program” (Taiwan). (US DOC, BIS, 2003, “Sixth,” Appendix E)  
Understanding that countries employ different terms to describe policies and programs 
relating to offsets, is important with respect to determining what does and does not 
constitute an offset in international trade.   
b. Academic Definitions of Offsets    
Dr. Jurgen Brauer, Professor of Economics at Augusta State University, 
reviews numerous offset definitions offered in the economic literature, citing Neuman 
(1985), Udis and Maskus (1991), and Martin and Hartley (1995).  His research revealed 
                                                 
7 See also Taylor who writes, ”Offsets often appear under the guise of compensation packages, 
industrial benefits programs, cooperative agreements, and countertrade policy.”  (Emphasis in the original.  
Taylor, 2002, p. 2) 
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that each of these definitions implied some degree of coercion by the buyer to enter into 
offset transactions.  However, he offered an opinion, substantiated by Hall and 
Markowski (1994), that a seller is never forced to sell and therefore chooses to undertake 
offset transactions voluntarily.  He cites Hall and Markowski, to wit, “Offsets are simply 
goods and services which form elements of complex voluntary transactions negotiated 
between governments as purchasers and foreign suppliers … they are those goods and 
services on which a government chooses to place the label ‘offsets’.” (Hall and 
Markowski, 1994 in Brauer, 2002)8 
c. US Government Definitions of Offsets   
The views held by offices within the US Government are just as varied as 
those of the aforementioned academics.  As early as October 1985, the GAO testified 
before Congress, “the concept of offsets lacks a uniform definition.” (US GAO, 1985, 
“Foreign,” p. 2)  In 1998, Representative John F. Tierney directed the minority staff of 
the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight to prepare a report on 
offsets which was entitled “Foreign Offset Demands in Defense and Civil Aerospace 
Transactions.” (US House, 1998)  The staff report provided, inter alia, commentary on 
the evolving definition of offsets, noting that they “differ primarily in the extent to which 
compensation must be required.” The staff report drew a distinction between offsets 
offered by US suppliers as a condition of foreign government policy requirements and 
offsets voluntarily provided by US suppliers as a result of “competitive pressures in the 
marketplace.”  Also, a footnote in this report stated that the GAO definition of offsets had 
evolved from a 1990 report citing offsets as “required” by the purchasing government to 
a 1996 report noting that offsets were a “inducements or conditions” of a sale.  (US 
House, 1998, p. 2) 
However, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) within the DOC, 
charged with preparing an annual report to Congress on offsets, narrowly limits its 
consideration of offsets to purchases related to the defense sector and continues to denote 
offsets solely from a perspective of a requirement from the purchasing government, 
                                                 
8 Dr. Brauer’s September 2002 paper was presented at an International Conference on Defense 
Offsets and Economic Development in Capetown, South Africa.  Cited with permission of Dr. Brauer. 
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defining offsets as “Industrial compensation practices required as a condition of purchase 
in sales of defense articles and/or defense services.”    
3. Working Definition of Offsets 
Given the discussion of characteristics of offsets as well as terms and definitions, 
the best available working definition for the purpose of this paper is a slightly modified 
version of what was provided in the Status Report by the Offsets Commission, “The term 
‘offset’ means the entire range of industrial and commercial benefits provided to foreign 
governments as an inducement or condition to purchase … goods or services.”9 (US 
Presidential Commission, 2001, p. 5)  
B. TRADE IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 
This section examines the underlying principles of trade and introduces a model 
of trade within the global marketplace.  The components of this model include external 
elements that influence trade; the markets, market structure, and trade flows along which 
transactions occur; and the trade practices employed by governments conducting trade.  
This section concludes with a description of how the components of this model work 
together in international trade. 
1.  Principles of Free Trade 
Economists Marc Lieberman and Robert Hall observe that “Over the post-World 
War II period, there has been a worldwide movement toward a policy of free trade—the 
unhindered movement of goods and services across national boundaries.” (Emphasis in 
the original, Lieberman, 2000, p. 490)   These authors define the underlying principles of 
free trade theory as comparative advantage, opportunity cost and specialization and 
exchange.  (Lieberman and Hall, 2000, pp. 490-510) 
                                                 
9 The original language in the Offset Commission Status Report states, “This report uses the broad 
definition of defense offset set out in the statute establishing the Commission: ‘The term ‘offset’ means the 
entire range of industrial and commercial benefits provided to foreign governments as an inducement or 
condition to purchase military goods or services, including benefits such as co-production, licensed 
production, subcontracting, technology transfer, in-country procurement, marketing and financial 
assistance, and joint ventures.’ [italics added]”  The report continues, “This report uses an analogous 
definition of commercial offset, which tracks the above language but substitutes the word ‘non-military’ for 
‘military’ (see italicized term above). Thus, commercial offsets apply to the purchase by other nations of 
such non-military items as communications equipment, civil aircraft, and nuclear power plants.”   
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a. Comparative Advantage and Opportunity Cost   
Comparative advantage is “the ability to produce a good at a lower 
opportunity cost than elsewhere.”  (Lieberman and Hall, 2000, p. 492)  Opportunity cost 
is determined by assessing the value of what is sacrificed (i.e., not produced) in order to 
produce another good.  A nation gains comparative advantage by producing a particular 
good with a lower opportunity costs than another nation.  
b. Specialization and Exchange   
Specialization is a “method of production in which each person 
concentrates on a limited number of activities.”  Exchange is the “act of trading with 
others to obtain what we desire.”  Though defined for an individual person, these same 
principles apply to all entities engaged in international trade when gains are made “from 
specializing according to comparative advantage.” (Lieberman and Hall, 2000, p. 25) 
2. Model and Basic Description of Trade  
Trade involves the exchange of goods or services between two parties, a buyer 
and a seller.  Each party seeks to derive maximum value and benefit from this exchange.  
The buyer strives to pay the lowest possible price to obtain a particular quality good or 
service at a specified time and place.  The seller, in turn, works to attain the highest 
possible profit: the difference between the price the buyer will pay and the cost the seller 
will incur for providing a particular good or service.  Trade happens between and among 
various types of entities, including individuals, businesses, governments, etc.  
International trade is a subset of trade that occurs when the entities involved in a 
particular transaction are located in different nations. (Lieberman and Hall, 2000, pp. 
491-492)  The specific components of the model are outlined below.   
a. External Elements   
For domestic trade these include types of economic system, i.e., 
determinations of resource ownership and resource allocation.  The particular 
environment, or economic system, is determined by the structure of resource ownership 
(either the individual, the state, or some combination thereof) and the mechanism by 
which those resources are allocated (either markets driven by consumer choice or 
governments which use command).  Table 1 illustrates various combinations of resource 
allocation and ownership within contemporary economic systems.  Trade within a 
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particular system operates according to the economic rules established by the entity that 
governs the system.  According to Lieberman, “different laws must be dealt with.” 
(Lieberman and Hall, 2000, p. 498)  For example, individuals trading within the 
economic sphere controlled by United States follow the rules of market capitalism as well 
as the laws of the United States; individuals trading within Cuba follow the rules of 
command socialism and the laws of Cuba. 
Table 1:  Economic Systems (From Lieberman, 2000, p. 36) 
For international trade, external elements include international and 
regional forums to reduce and remove trade barriers and thereby enhance free trade.  
International forums include the WTO (successor organization to the GATT regime) and 
specific WTO arrangements such as the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) 
and the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (TCA).  Significantly, the GATT, which 
originally instituted free trade as a basic principle for world commerce, states that GATT 
parties (now WTO members) may not take measures that cause discrimination against or 
among competitors based on noncommercial factors. This principle was intended to 
eliminate government interference that distorts commercial transactions otherwise 
governed by market forces.  Two substantive provisions within the GATT further this 
goal.  Article 1 requires members to treat products from all other members equally (most 
favored nation or MFN treatment), and Article 3 requires that members treat foreign 
products at least as well as their own (national treatment). (US House, 1998, p. 18) 
Regional trade agreements provide forms of governance within particular 
regions.  Examples of these types of agreements include the NAFTA, European Union 
(EU), and ASEAN10 Free Trade Agreement (AFTA).  Also, two countries or regional 
blocs may choose to establish on a bilateral basis reciprocal trade agreements to further 
                                                 
10 ASEAN is the Association of South East Asian Nations and includes the following countries:  
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Vietnam.  (www.aseansec.org accessed 3 August 2003)  
Resource Allocation  
Market  Command 
Individuals  Market Capitalism Centrally Planned Capitalism Resource 
Ownership State  Market Socialism Command Socialism 
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control trade flows of specified goods and services. (Lieberman and Hall, 2000, pp. 504-
506)   
b. Markets and Market Structures   
A market is simply defined as a “group of buyers and sellers with the 
potential to trade.”  (Lieberman and Hall, 2000, p. 523)  A market where trade occurs 
within a national economy or economic sphere is regarded as a domestic market.  The 
market in which trade occurs and crosses national economic boundaries is referred to as 
an international market. 
A market structure refers to unique features that have an effect on how 
trade occurs within a particular market.  Market competition exists under certain 
conditions that primarily depend upon the numbers of buyers and sellers, type of product 
(standardized or differentiated), ease of market entry or exit and degree of independence.  
Other market conditions include the level of information that is available to participants 
(e.g., perfect information) as well as presence or lack of “benefit spillovers among 
activities.” (Markowski and Hall, 1998, p. 25)   
Three basic market structures exist based on competition: perfect, 
monopolistic, and oligopolistic.   In the case of perfect competition, no buyer or seller is 
able to influence price by changing the quantity it buys or sells.  Additionally, 
standardized products and sellers may easily enter or exit perfect markets.  Information is 
assumed to be nearly perfect or at least available and buyers obtain the benefits of the 
purchased good with few, if any, residual benefits other than those directly offered by the 
purchased good.  With perfect competition, economic profit in the long run is minimized.   
Similarly, monopolistic competition has many buyers and sellers who 
easily enter and exit the market.  However, in monopolistic competition, information 
provided to the seller is less than perfect, but additional benefits may accrue.  Unlike the 
perfectly competitive scenario, a differentiated product permits the monopoly competitor 
to earn economic profits in the long run.   
Finally, oligopolistic competition may or may not have a differentiated 
product, normally has few sellers, and limits to market entry.  Information is imperfect 
which may result in additional benefits, particularly to the seller.  A unique feature of 
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oligopolies is that they are marked by a “small number of strategically interdependent 
firms” that must take into account their competitors’ actions and reactions.  In this case, 
profits reach an equilibrium depending on decisions made by the firms involved. 
(Lieberman and Hall, 2000, pp. 216-217, Markowski and Hall, 1998, p. 17) 
c. Trade Flows 
Trade is the transfer or flow of goods and services between people.  Those 
goods and services produced domestically, but sold abroad are labeled as exports.  Those 
goods and services produced abroad, but consumed domestically are labeled imports.  
Imports and exports occur independently of one another.  The marketplace provides the 
environment within which trade occurs, but “it is individual consumers and firms [and 
governments] who decide to buy things—at home or abroad.” (Lieberman and Hall, 
2000, p. 496) 
d. Trade Practices/Barriers   
Governments enact laws, make policies, and establish regulations that 
result in practices that affect both domestic and international trade.  Domestically, these 
include practices such as providing subsidies to specific suppliers, establishing set-asides 
that provide preference to specified companies (e.g., small, disadvantaged businesses, 
etc.) for award of designated contracts, and zoning which restricts the location where 
certain trade activities may occur.  Internationally, governments adopt practices to protect 
domestic interests by establishing laws, policies, and regulations intended to protect or 
promote national interests.  Most countries regulate international trade by establishing 
tariffs which tax imports and quotas which limit imports.  Governments may also enact 
protectionist legislation (e.g., buy national provisions) or establish various forms of non-
tariff trade barriers (NTBs) to protect domestic industry interests.11 (Mikic, 1998, p. 324).  
The components of the international trade model described here consist of 
the following major components:  external elements (economic system determinants and 
international trade agreements), markets (international and domestic) and their trade 
flows (exports and imports), buyers and sellers, and trade practices/barriers (domestically 
                                                 
11 Mikic lists such items as quasi-non tariff measures, quantitative trade restrictions, price-cost trade 
measures, standards and regulations, government purchasing policies, arbitrary customs procedures, tied-
aid programs, competitive and industrial policies. 
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to include set-asides, subsidies, and zoning; internationally to include tariffs, quotas, 
protectionist legislation, and NTBs).  This model is a synthesis based upon the work of 
Lieberman and Hall (2000) and Mikic (1998).  Figure 1 introduces a visualization of this 
model of international trade and will be updated with additional elements in this chapter. 
 
Figure 1:  Model of International Trade – Basic Model (After 
Lieberman and Hall, 2003 and Mikic, 1998) 
 
C. OFFSETS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE  
From the above working definition and trade discussion, it is apparent that offsets 
are another mechanism through which governments seek to manage or control trade in 
certain international transactions.  Therefore, offsets exist as trade barriers under the 
proper conditions.  This section places offsets in the context of international trade by, 
first, discussing why offsets challenge the principles of free trade; second, reviewing the 
role of offsets in various international trade agreements; and third, examining market 
structures and trade flows resulting from offsets.  This section concludes by establishing 
the contextual “fit” of offsets in international trade and updating the model. 
Regional Trade Agreements:  
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1.   Offsets and Free Trade Principles 
As trade barriers, offsets run counter to and are the result of rejecting free trade 
principles.  Rejection of these principles occurs in specific sectors, primarily government 
and defense procurement.  For example, “Public officials have rejected competition and 
comparative advantage as the basis for military industrialization.” (Kapstein, 1991, p. 
660)  Free trade principles are rejected in other areas as well.  For example, some 
industries such as civil aerospace, which the US regards as a commercial concern, may 
have a connection to the government of the country in which it operates.  Therefore, 
purchases for these entities are regarded by some nations as government procurement and 
therefore exempt from rules in GATT and other international agreements against 
discriminatory trade practices. (US House, 1998, p. 25) 
2. Offsets in International Trade Agreements 
The purpose of the various international trade agreements and forums is to reduce 
and remove trade barriers which, it has been argued, now include offsets.  The US House 
minority staff wrote, “Generally, the theory underlying free trade agreements is that 
[trade barriers to include] offsets are ‘economically inefficient and market distorting.’”  
(US House, 1998, p. 16)  Despite this, various international agreements permit offsets in 
certain circumstances.   
a. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World 
Trade Organization (WTO)   
The GATT does not specifically mention offsets, presumably, according 
to the writers of the US House study on offsets, “because the use of offsets accelerated 
after the GATT was established.”  The GATT requirements for MFN and national 
treatment would seem to preclude practices similar to offsets; however, GATT Article 
3.8(a) “explicitly exempts from its nondiscrimination rules any procurement for 
governmental purposes.” (US House, 1998, p. 19)  Therefore, offsets and other 
discriminatory trade practices are permitted in government trade. 
b. Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)   
First entered into force in 1981, the GPA was most recently amended in 
1996.  The purpose of the GPA was to continue to open government business to 
international competition by increasing transparency in “laws, regulations, procedures, 
and practices” pertaining to government procurement and further reduce barriers to trade.  
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Article XVI specifically addresses and excludes offsets from government procurement 
stating, “Entities shall not, in the qualification and selection of suppliers, products or 
services, or in the evaluation of tenders and award of contracts, impose, seek or consider 
offsets.” (WTO, 1996)   
However, several factors limit the effectiveness of the GPA in reducing 
and removing offsets and related barriers to trade.  First, the GPA is considered a 
“plurilateral” agreement and nations are not required to participate prior to joining the 
GATT/WTO.  Therefore, the only nations bound by the GPA are those that choose to 
sign the agreement.  (Fewer than 30 nations have acceded to the GPA compared to more 
than 130 countries that have acceded to the WTO.)12  Second, the GPA permits nations to 
determine which types of government procurement are covered by the agreement.  Third, 
the GPA establishes different monetary thresholds for various types of government 
purchases.  Fourth, the same GPA Article XVI that excludes offsets explicitly states that 
developing countries wishing to join the GPA may negotiate “conditions for the use of 
offsets” as part of their accession agreements.  Finally, and most significantly, GPA 
Article XXIII permits exceptions for “procurement indispensable for national security or 
for national defence purposes.” (WTO, 1996)  As a result, offsets and other 
discriminatory trade practices are permitted in defense trade. 
c. Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (TCA)   
Entered into force in 1980, the TCA was last updated in 1987 and, like the 
GPA, undertook action to enhance transparency and reduce trade restrictions for products 
relating to civil aviation.  TCA Article 4.3 states, “the purchase of products covered by 
this Agreement should be made only on a competitive price, quality and delivery basis.”  
(WTO, 1987)  In a separate 1992 agreement between the US and the EU entitled 
                                                 
12 According to the WTO, parties to the GPA (committee members) include the following:  Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Communities, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong 
China, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Netherlands 
with respect to Aruba, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States.  As of 2003, countries negotiating accession include:  Bulgaria, Estonia, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Latvia, Panama, Chinese Taipei.  Observer governments include:  Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, 
Cameroon, Czech Republic, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Mongolia, Oman, Panama, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey.  
(www.wto.org accessed 10 July 2003.) 
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“Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the European 
Economic Community Concerning the Application of the GATT Agreement on Trade in 
Civil Aircraft on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft,” the parties agreed to interpret Article 4.3 
as prohibiting offsets:  
the signatories agree that Article 4.3 does not permit Government-
mandated offsets.  Further, they will not require that other factors, such as 
subcontracting, be made a condition or consideration of sale.  Specifically, 
a signatory may not require that a vendor must provide offset, specific 
types or volumes of business opportunities, or other types of industrial 
compensation.  Signatories shall not therefore impose conditions requiring 
subcontractors or suppliers to be of a particular national origin. (Verzariu, 
2000, p. 22)   
Like the GPA, TCA accession is voluntary and currently limited to 26 member nations.  
The TCA does not address military aircraft. 
d. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
Entered into force in 1994, NAFTA created a free trade area between 
Canada, Mexico, and the US.  A primary purpose behind NAFTA and similar free trade 
agreements (e.g. EU, AFTA, etc.) is to eliminate tariffs in substantially all trade between 
the parties.  This is encouraged by the GATT/WTO and extends WTO objectives beyond 
simply identifying and lowering tariffs.  However, like the GATT and GPA, NAFTA 
permits offsets for purposes of defense and national security. (US House, 1998, p. 21) 
3.  Market Structures and Trade Flows 
Market structure may also influence the use of offsets along with other trade 
barriers and practices.  Markowski and Hall argue that results from market competition 
result in “best outcomes” if certain necessary and sufficient conditions are met (e.g., 
“well informed agents; no barriers to entry or exit; no cost or benefit spillovers”), but that 
these “often do not apply in markets for major items of defense equipment.” since 
suppliers experience barriers to market entry. (Markowski and Hall, 1998, p. 25)  Brauer 
and Taylor as well as Markowski and Hall also note that markets operate imperfectly, 
particularly defense markets which typically have few buyers and sellers and operate 
within an oligopolistic structure where transactions are complex and information is 
22 
asymmetric. According to Taylor, these conditions allow “for moral hazard and adverse 
selection.”13 (Taylor, 2002, 12, Brauer, 2002, p. 6) 
Offsets alter trade flows.  Imports and exports are no longer regarded as 
independent events, but are “linked” or “bundled” together.  In tracing the history of 
offsets and related compensatory transactions, Verzariu writes of this concept of “linked 
import/export exchanges,” Noting that “[m]anaged or conditioned trade involving 
contractually-enforced reciprocity commitments has always existed in international 
commerce,” he refers to the time following World War I as the “modern era of 
compensatory trade” which “began when linked import/export exchanges helped the 
German economy.” This type of compensatory trade continued after World War II to aid 
the European economies with such devices as “bilateral clearing arrangements” which 
provided “for the exchange of goods under government-to-government arrangements.”  
In 1961, the term offsets first appeared in usage as a tool whereby the US “pressed West 
Germany to offset the foreign exchange costs of keeping U.S. troops in Germany by 
buying American weapons.” (Emphasis added, Verzariu, 2000, p. 2)   
4.   Contextual Fit of Offsets in International Trade 
Brauer, Taylor, and others argue that offsets may have a role in promoting welfare 
for buyers14 particularly given the oligopolistic market structures and imperfect 
information that exist within many government and defense transactions.  Figure 2 
identifies separate sectors for government and defense trade sectors and highlights offsets 
as occurring internationally within some parts of these two sectors as well as in some 
                                                 
13 Hazards to exchange or simply “exchange hazards” are practices that impede free and open 
exchanges.  Exchange hazards include imperfect information as well as “moral hazards” and “adverse 
selection.”  In this context, a “moral hazard” occurs when a seller exerts less effort after a buyer agrees to a 
transaction and results from the seller misleading a decision maker with distorted information.  “Adverse 
selection” entails the buyer making a less than optimum choice due to seller misrepresentations or 
information that is hidden either intentionally or unintentionally.  According to Taylor, “Exchange hazards 
tend to increase as the market structure approaches oligopoly.  Oligopoly and monopoly markets are more 
susceptible to exchange hazards because many of the goods and services in these markets embody high 
technology and tacit information.”  (Taylor, 2002, p. 11) 
14 Taylor cites Singer, “When oligopolistic multinational firms are key decisionmakers, it would be 
foolhardy for a developing country to proceed with policy on the basis of traditional models of pure 
competition, perfect markets, and comparative advantage.” (Singer and Tandon. 1991. p. 142 in Taylor 
2002, p. 2)  Brauer quotes Martin and Hartley, “in a world of imperfect markets, oligopoly rents, complex 
transactions and asymmetrical information, offsets might enhance the welfare of the purchaser.”  (Martin 
and Hartley, 1995, p. 127 in Brauer, 2002, p. 6) 
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segments of the non-governmental sector.  Additionally, in contrasting many sellers and 
many buyers outside of the realm of offsets, primary sellers on the domestic side are 
portrayed as limited and interdependent; the primary buyer is limited in number as well.  
Also, a linked import/export exchange may be created whereby the primary buyer may 
involve one or more secondary sellers in the transaction and the primary seller may 
involve one or more secondary buyers. 
 
 
Regional Trade Agreements:  





































Model of International Trade and Offsets
X = Primary Seller









































Figure 2:  Model of International Trade and Offsets – Placing Offsets 
in Context (After Lieberman and Hall, 2003, Mikic, 1998, and US 
Presidential Commission, 2001) 
 
D. SUMMARY  
Governments participating as buyers in the global marketplace adopt a variety of 
strategies designed to protect national interests as well as to enhance the transactional 
value of traded goods or services – particularly within economic sectors related to 
defense and national security.  Offsets are one of the many practices that nations use to 
protect as well as promote development of domestic, national interests.  Industry often 
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undertakes offsets as “a necessity dictated by market considerations, a competitive 
advantage, or an alternative to no trade.” (Verzariu, 2000, p. i) 
Chapter II has established a basic framework for understanding offsets in the 
context of international trade by defining offsets, discussing international trade in the 
global marketplace, and demonstrating how offsets fit.  The following chapters examine 
the early development of offsets (World War II to the mid-1970s), the development of 
DOD offset policy (1973-1980), the evolution of USG offset policy (1981-1990), and 
refinement of US offset policy (1991-2003). 
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III. POST WORLD WAR II TO MID-1970:  EARLY OFFSET 
DEVELOPMENT15 
As discussed in Chapter II of this study, international commerce has “always” 
included some form of “compensatory trade” or “contractually-enforced reciprocity.”  
The phrase “linked import/export exchanges” began to appear following World War I to 
describe “offset-like” practices that provided aid to the ailing German economy.  These 
types of compensatory practices were also employed following World War II to assist in 
the economic recovery of Europe. (Verzariu, 2000, p. 2) 
The GAO reported in 1984 that offsets, particularly in the form of co-production, 
“began in the late 1950s and early 1960s in Europe and Japan.”  (US GAO, 1984, “Trade 
Offsets,” Appendix I, p. 2)  In June 1999 testimony before the Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources of the House Committee on Government 
Reform, R. Roger Majak, Assistant Secretary for Export Administration for the DOC, 
pointed to the importance of these trade practices following World War II, stating that 
they “were justified on national security grounds -- co-production was needed to rebuild 
war-damaged defense industrial bases in Europe and Japan to enable them to resist the 
spread of communism.” (US House, 1999, p. 164)   
In an earlier report the GAO provides information on a wide variety of 
coproduction programs and licensing arrangements undertaken by the military 
departments from the late 1950s through the mid-1970s.  The discussion of advantages 
and disadvantages in this report parallel the description of offset advantages and 
disadvantages discussed in Chapter I of this study. (US GAO, 1975, “Coproduction,” 
Appendix I, pp. 7-8)  However, the only program referred to in the report as involving an 
“offset commitment” was the F-16 program that took place in 1975 and is more 
                                                 
15 In an interesting footnote in his book, Winning the Countertrade War, Schaffer observed that 
Canada had signed an agreement in 1956 similar to the offset agreements signed in the 1970s. (Schaffer, 
1989, p. 56)  This US-Canadian agreement is known as the Defence Production Sharing Arrangement 
(DPSA).  Through the DPSA, “Canada agreed to purchase integrated weapons platforms from the United 
States in return for privileged access to the American defence market.” (Fergusson, 1996, p. 110)  An 
argument could be made that DPSA is similar to an offset arrangement due to the element of reciprocity.  
However, DPSA lacks the specificity of offset agreements.  Fergusson notes that offsets did not become 
common in Canadian policy until 1976. (Fergusson, 1996, p. 132)  For further information on the DPSA, 
see http://www.dnd.ca/site/Reports/Budget01/Canada_US_b_e.htm. (Canada, 2001)   
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thoroughly treated in this chapter at Section D. (US GAO, 1975, “Coproduction,” 
Appendix I, pp. 13-18) 
Finally, the term “offset” was first applied as a specific practice in international 
trade in 1961, and each US administration between 1961 and 1975 employed offset 
“arrangements” with allies as one of a number of tools to help correct balance of payment 
problems.  The principal offset arrangement was between the US and the Federal 
Republic of Germany.  The US attempted, with varying degrees of success, to structure 
similar agreements with France, Italy, Japan, and Spain.  Also, State Department records 
during this period indicate the early emergence of the employment of offsets, albeit 
without success, as a tool to enhance the United Kingdom (UK) purchase of the F-111 
aircraft.  A 1974 DOD report also referred to the existence of unspecified offset 
arrangements that various elements within the DOD had concluded with Germany 
(1968), Norway (1968), and the UK (1971 and 1972). (Welsch, 1974, p. 1) 
A. THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
In the 1950s, the US economy was strong and growing.  Between 1950 and 1960, 
US GDP16 grew from $1,687 billion to $2,378 billion at an average real growth rate of 
3.17 percent (US DOC, BEA, 2003, “GDP”), while unemployment averaged 4.6 percent. 
(US DOL, BLS, 2003)  During this period, the USG aggressively opposed Soviet 
expansion and undertook several measures to strengthen involvement with Western 
European governments.  Among these efforts was the establishment of a massive Military 
Assistance Program (MAP).  Under MAP, the US transferred more than $10 billion in 
military equipment and services to Western European nations.  As European economies 
recovered from World War II during the late 1950s, the direct transfers provided under 
MAP were replaced by licensed production of US military hardware, including different 
types of fighter aircraft, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters.17 (Udis and Maskus, 
1996, p. 358) 
                                                 
16 All US GDP figures used in this study are based on 1996 dollars unless otherwise stated. 
17 Some authors refer to these licensed production arrangements between the US and various allies as 
early offset agreements.  However, these early licensed production arrangements were not “consciously 
structured” as offsets.  Therefore, the author of this study has opted to note the existence of these early 
licensed production arrangements, but not as offsets per se. 
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By the early 1960s, with the Soviet Union leading one sphere (the Warsaw Pact) 
and the US leading another (NATO), the world remained economically bi-polar in 
outlook.  Between 1961 and 1972, US GDP grew from $2,432 billion to $3,898 billion, 
with real growth of 4.38 percent. (US DOC, BEA, 2003, “GDP”)  During this same 
period, unemployment averaged 4.9 percent. (US DOL, BLS, 2003)  Economies 
throughout the world, particularly Europe, had gained strength at the expense and through 
the assistance of the US.  However, one of the greatest problems faced by the US was 
how to pay for growing commitments and share burdens for these commitments with its 
allies while maintaining a proper balance of payments.   
This issue of balance of payments between the US and foreign nations became a 
significant preoccupation for USG policymakers.18  Until 1972, the US dollar was tied to 
gold (one ounce of gold was equal to $35) and foreign exchange rates were largely fixed 
to the US dollar.  This placed a tremendous burden upon US domestic and international 
economic policy.  As economist Robert Schenk points out, “Throughout the 1950s and 
1960s the U.S. lost gold, and by the end of 1967 it had only one half of what it had had in 
mid-1949.” (Schenk, 1997)  US policy makers demanded these early offsets 
arrangements as a result of concerns regarding deficits in the balance of payments and 
outflow of gold from the US economy.  (Gavin, undated, p. 6) 
An editorial note in the State Department archives provides an interesting 
observation of this period. 
By 1969 the United States, the unipolar economic and military power in 
the early postwar world, now shared economic power, and to a degree 
military power, with Western Europe and Japan. The Nixon administration 
believed, however, that the members of the European Community, Japan, 
and the other industrial democracies in the G-10 and the OECD were not 
bearing their share of the responsibility for managing adjustments to 
economic imbalances and for providing international assistance and 
international security. (US State, 1969-1972 Volume IV, No. 279)19 
                                                 
18 A thorough discussion of balance of payments is considered beyond the scope of this study.   
However, at http://wueconb.wustl.edu/E1043S00/schenk/TitlePage.html, Professor Robert Schenk, an 
economist at Saint Joseph's College-Indiana, provides an overview of economics that includes relevant 
subjects such as the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement, fixed versus floating exchange rates, and balance of 
payments.  
19 According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), “The Group of Ten is made up of 
eleven industrial countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States) which consult and co-operate on economic, 
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B. US GOVERNMENT PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR ROLES 
During this period in offset development, members of the executive branch 
dominated USG participation.  State Department records indicate active involvement of 
the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury, and 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.  Additionally, the US Ambassadors to the 
UK and Germany participated in discussions relating to offsets with their host nations.  
Records indicate the formation of a Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments (Cabinet 
Committee) which addressed, inter alia, offset issues.  Also referred to in State 
Department documents were the Bureau of Budget (BOB, forerunner of the OMB) and 
the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA).  Both offices had limited involvement 
regarding Germany’s offsets, with the BOB coordinating reports with Treasury and the 
CEA concurring in recommended plans (US State, 1961-1963; 1964-1968 Volume VIII; 
1964-1968 Volume XII; 1969-1972 Volume III)  
In the US Congress, a few senators led by Senator Mike Mansfield approached 
solving the problem of balance of payments from another angle, urging reductions in 
numbers of troops stationed in Europe. (Bare, 1976, pp. 425-427)  The Jackson-Nunn 
Amendment to the 1974 Defense Appropriations Authorization Act which became 
section 812 of Public Law 155 (P.L. 93-155 Section 812) required a reduction in the 
numbers of troops stationed in Europe if the 1974 balance of payment deficit remained 
uncorrected.20 (US GAO, 1984, “Reductions,” pp. 1-2)  
The principal focus for all participants was to engage in discussions and 
negotiations with foreign counterparts to further offset arrangements in order to obtain a 
positive position regarding US balance of payments.  Treasury and the BOB were 
involved with monitoring and reporting to the President and others progress made in 
achieving a positive balance of payments. (US State, 1961-1963) 
                                                                                                                                                 
monetary and financial matters.” (http://www.bis.org/about/gten.htm )  Also, the OECD is the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development. (http://www.oecd.org) 
20 In May 1975, the President reported that the balance of payment deficit had been met.  Therefore, 
no US troop reductions were necessary. (US GAO, 1984, “Reductions,” p. 2) 
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In a 27 July 1962 report to President Kennedy on balance of payments, the 
aforementioned Cabinet Committee clearly stated the import of military offset 
arrangements over other forms of development assistance in achieving a proper balance 
of payments. 
United States objectives with respect to the other industrialized countries 
of the Free World include (a) arrangements for offsetting the dollar costs 
of United States military expenditures in such countries; and (b) an 
increase in, and improvement in the terms of, development assistance from 
other industrialized countries to the developing areas. Both these 
objectives are important to our foreign economic policy. However, it 
should be understood that under present circumstances military offset 
arrangements enjoy a clear priority over increased development assistance 
because of the immediate and direct benefits which this objective can 
bring to our balance of payments. Appropriate United States missions 
should be instructed accordingly. (US State, 1961-1963, No. 17) 
  
C. ACTIVITIES DURING THIS PERIOD  
Activities related to offsets during this period were, according to Udis and 
Maskus, confined primarily to the seven “offset” agreements between the US and Federal 
Republic of Germany.  However, government records also demonstrate similar initiatives 
with France, Italy, Japan, and Spain.  Government records also mention offset 
arrangements with the British government in relation to the proposed sale by the US to 
the UK of the F-111, as well as unspecified offset agreements with Germany, Norway, 
and the UK. 
1. German Offset Arrangement 
According to US State Department records the seven offset agreements signed 
between the US and Germany were initiated during the Kennedy administration in 1961 
as part of a larger plan to help balance of payment problems faced by the United States.  
These agreements were re-negotiated at approximately two-year intervals until the 
economic environment shifted in 1975 by the US decision to sever the link between the 
dollar and gold and “float” the dollar.21  Under these agreements, the US essentially paid 
for and provided a service, i.e., military security in Europe with the placement of six 
                                                 
21 Data on these agreements is available at various locations at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/ and 
was accessed 30 August 2003.  This US State Department website provides a gateway to obtain many 
declassified documents from the Truman through Ford administrations.  The topic of “German Offsets” is 
discussed throughout documents in the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations. 
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divisions in Germany. (Gavin, undated, p. 7, US State, 1964-1968 Volume VIII, No. 6)  
To mitigate the full burden borne by US taxpayers, Germany agreed to purchase US 
goods equal to some percentage (generally regarded to be 70-80 percent) of the cost of 
providing the six divisions.22   
An internal State Department memorandum from 24 March 1965 outlined some 
of the specific offset arrangements made with Germany in attempting to achieve “full 
offset of US defense expenditures of $1.35 billion for CY 1965-1966.”  (US State, 1964-
1968 Volume VIII, No. 55)  The primary goal was to obtain offsets by having Germany 
purchase US defense goods.  Another memorandum stated, “military purchases are 
conventionally accepted as true offsets.” (US State, 1969-1972 Volume III, No. 13)  This 
24 March 1965 memorandum continued to spell out details that indicated that the 
German Government wanted the US to “accept as offsets German purchases in other 
fields (e.g., Boeing aircraft sales to Lufthansa).” (US State, 1964-1968 Volume VIII, No. 
55) 
Another notable activity during the Johnson Administration involved a 
“complicated, 3-cornered deal” in March 1967, transferring from the US to the UK $100 
million in offset obligations owed by Germany.  Again, this transfer was made to cover a 
shift in receipts between fiscal quarters to cover a balance of payment shortfall.  (US 
State, 1964-1968 Volume VIII, No. 118)  What makes this transaction noteworthy is the 
introduction of trading in offset credits, a practice now prevalent in private industry. 
The total cost to Germany for these seven offsets arrangements exceeded $11 
billion, primarily involving procurement of US military equipment.  In July 1976, 
President Ford and German Chancellor Schmidt declared an end to these offset 
arrangements with a Joint Statement on Mutual Defense Issues. 
Given the recently introduced changes in the international monetary area, 
specifically flexible exchange rates, as well as the notably improved 
strength of the dollar and a more acceptable U.S. balance-of-payments 
position, the President and the Chancellor consider that the traditional 
                                                 
22 Interestingly, a “Record of Conversation” of a 30 June 1965 meeting between US and British 
officials indicated Germany had a similar offset arrangement with the UK to maintain the British Army of 
the Rhine (BAOR) for related security services. (US State, 1964-1968 Volume XII, No. 244) 
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offset arrangements approach has lost its relevance.  (US GAO, 1984, 
“Reductions,” p. 11) 
Arguably different than present day “offset arrangements,” the usage of this term 
does not equate to the working definition of offsets and is really a burden-sharing 
arrangement.  Nonetheless, these activities introduced the modern quid pro quo 
arrangements that emerged in 1973 as offsets in international trade.   
2. Offset Arrangements with France, Italy, Japan, and Spain  
Brief mention is made in State Department records of similar arrangements with 
France, Italy, Japan and Spain.  In 1962, USG negotiators attempted to establish an 
arrangement with the French for additional purchases of US military equipment, but were 
rebuffed by French officials who “stated that major increases in purchases from the U.S. 
will not occur, as long as the U.S. remains unwilling to sell equipment in the nuclear and 
missile fields.”  (US State, 1961-1963, No. 18) 
With Italy, negotiators did meet with modest success.  In October 1962, Secretary 
of the Treasury Dillon reported to President Kennedy that “Negotiations for an offset 
arrangement with Italy resulted in an Understanding, reached on 19 September 1962, that 
Italy will place initial orders for military equipment, approximating $100 million, with 
the U.S. Department of Defense within 30 days and that the U.S. will guarantee the 
availability of $100 million in credit assistance repayable over five years.”  (US State, 
1961-1963, No. 18) 
By January 1963, the President’s National Security Affairs staff opined that 
pursuing negotiations on offsets was “running into diminishing returns,” however 
recommended proceeding into negotiations for offset arrangements with Spain and Japan.  
(US State, 1961-1963, No. 19)  No further records of Spanish offset negotiations during 
this period were found.  Negotiations with Japan resulted in a less than anticipated 
outcome.  The Japanese proposed pursuing cooperative actions to help reduce balance of 
payments.  (US State, 1964-1968 Volume VIII, No. 179) 
3. Offsets as a Trade Tool with the United Kingdom 
In a 14 September 1967 telegram, Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, cautioned 
the US Ambassador to the United Kingdom, about the negative legislative impacts due to 
the Byrne Amendment which was incorporated into the 1968 Defense Appropriations 
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Bill.  Rusk warned that the law would not permit the use of appropriated funds for 
foreign construction of naval vessels.  He wrote, “This threatens right of HMG [Her 
Majesty’s Government] to bid on 16 minesweepers which Navy had previously selected 
as appropriate for HMG competition offset arrangement.”  He also seeks to reassure the 
Ambassador of USG commitments to fulfill already established offset arrangements.  
Rusk continues, “Further, we can convey assurance that nothing in Byrnes Amendment 
will prevent USG fulfilling the $325 million and supplementary offset targets.” 
(Emphasis added.  US State, 1964-1968, Volume XII, No. 276) 
On 16 January 1968, the British government notified the USG that the planned 
purchase of 50 F-111 aircraft from the US was cancelled.  The US Embassy and State 
Department officials as well as President Johnson used offsets as a principal tool during 
last minute communiqués as a mechanism to try and persuade the British government to 
sustain the purchase.  In discussions between staff officials from the US Embassy and 
British Ministry of Defense (MOD), offsets were mentioned as a key to helping Defense 
Minister Healey “materially … in holding the line.” (US State, 1964-1968 Volume XII, 
No. 283)  On 9 January 1968, Defense Minister Healey noted to US Embassy officials 
the helpfulness of earlier talks whereby USG officials agreed the “UK could keep 
Jetstream order, present offset arrangements.” (US State, 1964-1968 Volume XII, No. 
287)  Finally, President Johnson in a 15 January 1968 message to Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson addressing the consequences if the F-111 order was canceled wrote, “Retention of 
the present offset arrangements would become out of the question.”  (Emphasis added.  
US State, 1964-1968 Volume XII, No. 290) 
D. STATUTES, POLICIES, AND REGULATIONS DEVELOPED 
Other than the aforementioned reference to the 1974 Jackson-Nunn Amendment 
no other mention of offset related legislation was found in the literature.  Other than the 
aforementioned agreements, the brief discussion pertaining to possible offsets with the 
UK and notation of unspecified offset arrangements with Germany, Norway, and the UK, 
a review of the academic and government literature results in a negative finding of 
specific policies or regulations that pertain to offsets. 
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E. SUMMARY  
For the early part of this period, the US was the primary economic power in the 
West.  The world was on the gold standard with most currencies fixed to the dollar and 
the dollar fixed to gold.  The US economy was strong.  US GDP growth was steady and 
unemployment was decreasing.  Throughout this period, the USG used offsets as one of a 
number of mechanisms to help keep the US economy strong by countering balance of 
payment problems with its allies.  Various offices and agencies within the executive 
branch concerned with the balance of trade were involved in employing offsets.  The US 
Congress attempted to exert some control with respect to balance of payment deficits 
through the 1974 Jackson-Nunn Amendment, but at this point Congress had not exhibited 
concern about the issue of “ trade offsets.”  The concept of using offsets within defense 
trade, as defined in this study, surfaced in 1968; however the UK opted not to buy the F-
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IV. DEVELOPING A DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFSET 
POLICY (1973-1980) 
The first part of this period overlaps with the prior period, but focuses on the 
emergence of offsets as defined in this study and as the term is used in the conventional 
sense.  In the early 1970s, the US abandoned the gold standard and the link between the 
dollar and gold was broken.  Although economists continue to monitor this issue, the 
rationale for using offset agreements as an aid in resolving balance of payments issues 
was largely abandoned by the US.  For a number of years, Australia had been seeking 
innovative approaches to use its power as a defense equipment purchaser as a lever to 
influence the USG and US prime manufacturers to enhance Australian industry.  The 
1973 offset arrangement between Australia and the US opened the door to a number of 
offset transactions in which the USG actively participated alongside US industry.  
However, these transactions primarily affected DOD, with little USG involvement from 
other agencies during this eight-year period.   
However, DOD involvement in offsets was extensive and included negotiation of 
at least three major offset arrangements, participation as a guarantor for offset 
commitments, and development of policy and regulations pertaining to offsets.  Annual 
estimates of US offset obligations incurred during this period ranged from $1.5 to $5 
billion.23 (Nueman, 1985, pp. 197-198)  Direct DOD participation in offset arrangements 
declined at the end of this period with the incorporation of the Duncan Memorandum as 
part of defense procurement regulations in 1980.   
The US Trade Representative (USTR) also played a role during this period, 
attempting to address “problems caused by new trade practices, such as demands for 
                                                 
23 Neuman cites the lower figure from a Department of the Treasury report, “Offset/Coproduction 
Requirements in Aerospace and Electronics Trade.”  She writes, “The Treasury study reports on the 
findings of a survey of the Aerospace Industries Association and the Electronics Industries Association.  
Twenty-six companies reported a total of 143 contracts involving compensation trade agreements with a 
face value of $15.2 billion, signed between January 1, 1975, and the summer of 1981.  The twenty-six 
responding firms included most of the largest and most diversified manufacturers in the fields of aerospace 
and electronics.  Of these contracts, 120 (84 percent) valued at $14.2 billion were in the military sector of 
which offsets totaled $8.94 billion.  On the higher figure, Congressman Bruce F. Vento used this data to 
extrapolate and testify in 1984 that he believed annual offset commitments approached $5 billion.” 
(Neuman, 1985, pp. 197-198)   
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offsets.”  According to Charles H. Blum, Acting Assistant USTR for Industrial Trade 
Policy, US trade negotiators achieved some success in two agreements resulting from 
“the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) during the 1970s [that] 
dealt with offsets.”  The GPA and TCA, along with their appropriate offset provisions, 
were previously addressed in this study (Chapter II.C.2).  Blum argues that these 
agreements established “some discipline on demands for offsets” and “represented a first 
step toward establishing controls over demands for offsets.” (US House, 1984, “Impact,” 
pp. 45-46)  Although further discussion of these agreements is beyond the scope of this 
study, it is important to place these negotiations within the offset policy development 
context.  The Tokyo Ministerial meetings occurred in September 1973, and, as already 
indicated, the TCA and GPA entered into force in January 1980 and January 1981, 
respectively. 
A. THE ENVIRONMENT 
The beginning of this period was marked by tremendous change in the economic 
environment.  The US had abandoned the gold standard and shifted the dollar from a 
fixed to a floating exchange rate.  One offsets observer wrote that this period was marked 
by, “Disturbances in the international economy since 1973—rising oil prices, high rates 
of inflation and slow economic growth and trade.” (Neuman, 1985, p. 191)  US GDP 
grew from $4,123 billion (1973) to $4,901 billion (1980) with a real growth rate of 2.50 
percent largely due to a recession in 1974-1975. (US DOC, BEA, 2003, “GDP”)   During 
this same period, unemployment averaged 6.6 percent. (US DOL, BLS, 2003)  Some 
observers have provided retrospective analyses beginning with this period that examine 
specific economic sectors to determine factors affecting employment.  Dr. Robert Scott, 
an economist with the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), testified before the House 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources that US aerospace 
employment grew by more than 16 percent during this period, from 666,000 jobs (1974) 
to 775,000 (1979). (US House, 1999, p. 109) 
In 1983, the Department of the Treasury, with the assistance of the Aerospace 
Industries Association (AIA) and the Electronic Industries Association (EIA), conducted 
a survey of 26 aerospace and electronics companies involved in offsets.  This study, cited 
by GAO, reported offset obligations of $9.6 billion with 23 different countries resulting 
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from military sales totaling $14.3 billion between 1975 and 1981. (US GAO, 1984, 
“Trade Offsets,” Appendix I, p. 2)  Offset value accounted for slightly more than 67 
percent of the contract value.  Annually the average value of these offsets for this seven-
year period approached $1.4 billion. 
B. US GOVERNMENT PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR ROLES 
The number of USG participants in offsets during this period was limited, 
including significant executive branch involvement by various elements of the DOD and 
minor involvement by the legislative branch.  Offsets, per se, did not become a matter in 
which Congress engaged until 1981.  However, in December 1975, GAO reported to the 
House Committee on International Relations on “coproduction offsets” in conjunction 
with the F-16 aircraft purchase made by the four-nation consortium known as the 
European Participating Governments (EPG): Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
Norway.  This report, entitled “Coproduction Programs and Licensing Arrangement in 
Foreign Countries,” discussed a broad range of coproduction and licensing arrangements 
between the DOD and numerous foreign governments beginning in the 1950s through the 
mid-1970s.  The sole mention of offsets in this report was the discussion pertaining to the 
F-16 program. (US GAO, 1975, “Coproduction,” Appendix I, pp. 13-18)  Two further US 
GAO reports addressing the F-16 coproduction program that touched upon related offset 
commitments with the EPG were published in 1979.24   
Within the executive branch, DOD participants were particularly active in 
developing offsets policy and procedures.  In January 1973, the Defense Security 
Assistance Agency (DSAA), the DOD organization charged with oversight of the Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) program, published guidance on responding to requests for offset 
procurement.  The Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense signed three major offset 
agreements with Australia (1973), Switzerland (1975), and the EPG (1975).  The DOD 
Comptroller issued an audit report on offsets in 1974.  DOD procurement regulations 
were updated beginning in 1976 to include a discussion of procurements involving 
offsets.  Prior to publication of the Duncan Memorandum, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
                                                 
24 See "The Multinational F-16 Aircraft Program:  Its Progress and Concerns."  June 1979.  
GAO/PSAD-79-63 and "A New Approach is Needed for Weapons System Coproduction Programs 
Between the United States and Its Allies."  April 1979.  GAO/PSAD-79-24. 
38 
(DEPSECDEF) Clements issued an offsets policy in 1976.  Also, the role of DOD as 
guarantor of US industry commitments for certain sales involving offsets led to changes 
in US offsets policy.25  
C. ACTIVITIES DURING THIS PERIOD  
US DOD efforts were largely focused on “accommodating our allies’ need to 
develop their own defense industries.” (Schaffer, 1989, p. 53)  That this aided US 
industry in obtaining sales of US produced equipment to foreign nations was important, 
but secondary.  The literature highlights a number of different offset arrangements 
involving the USG that related to sales of major defense equipment.  A number of these 
transactions that led to significant offset arrangements involved the sale of guided-missile 
frigates (FFG) to Australia, F-16 aircraft to the EPG, and F-5 aircraft to Switzerland.  
These sales were important because they were linked to offset agreements.  Australia, 
Switzerland, and the EPG nations were the only countries listed in defense procurement 
regulations as having offsets with the USG.  The offset agreements with Australia and 
Switzerland were included in these regulations “for information purposes.”  The Swiss F-
5 aircraft deal, in particular, had implications for USG policy towards offsets. (Udis and 
Maskus, 1996, p. 359) 
1. Australian Offsets 
The first significant26 offset agreement in which the USG became involved was 
with Australia. (Schaffer, 1989, p. 49)  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Australia 
purchased “substantial quantities of defence materiel” from the US.  During this period, 
Australia pursued “some form of reciprocal purchasing” with the US in order to support 
                                                 
25 Regarding other executive branch involvement, Schaffer writes that, “In 1977, an offset department 
was established in the Pentagon Office of International Acquisitions, now an agency of the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense for Procurement.  Its purpose was to review offset proposals being negotiated by U.S. 
firms.” (Schaffer, 1989, p. 51)  This office is not discussed elsewhere in the literature.  Also, in 1981 
testimony before the House Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, John D. Lange, Jr., Director, Office 
of Trade Finance for the US Treasury, testified that “About three years ago when the Treasury staff began 
to get concerned about this issue, President Carter directed the Department of State to look into the notion 
of doing a multilateral agreement.”  However, during this period no other references were located in the 
literature pertaining to Treasury involvement in offsets. (US House, 1981, “Revitalization,” p. 555)  In 
providing oversight of the FMS program the State Department had an implicit role in monitoring offset 
activity and was provided brief mention in the Military Assistance and Sales Manual (MASM). 
26 According to a 1974 DOD Comptroller report, the offset target with Australia was $175 million 
(based on a $700 million sale) and surpassed offset targets set for other countries listed in this report.  
Those targets included $125 million for Germany, $50 million for Norway, and $45 million for the UK in 
two separate offset agreements.  (Welsch, 1974, p. 2) 
39 
“development of Australia’s defence-related industries.”  Australian missions visited the 
US in 1968 and 1969 to investigate possibilities for involving “Australian industry in US 
defence procurement.” (Markowski and Hall, 1996, p. 51)  In 1973, Australia concluded 
an offsets agreement with the USG to purchase three FFGs from the US.  DEPSECDEF 
Wayne P. Clements signed the offset agreement reflected in the 10 April 1973 
Memorandum of Discussion.  This memorandum stated that “the US DOD and industry 
agreed to meet an offset objective of up to 25 percent” on a “best efforts” basis. (32 CFR 
6-1310, 1 August 1981) 
The agreement established a hierarchy of preferred approaches to satisfying the 
offset agreement.  First, DOD would “look to those US firms benefiting substantially 
from an Australian order to carry the initial and primary burden of offset 
implementation.”  Second, if US firms were not able to meet these offset commitments 
then DOD would next offer Australian industry the opportunity to bid on selected 
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) or other defense-related supplies and 
equipment that Australian sources could provide on a competitive basis.   
(32 CFR 6-1310, 1 August 1981)  The Australian sources had to be competitive from the 
perspective of performance, quality and delivery and costs were not allowed to exceed 
comparable costs for producing the item in the US.27   
                                                 
27 In the mid-1970s timeframe, Australia initiated a competition for a New Tactical Fighter (NTF).  
As part of the NTF, the Australian DOD revised offset guidelines and published a “Guidance Paper” for 
NTF competitors.   This guidance increased the offset objective to “30 percent of the imported content of 
project costs.” (Markowski and Hall, 1996, pp. 50-52)  In October 1981, Australia selected the F/A-18 
aircraft.  Australia worked with the USG to structure a government-to-government purchase of 75 aircraft 
for $2.36 billion  This program included an offset agreement between the Australia and McDonnell-
Douglas, the builder of the F/A-18. (US OMB, 1990, p. 67)  DOD officials confirmed that the USG was not 
a party to the NTF offset agreement, as it was a commercial transaction.  (US House, 1982, “To Amend,” p. 
72)   
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2. Swiss Offsets 
During the mid-1970s, the Swiss agreed to purchase 72 F-5 aircraft from the US 
via a $340 million FMS agreement combined with a “quid pro quo” offset arrangement. 
(Udis, 1996, pp. 322-327)  In July 1975, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and his 
Swiss counterpart signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) whereby the US 
agreed to sell F-5 aircraft to Switzerland and to place “contracts on a competitive basis 
with Swiss industries” that would provide offsets of no less than 30 percent.  Similar to 
the agreement with the Australians, this MOU looked to those companies that would 
benefit the most from the sale to fulfill the offset commitment.  However, the MOU 
stated that the burden of meeting the offset was placed upon US contractors during the 
first two years and that every two years the agreement would be reviewed.  DOD agreed 
to “augment industry efforts” if the contractors did not meet their commitments during 
the first two years. (32 CFR 6-1310, 1 August 1981)  In effect, DOD “agreed to act as 
guarantor for the offset commitments entered into by the major US prime contractors.” 
(Udis and Maskus, 1996, p. 359)  Although the US contractors involved eventually met 
their offset obligations, the offsets program did not execute as quickly as planned and 
DOD was forced to intervene through direct purchase of Swiss goods and efforts “to 
encourage other USG acquisitions of Swiss products.”  The need for DOD intervention 
on this program led to the “Duncan Policy,” discussed below.28  (Udis, 1996, pp. 322-
329)  
3. EPG Offsets 
From a French perspective, the “birth of offsets” occurred as a result of a need by 
“north European NATO countries’ combat air fleets” to replace obsolete aircraft. (Hebert, 
1996, p. 139)  This occurred at about the same time that the US was deciding between the 
General Dynamics’ F-16 Fighting Falcon and the Northrop Cobra; the US selected 
General Dynamics29 and decided to build 650 F-16s in 1975. (Struys, 1996, p. 91)  The 
                                                 
28 In 1980, the governments of Switzerland and the US extended the MOU to purchase additional F-5 
aircraft.  This amendment was effective from mid-1983 to mid-1987.  The Swiss eventually purchased 38 
aircraft for $280 million.  This version of the MOU “implicitly recognized the impact of the Duncan 
Memorandum” by not requiring that DOD incur additional offset obligations.  However, purchases made 
by DOD, though not required, were captured as “offset credit.”  (Udis, 1996, pp. 327-328)  See also 51 FR 
46052 (23 December 1986) for specifics of this amendment and 53 FR 38171 (29 September 1988) for 
documentation on the removal of the Swiss MOU from defense procurement regulations.  
29 Lockheed-Martin is now the prime contractor for the F-16. 
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consortium also agreed to purchase “for $2.8 billion” (Schaffer, 1989, p. 50) 348 F-16 
aircraft in 1975. (Struys, 1996, p. 92)  This five-nation MOU signed by Secretary of 
Defense Schlesinger on 10 June 1975 (US GAO, 1975, “Coproduction,” Appendix I, p. 
13) adopted a different approach from that undertaken in the Swiss F-5 sale.  Instead of 
acting as a guarantor as in case of the Swiss F-5, the USG negotiated a multilateral 
coproduction30 agreement that obligated the F-16 prime contractor, “to establish offset 
projects in these countries.31  These obligations [consisted of] direct offsets relating to F-
16 components and parts to be sourced to these countries.” (Marvel, April 2001, p. 23)  
Specifically, the USG guaranteed participation by industry within the consortium of 10 
percent of the value of 650 F-16 aircraft32 purchased by the US Air Force, 40 percent of 
the value of all F-16 aircraft purchased by the consortium, and 15 percent of the value of 
all F-16 purchases by third countries. (Struys, 1996, pp. 91-95)   
D. POLICIES AND REGULATIONS 
During this period, two offsets policies were articulated at the highest levels 
within DOD.  DEPSECDEF Clements issued the first policy in November 1976 
highlighting the “present practice of discouraging offset procurement arrangements.”  
DEPSECDEF Charles Duncan issued the second policy in May 1978 stating, “DOD shall 
not normally enter into such [offset] agreements.” (DSAA, 1980, pp. C-12-13)  Both 
policies provided explicit guidance for entering into offset agreements if needed.   
Additionally, DOD put offset policies and procedures into place as part of the 
FMS program as early as January 1973 in the Military Assistance and Sales Manual 
(MASM).  The MASM preceded the Clements policy in discouraging offsets, but also 
listed a number of difficulties faced by foreign customers in pursuing offset arrangements 
                                                 
30 Economist and offsets observer Costas Alexandrides writes, “In USG administrative usage, 
coproduction is not an offset.”  (Alexandrides, 1987, p. 40)  Nonetheless, a number of offset observers 
including Stephanie Neuman argue that coproduction constitutes “government-sponsored offsets.”  She 
writes, “The term coproduction, however, itself implies some sort of government participation in offsets.” 
(Neuman, 1985, p. 203)  Nonetheless, these EPG nations were listed in defense procurement regulations as 
having offset agreements with the USG. (32 CFR 6-1310, 1 August 1981)  
31 An interesting argument that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger used with the EPG was that the 
production approach “would offset a large share of balance-of-payment costs through production within 
their own countries.” (US GAO, 1975, “Coproduction,” Appendix I, pp. 13-18) 
32 US GAO reported that the US would “maintain an autonomous capability” to eliminate 
“dependence on Consortium contractors.”  (US GAO, 1975, “Coproduction,” Appendix I, p. 16) 
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and established guidelines and conditions to follow if a foreign government wished to 
pursue an offset.   
Procurement regulations play a critical role in contracting.  Since offsets were 
linked to defense systems contracts, incorporating information on offsets as part of DOD 
procurement regulations was a natural evolution.  During this period, these procurement 
regulations evolved from the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) to the 
Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR) in 1978.  The ASPR and DAR were listed under 
Title 32, Chapter I, parts 1 through 39 of the CFR.  This thesis provides background on 
the inclusion of offsets within DOD procurement regulations and explores the 
development of offset-related provisions in these regulations.  The ASPR were amended 
in 1976 to include language on “Implementation of Offset Arrangements Negotiated 
Pursuant to Foreign Military Sales Agreements.” 
1.   Deputy Secretary of Defense Offset Policies  
a. The Clements Policy33   
DEPSECDEF Clements was familiar with offset arrangements.  He was a 
signatory to the 1973 Australian offset agreement and received a 1 November 1974 letter 
from the AIA that addressed offsets.  The letter was sent by Karl J. Harr, Jr., the head of 
AIA, requesting that the DEPSECDEF review a number of policies and practices relating 
to US industry participation in FMS, including the impact of offsets.  Mr. Harr wrote in 
the supporting statement that accompanied his letter, “Perhaps the most important 
development has been the impact of foreign competition and foreign government 
demands for offset procurement.” (Harr, 1974, p. 2)  DEPSECDEF Clements tasked the 
ASPR Council to examine defense procurement regulations.  Also, as Mr. Schelsinger’s 
deputy, DEPSECDEF Clements was likely involved in the 1975 Swiss MOU.  Therefore, 
it is not surprising that he would issue policy on this topic.  On 15 November 1976, he 
signed a memo entitled, “General Policy on Purchases by DOD from Foreign Sources in 
Furtherance of Government-to-Government Offset Agreements.”  The provisions of this 
                                                 
33 The author would like to express his appreciation to Mr. John J. Marini, Technical Director for the 
Security Assistance Directorate within the Navy International Programs Office for pointing to the 
“Clements Memorandum” as the first DOD policy pertaining to offsets. 
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memorandum were incorporated into FMS guidance issued by DSAA in the MASM. 
(DSAA, 1977, pp. C-11-12) 
Drawing upon language in the Australian Memorandum of Discussion, the 
Clements memorandum clarified that “offset agreements included any agreement by 
DOD to purchase items from a foreign country in order to offset some specific amount or 
percentage of the foreign country’s expenditures in the US for US defense items.”  Key 
provisions included designation of the Secretary (or Deputy Secretary) of Defense as the 
sole approving authority for DOD offset agreements, a requirement for negotiation prior 
to final acceptance of the government-to-government agreement, a statement that 
contractors benefiting from the sale are to assume the primary responsibility for offset 
fulfillment, assigning responsibility for marketing products within the US to foreign 
firms, and use of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) if an offset 
involved export of US technology or technical data. (DSAA, 1977, pp. C-11-14) 
b. The Duncan Policy   
As part of the Swiss MOU, DOD was forced to intervene in fulfilling 
offset obligations as a result of slower than anticipated performance of US contractors.  
The result was a memorandum issued on 4 May 1978 by DEPSECDEF Charles Duncan 
addressed to the Secretaries of the Military Departments titled “General Policy on 
Compensatory Coproduction and Offset Agreements with Other Nations.”  This policy 
severely limited the role of DOD in offsets allowing exceptions “of significant 
importance to [US] national security interests.” (DSAA, 1980, p. C-13)  As Udis and 
Maskus wrote, “This significant change in US offset policy was a direct consequence of 
the Swiss F-5 program.” (Udis and Maskus, 1996, p. 360) 
The Duncan Memorandum34 notes that offsets have “led to friction 
between allies when specified [offset] goals are not met or even approached.”  As a result 
of this “friction” and “the inherent difficulties in negotiating and implementing 
compensatory coproduction and offset agreements,” DEPSECDEF Duncan decided that 
“DOD shall not normally enter into such agreements.”  The memorandum also assigned 
responsibility to various DOD offices for reviewing any proposed agreements and 
                                                 
34 The Duncan Memorandum is included as enclosure 4 to DOD Directive 2010.6 of 5 March 1980.  
As of November 2003, this directive was active. 
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required a semi-annual report providing “the status of all existing and proposed 
compensatory coproduction and offset agreements” in order to “highlight the US 
financial obligation.” (US DOD, 1980, p. 27) 
In one of its earliest reports on offsets, GAO provided a summary of the 
policies and rationale for the Duncan Memorandum. 
Reasons for adopting the existing policy [the Duncan Policy] included (1) 
management complexities and resource drain on DOD in negotiating and 
implementing compensatory coproduction/offset agreements (2) such 
agreements had the effect, or created the impression, of obligating the 
USG to place orders for systems or components in foreign countries or of 
requiring DOD to force U.S. contractors to do so (3) a conviction that 
offset commitments were business judgments which should not involve 
DOD, and (4) once commitments were made by industry, the U.S. defense 
contractors, not DOD should assume responsibility to the foreign 
government for fulfilling the promised offset.  (US GAO, 1984, “Trade 
Offsets,” Appendix I, p. 1) 
 
2.   Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Policies 
Since 1970, DSAA35 has provided policy, direction, and oversight for the USG 
Security Assistance Program to include FMS.  DSAA published procedures for 
conducting FMS in the MASM between 1970 and 1984 and the Security Assistance 
Management Manual (SAMM) since 1 April 1984.  The January 1973 MASM was the 
oldest document in the government literature addressing defense offsets.  The MASM 
defined offset procurement as “the offering, on a selective case-by-case basis to foreign 
governments of opportunities to respond to selected DOD procurement requirements.” 
(DSAA, 1973, p. F-7)  
The MASM detailed a number of difficulties that foreign industry faced when 
competing for US business.  First, DOD did not believe that it had the need for a system 
that would make procurement from a foreign source economically beneficial.  Second, 
logistical considerations mandated that DOD retain the ability to mobilize the defense 
industrial base, an arrangement at odds with foreign sourcing.  Third, DOD was 
concerned about obtaining assurance of proper quality from foreign sources. Fourth, the 
                                                 
35 In September 1998 DSAA was assigned additional mission areas (e.g., demining, humanitarian aid, 
etc.) and was redesignated as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).  
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process by which DOD identified items suitable for procurement from foreign sources 
was cumbersome.  Fifth, DOD was required to apply “bid differentials” when considering 
bids for items DOD wanted to purchase from foreign sources.  The MASM stated that 
obtaining waivers to these bid differentials was difficult.  Finally, the MASM indicated 
that foreign producers faced “political and other pressures” from domestic competitors. 
(DSAA, 1973, pp. F-7-8)  
The MASM also contained three guidelines, two conditions, and a hierarchical 
approach when undertaking an offset arrangement.  As the MASM policy was signed 
during the same year as the Australian Memorandum of Discussion, the similarity of the 
guidelines, conditions, and approach is not surprising.  However, the MASM hierarchical 
approach added that the least preferred alternative to fulfill offset commitments was 
through “items not directly related to the equipment being sold,” more commonly 
referred to as indirect offsets.  The MASM also suggested foreign participation in 
Interdependent Research and Development projects as another approach to fulfilling 
offset obligations. (DSAA, 1973, pp. F-8-9) 
In June 1977, DSAA added a significant section to a chapter entitled “DOD 
Procedures in Offset Agreements” incorporating the provisions of the Clements 
Memorandum, and, in December 1980, DSAA updated this section of the MASM to 
reflect the contents of the Duncan Memorandum.   
3.   Procurement Regulations 
The introduction of offsets as part of defense procurement regulations in 1976 
was partially influenced by a May 1974 DOD Comptroller report on offset arrangements 
and by a November 1974 AIA letter to DEPSECDEF.  On 29 May 1974, DOD 
Comptroller sent a report on offset arrangements to the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Installations and Logistics) and DSAA.  This document reported numerous findings 
relevant to the formulation of offset policies and practices within the USG.  The report 
stated that no single activity in DOD was responsible for engaging in offsets and that 
DOD lacked a standard system to track and report on progress against fulfilling offset 
obligations.   
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The report also cited concern regarding the ability of DOD to effectively 
implement offset arrangements.  For example, the reported stated that the participants in 
offset arrangements lacked criteria for obtaining credit for offset transactions.  The report 
found that the Naval Air Systems Command had implemented an offset arrangement with 
Germany and directed relevant industries to report progress as offset obligations were 
met; DSAA36 implemented the offset arrangement with Norway, but required quarterly 
progress reports from the US Military Departments involved in these transactions; and no 
procedures existed “in final form” for offsets with the UK. (Welsch, 1974, pp. 2-3) 
The report provided three recommended actions.  First, the report stated that 
appropriate offices within DOD should develop policies and procedures for 
implementation of all future offset agreements.  Second, the report recommended that 
DOD develop a complete and standard system to identify, record, and report purchases 
under offset arrangements.  Third, the report recommended that DOD establish criteria to 
negotiate offset parameters.  The report noted that offices within DOD were staffing a 
draft instruction to implement these recommended actions. (Welsch, 1974, pp. 3-4)  
According to DAR Council records, this draft instruction resulted in a 12 December 1974 
memorandum requesting that the ASPR Council establish a new section in the ASPR to 
address offsets.  
During this same timeframe, the aforementioned AIA letter was sent to 
DEPSECDEF Clements.  This letter was sent to the ASPR Council for further 
investigation and action.  In response to the DEPSECDEF tasking and the DOD 
Comptroller report, the ASPR Council proceeded to develop procurement policy and 
regulations pertaining to offsets between December 1974 and September 1976.  The 
ASPR Council obtained numerous comments from various US government agencies and 
industrial associations.   The development of these regulations was extended in order to 
provide sufficient time to address industry concerns as well as accommodate anticipated 
changes in the law as a result of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), enacted as P.L. 
94-329 on 30 June 1976.  To address offsets and other aspects of foreign procurement, 
the ASPR Council issued Defense Procurement Circular (DPC) 76-4 and added a new 
                                                 
36 The author notes that DSAA was not established until 1970.  According to DOD Comptroller 
report, the Norwegian agreement was signed with DOD prior to the establishment of DSAA in 1968. 
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section VI, part 13 to the 1976 version of the ASPR on 7 September 1976.  The updated 
1976 version of the ASPR articulated DOD policy, as follows:  
 
The policy of the DOD is that the U.S. contractor involved in the FMS 
and the foreign customer will make suitable arrangements to fulfill an 
offset agreement.  Only if it is determined that the offset agreement 
cannot be fulfilled in this fashion will the Department of Defense seek to 
fulfill the offset commitment from other defense procurements.  When 
practical, the U.S. prime contract shall be contacted and coordination 
obtained prior to the Government committing the U.S. prime 
contractor’s participation. (Section 6-1310.2(b)) 
 
On 23 March 1978, the ASPR was redesignated as the DAR.  The section of the 
ASPR/DAR on offsets experienced little revision until Defense Acquisition Circular 
(DAC) 76-25 was issued on 31 October 1980.  DAC 76-25 added another section to the 
DAR (6-1315) containing an informational copy of USG offset agreements with 
Australia and Switzerland.  This version of the DAR now contained three principal 
sections that specifically addressed offsets:  a policy and procedures section (6-1310), a 
section containing offset agreements (6-1315), and a section on similar agreements with 
NATO allies (6-1406).  Most of these NATO agreements contained statements noting the 
existence of offset arrangements in the broader context of an overall cooperative 
relationship.  Another significant part of the DAR (6-1304.2(a)(iii)) indicated that “costs 
associated with the implementation of DOD offset arrangements”  were recoverable as a 
cost of doing business with a foreign government. (32 CFR 6-1310, 6-1315, 6-1406, 6-
1304, 1 August 1981) 
E. SUMMARY  
A number of situations influenced the development of US policies and procedures 
relating to offsets from 1973 to 1980 when the Duncan Memorandum was incorporated 
into the MASM and the DAR.  First, the US economy had moved from the gold standard; 
the exchange rate for the dollar was no longer fixed and was permitted to float.  As a 
result, ensuring that the US was able to maintain a strong dollar through a positive 
balance of payments was no longer of paramount importance.  Foreign governments 
desiring indigenous defense capabilities and recognizing this situation pressed for greater 
consideration of and participation by their industries in the US procurement system, 
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particularly when the foreign government made major purchases of US defense goods 
and services.   
Second, oil prices and inflation increased, unemployment was high, and the US 
experienced a recession in 1974-1975.  The US sought approaches to support 
international sales and reinvigorate trade that would help counter slow economic growth.  
Trade offsets provided an approach that responded to both situations.  Offsets provided 
the US with a mechanism to positively respond to allied needs for building a domestic 
defense infrastructure while at the same time supporting US industry.  Offsets also 
offered US industry a competitive advantage in international competitions throughout the 
world.  And, although some smaller areas of the labor force were immediately affected 
(e.g., the US machine tool industry was negatively affected due to the influx of Swiss 
competition resulting from the Swiss F-5 offsets), overall employment in the aerospace 
sector where the effects of offsets were concentrated (and later were linked most clearly) 
increased between 1974 and 1979 by more than 16 percent.   
Although the three GAO reports published in 1975 and 1979 mentioned offsets in 
conjunction with defense trade, legislators remained largely unaware of the effects of 
offsets on their constituents and, thus, were not yet inclined to address offsets as an issue.  
Similarly, most agencies in the executive branch were not engaged in offsets.  By 
contrast, DOD was intensely involved with offsets throughout this period, particularly at 
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense levels.  DOD offset policies and 
procedures developed concurrently and evolved with the establishment of various offset 
agreements.  Additionally, contractors involved in fulfilling offsets as well as industry 
associations such as AIA influenced the development of DOD offset policies and 
procedures.   
Despite statements that the USG “encouraged the use of offsets” (US House, 
1998, p. 10) during this period, a review of the policies and regulations between 1973 and 
1980 suggests a differed picture.  Direct DOD involvement in offset agreements was 
discouraged as a consequence of the MASM (1973), the Clements Policy (1976), the 
Duncan Policy (1978), and, finally, inclusion of the Duncan Policy provisions in the 
MASM in December 1980. 
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V. USG OFFSET POLICY EVOLUTION (1981-1990) 
By 1981, offsets were used with increasing frequency by foreign governments 
purchasing defense articles and services.  All countries involved in trade as defense 
exporters incurred offset obligations; however, the US had the largest share of defense 
exports and therefore the largest number of offsets.  Concerns about the effect of offsets 
began to increase as unemployment increased and economic growth declined.  The US 
Congress began to take an active interest in understanding, examining and countering the 
negative effects of offsets.  Numerous agencies within the USG began to publish reports 
pertaining to the effects of offsets on the US relating to technology transfer, the economy 
and employment, particularly aerospace employment.  The “Duncan Policy” provided a 
starting point for developing an offsets policy within the USG.  Congressional hearings, 
executive branch reports, legislation, executive orders, and regulations pertaining to 
offsets emerged.  This period culminated with publication of the “USG Policy on Offsets 
in Military Exports” in April 1990.   
A. THE ENVIRONMENT 
Between 1981 and 1990, US GDP grew from $5,021 billion to $6,708 billion, 
with the growth rate fluctuating widely from -2.03 (1982) to 7.27 percent (1984), but 
with a real growth of 3.52 percent. (US DOC, BEA, 2003, “GDP”)  During this same 
period, unemployment ranged between 9.7 (1982) and 5.3 (1989) percent, averaging 7.1 
percent, slightly worse than the 6.6 percent unemployment for the previous period. (US 
DOL, BLS, 2003)  In contrast, the EPI reported growth in US aerospace employment of 
more than 22, percent from 775,000 jobs (1979) to almost a million aerospace jobs 
(1989) before settling at 946,000 (1990) jobs at the end of this period. (US House, 1999, 
p. 109) 
The US International Trade Commission (USITC) conducted an industry survey 
in 1985 that captured information on offset agreements between 1980 and 1984.  OMB 
used this data in its first report on offsets, published in 1986.  OMB, in conjunction with 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) within the DOC, initiated a more 
comprehensive survey, with industry of military exports and related offset agreements 
between 1980 and 1987.  This second survey reported offset obligations of $20 billion 
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with 30 different countries resulting from military sales totaling $35 billion between 1980 
and 1987. (US OMB, 1990, pp. 121-123)  Offset value accounted for slightly more than 
58 percent of the contract value.  The average annual value of these offsets for this eight-
year period increased from $1.4 billion during an eight-year timeframe in the previous 
period to $2.5 billion. 
B. US GOVERNMENT PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR ROLES 
Offset policy development expanded significantly between 1981 and 1990, with 
five major participants emerging from the legislative and executive branches of the USG.  
From the legislative branch, Congress and GAO began to earnestly engage in offset 
policy in the early 1980s.  From the executive branch, DOD continued its involvement in 
offsets as modified in 1978.  However, as a result of legislation, the President and the 
OMB were also thrust into the middle of offset discussions, while a number of other 
executive branch participants played minor, but important supporting roles relating to 
offsets.  These participants included the DOS, DOC, Department of Treasury (Treasury), 
USITC, and USTR.37 38  During this period, the President designated OMB to lead a 
Coordinating Committee to examine and provide a report on offsets with principal 
members from DOC, DOD, DOL, and Treasury.   (US GAO, 1986, “Military Exports: 
Analysis,” p. 5)  However, GAO observed “little joint coordination” on offsets among 
these agencies: “There is little coordination among the agencies studying offsets, and no 
single federal agency has taken the lead to ensure that the various U.S. interests are 
served when a U.S. firm makes an offset commitment with a foreign government.” (US 
GAO, 1984, “Trade Offsets,” Appendix I, pp. 2-3) 
1. Congress  
Together, the Senate and House considered a number of offset-related bills and 
eventually passed legislation that mandated gathering, monitoring, reporting and studying 
information on the impact of offsets in defense trade.  Congress also passed legislation 
directing the President to develop an offsets policy and to negotiate with US trading 
                                                 
37  Some sources refer to the US Trade Representative as the Special Trade Representative (STR).  
38 Other participants mentioned infrequently in offsets literature include the DOL, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), CEA, and National Security Council (NSC).  (US GAO, 1986, “Military Exports: 
Analysis,” p. 5) 
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partners to identify multilateral solutions on offsets.  Throughout this period, Congress 
received a number of GAO reports and conducted hearings that pertained to offsets.  The 
first GAO product to provide a substantive treatment of offsets was contained in a June 
1982 report to the Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance, and Security 
Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, entitled, “U.S. Security and Military 
Assistance:  Programs and Related Activities.”  This report included offsets as a type of 
activity that supports foreign governments and addressed USG offsets, US industry 
offsets, and current governmental activities regarding offsets. (US GAO, 1982, pp. 82-84)  
GAO updated the report in September 1985 and December 1988.  GAO also provided the 
US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and US House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
a June 1983 report titled “Assistance to Israel” which contained some general information 
pertaining to offsets. (US GAO, 1983) 
Within the House, five different subcommittees received two reports and one 
briefing from GAO and conducted eleven hearings that included substantial discussions 
pertaining to offsets.  The Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the Committee on 
Banking, Financing, and Urban Affairs was particularly active throughout this period.  In 
addition to holding the first hearing within Congress to address offsets, this subcommittee 
conducted five additional hearings on this topic between 1981 and 1989.  This 
subcommittee conducted a hearing on offsets in September 1981 as part of a larger series 
of hearings on “Revitalization and the US Economy,” received an April 1984 GAO report 
titled “Trade Offsets in Foreign Military Sales,” conducted hearings on the “Impact of 
Countertrade and Offset Agreements on the US Economy” in May 1984, held hearings on 
offsets in July 1985 as part of a series of hearings related to “US Trade and 
Competitiveness,” conducted hearings in June 1986 on “Offset Agreements,” and 
included discussion of offsets in May 1989 hearings on the “Defense Production Act 
Amendments of 1989 (H.R. 486).”   
The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce conducted a series of four hearings in October 1985 on “Foreign Military 
Sales and Offsets” and obtained a GAO Briefing Report entitled “Military Exports: 
Analysis of an Interagency Study on Trade Offsets” in April 1986.  Two Subcommittees 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs – International Economic Policy and Trade and 
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Arms Control, International Security and Science – held two hearings during June and 
July 1987 regarding “Countertrade and Offsets in International Trade.”  Finally, the 
Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of the Committee on Government 
Operations requested a review of a 1988 OMB Offsets Report as part of an overall review 
of the US Defense Industrial Base.  GAO responded with a subcommittee briefing on 
offsets in April 1989. (US GAO, 1990, “Defense Production,” p.11) 
The Senate requested and received few reports on offset related matters.  
Testimony before the Senate on offsets was confined to hearings in November 1989, 
March 1990, and July 1990 before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs involving the reauthorization of the Defense Production Act (DPA).  Also, in 
April 1990, Senator Alan J. Dixon (D-IL) requested and received a GAO report entitled, 
"Defense Production Act:  Offsets in Military Exports and Proposed Amendments to the 
Act."   
2. General Accounting Office (GAO) 
GAO conducted investigations into offsets and related areas as requested by 
congressional committees and subcommittees as well as individual members of Congress.  
During this period, GAO produced the three aforementioned reports directly relating to 
offsets in 1984, 1986, and 1990 and provided testimony on offsets at six different 
congressional hearings.  In general, GAO findings were similar, albeit at a federal level, 
to the 1974 findings of the DOD Comptroller, i.e., the USG lacked a comprehensive 
policy, a central focal point, and a database to gather information on offsets.  
Additionally, GAO was critical of the practice of using grant funds to pay for offsets in 
the sale of US defense goods. 
3. The President  
President Reagan issued three Executive Orders (EO) to implement offset related 
provisions in the law.  These included signing EO 12521 in June 1985 and EO 12649 in 
August 1988 which implemented offset-related provisions of the DPA enacted in April 
1984 and October 1986, respectively.  These orders delegated to OMB responsibility for 
preparing the DPA 309 report and for collection of offsets data, first, by the USITC, and, 
second, by the BEA.  EO 12661 implemented the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act (OTCA) of 1988 and trade-related provisions found in other laws including the 
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National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 1989.  Interestingly, no mention of 
offsets was made with respect to the OTCA, but certain offset-related negotiating 
functions were jointly delegated to the Secretary of Defense and the USTR.  
Additionally, President Bush issued the USG policy pertaining to offsets in military 
exports. 
4. Department of Defense (DOD) 
DOD published a report on International Cooperation and Industrial Participation 
Arrangements in August 1983 and the Defense Policy and Advisory Committee on Trade 
(DPACT) provided a report in December 1983.  DOD updated the DAR which became 
the Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS) in April 1984 and other offset-related changes 
evolved in the DFARS through November 1990.  DSAA published revised guidance for 
the Security Assistance Program in April 1984 which replaced many of the specific 
procedures with a simple policy statement that echoed the Duncan Policy.  Also, in 1984, 
DOD entered into an offset agreement with the Netherlands.  Finally, in 1989, DSAA 
imposed limitations on the use of offsets during competition for the Korean Fighter 
Program (KFP). 
5. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Other Executive 
Branch Agencies  
a. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
OMB was responsible for producing reports on offsets in response to 
presidential direction and, in this regard, coordinated the efforts of various departments 
within the Executive Branch.  Some confusion exists regarding the dating and sequencing 
of the six reports that OMB produced in response to Section 309 of the DPA between 
1985 and 1990.  The first report, dated December 1985, was published in February 1986, 
the second report, dated December 1986, was published in February 1987, and the third 
report, dated December 1987, was published in January 1988.  A summary of the first 
three reports was published in December 1987, the fourth report, dated December 1988, 
was published in January 1989, and the fifth report, dated April 1990, was published in 
July 1990.  The fourth and fifth reports also responded to reporting requirements found in 
Section 825(d) of the NDAA of 1989.  According to Udis and Maskus, these OMB 
reports concluded “that the impact of offsets on the US economy and defense technology 
base had been relatively minor.” (Udis and Maskus, 1996, p. 361) 
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b. Other Executive Branch Agencies 
A number of other agencies, including the USTR, DOS, DOL, and DOC 
participated in studies.  However, the only other specific offset policy products were a 
May 1983 report by Treasury, an analysis on offsets conducted in 1982 by the USITC, 
and an initial survey of industry regarding offsets that was conducted by USITC between 
1984 and 1985.  
C. LEGISLATION AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
Prior to 1981, provisions pertaining to trade offsets were not included in 
legislation or reports from Congress.  However, between May 1981 and November 1989, 
several bills containing offset provisions were introduced and five were enacted into law.  
These provisions affected laws contained in three different titles of the US Code (U.S.C.):  
Title 50 (War and National Defense), Title 10 (Armed Forces), and Title 15 (Commerce 
and International Trade).   
Of the five offset-related bills that became law, two are significant.  Offset 
reporting requirements were introduced in the DPA Amendments of 1984 in Section 4 of 
P.L. 98-265 which added Section 309 of the DPA (referred to as 50 U.S.C. Appendix 
(App.) 2099).  Also, P.L. 100-456, the NDAA for FY89, in Section 825 added 
requirements to 10 U.S.C. Section 2505 for the US President to develop an offset policy 
and open negotiations with other countries to reduce adverse affects of offsets and for 
industry to report on contracts containing offset arrangements.39  Both of these laws were 
further amended during this period.  It is also worth noting that Section 2205 of P.L. 100-
418 OTCA of 1988 amended 15 U.S.C. App. 4712 to establish a requirement for an 
interagency group on countertrade.  Congress required that the executive branch form this 
group to make recommendations on countertrade and offsets. 
1. Title 50 and Defense Production Act (DPA) Amendments of 1984 and 
1986 (P.L. 98-265 and P.L. 99-441) 
The purpose of the DPA is to enhance the defense industrial base and ensure that 
the industrial base is prepared for defense mobilization in the case of national emergency.  
In May 1981, the President signed P.L. 87-47 which extended the DPA through 30 
                                                 
39 On 23 October 1992, offset provisions under 10 U.S.C. Section 2505 were redesignated as 10 
U.S.C. Section 2532. 
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September 1982.  The report (No. 97-48) that accompanied the legislation put in place an 
important reporting requirement. 
Representative Bruce F. Vento of Minnesota proposed that the 
Subcommittee [on Economic Stabilization of the US House Committee on 
Banking, Financing, and Urban Affairs] also examine the effect of “offset” 
demands from other countries purchasing U.S. military equipment and 
other items.  He said that foreign countries are increasingly insisting that 
as a condition of such sales American firms compensate by subcontracting 
overseas, setting up production facilities, transferring technology, 
licensing manufacturers and other actions.  The effects of such “offsets” 
on the U.S. economy and national security are not clear and may well be 
adverse to U.S. defense production.  For this reason, the Committee 
believes the Department of the Treasury should continue its present effort 
to collect all available data from government and industry to evaluate this 
potential problem.  (US House, 1981, “Extension,” p. 5)   
Four months later, in September 1981, the Subcommittee on Economic 
Stabilization of the Committee on Banking, Financing, and Urban Affairs resumed a 
series of hearings on “Revitalization and the US Economy.”  A single hearing was set 
aside to address the topic of offsets and on 24 September 1981, John D. Lange, Jr. 
(Director, Office of Trade Finance, US Treasury) and Colonel Ronald L. Carlberg 
(Director, International Acquisitions, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense) provided 
testimony before the subcommittee.  This was the first hearing held within the US 
Congress directly addressing offsets.  The chair was Representative Vento (D-MN).  In 
opening the hearings, Congressman Vento observed that “Apart from the instructions to 
the Department of the Treasury in the subcommittee report on the Defense Production 
Act in 1981, this is the first Congressional attention to the problem of offsets and foreign 
military sales that I am aware of.” (US House, 1981, “Revitalization,” p. 483) 
These hearings were significant in opening to public debate the subject of offsets 
in defense trade.  In particular this hearing provided insight into the varying positions 
held by different agencies within the USG.  For example, Lange noted the Treasury 
position that offsets were a concern that needed examination.  “We at Treasury are 
concerned that the United States has paid inadequate attention to this phenomenon, and 
has too little information on what its economic effects may be or what, if anything, 
should be done about it.” (US House, 1981, “Revitalization,” p. 490)  On the other hand, 
Carlberg stated that the main concern for DOD was to protect its right to require domestic 
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production of equipment designs procured abroad.  “We will want to retain our 
prerogatives to require defense production of foreign-designed equipment in the United 
States.” (US House, 1981, “Revitalization,” p. 493)   
During the next legislative session (97th Congress, 2nd Session), the House 
initiated efforts to extend the DPA.  The Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization 
discussed the proposed legislation, H.R. 5540, at hearings on 23 March 1982.  As 
reported at these hearings, the text of the bill did not contain provisions relating to 
offsets; however, Congressman Vento raised the issue of the impacts of offsets on 
“foreign source dependency” and the effect of offset agreements on production capacity. 
(US House, 1982, “To Amend,” pp. 59-60)  On 17 May 1982, H.R. 5540 was committed 
to the Committee of the Whole House with amended language to include offset 
provisions inserted by Congressman Vento.  The language proposed by Congressman 
Vento for insertion into 50 U.S.C. is provided below.  
(e)(1)(A)(i)  Any person signing a contract which involves the sale of any 
defense article or service for use by a nation other than the United States 
and which includes an offset agreement in excess of $5,000,000 shall file 
an annual report with the Secretary of the Treasury.  Each report shall 
include the total of all offsets, classified by the category of the defense 
material or defense services involved, entered into by such person during 
the three calendar years preceding the year in which such report is filed.  
The first such annual report shall be filed with the Secretary of the 
Treasury not later than June 1, 1983.  Subsequent annual reports shall be 
filed not later than June 1 of each year. 
(ii)  Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and not withstanding any 
other provision of law, including section 552 of title 5 United States Code 
(commonly known as the Freedom of Information Act), the Secretary of 
the Treasury shall not disclose, except to the Congress, any information 
required to be reported pursuant to this subparagraph. 
(B)  Not later than the first October 1 occurring more than ninety days 
after the date of the enactment of this subsection and not later than each 
October 1 occurring after such October 1, the Secretary of the Treasury 
shall submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of 
the Senate and to the Committee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs of 
the House of Representatives a report on the total number of contracts 
reported pursuant to subparagraph (A) and the total amount of offsets 
required by such contracts.  Such report shall contain a breakdown of 
offsets by category of defense material or defense services involved by 
recipient country. 
(2) For purposes of this subsection – 
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(A) the term ‘offset’ means any international transaction between a buyer 
that provides nonmonetary compensation which may include, but not be 
limited to, the transfer of production or technology to the buyer as a 
consideration for the purchase of a particular item or service; and 
(B) the term ‘person’ means any individual, sole proprietorship, 
partnership, or corporation. 
(3) This subsection shall cease to be effective five years after the date of 
the enactment of this subsection.”  (US House, 1982, “Defense,” pp. 8-10) 
 
On 1 October 1982 the House considered, amended and passed the senate version 
of the bill extending the DPA, S. 2375.  (The House did amend S. 2375 by extending 
DPA expiration to 31 March 1983.)  S. 2375 was enacted as P.L. 97-336 on 14 October 
1982.  (US House, 1983, “Summary,” pp. 90, 103-104)  In late March 1983, the Congress 
decided by voice vote to extend the DPA expiration date to 30 September 1983 and the 
President signed H.R. 2112 as P.L. 98-12 on 29 March 1983.  (US House, 1985, 
“Summary,” p. 30)  The language proposed by Congressman Vento was not included in 
the DPA.   
In mid-April 1983, the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization conducted 
hearings entitled “The Defense Industrial Base Revitalization Act” in order to amend the 
DPA.  In May 1983, the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs sent H.R. 
2782 to the Committee of the Whole House.  H.R. 278240 which contained the same 
offset provision found in H.R. 5540, the language proposed by Congressman Vento the 
previous year.  It added a further amendment to include language requiring that the 
Secretary of Defense report to the US Congress within 30 days of signing any document 
that pertained to “actual, planned, or potential offsets in defense sales contracts” that 
totaled more than $5 million.  (US House, 1983, “Defense,” Report 98-110 Part 2, p. 10)  
However, H.R. 2782 did not reach the floor for a vote and DPA authorities lapsed on 1 
October 1983.  In November 1983, Congress included an amendment to H.R. 3959, the 
                                                 
40 The bill number used during hearings and referred to in the report (No. 98-24) refers to H.R. 2057.  
Except for the new reporting requirement for the Secretary of Defense, H.R. 2782 contained the identical 
offsets language.  Interestingly, the “Summary of Activities” includes H.R. 2782, but not H.R. 2057 in its 
“Summary of legislation reported but not enacted.” (US House, 1985, “Summary,” p. ix)  However, the 
Legislative History of the law that was eventually enacted that included offset provisions (P.L. 98-265) lists 
both H.R. 2057 and H.R. 2782.  (CIS, 1984, P.L. 98-265) 
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supplemental appropriations bill enacted as P.L. 98-181 extending the DPA through 30 
March 1984. 
Finally, since language relating to offsets and a number of other provisions was 
not included in the Senate version of the 1984 DPA reauthorization bill, S. 1852, the 
Senate and House convened a conference committee to discuss and reach agreement 
regarding differences between their versions of the DPA in early 1984.  Congressman 
Vento, whose support for offset reporting language had been critical during the previous 
two years, participated in this Conference.  The Conference Report (No. 98-651) 
reflected agreement between the Senate and House on the DPA to include language 
pertaining to offsets and S. 1852 as amended was enacted into law (P.L. 98-265) on 17 
April 1984 with the first offset provisions included.41   
SEC. 309.  Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of the 
Defense Production Act Amendments of 1984, and annually thereafter, the 
President shall submit to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban 
Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate, a report on the impact of offsets 
on the defense preparedness, industrial competitiveness, employment, and 
trade of the United States.  Each such report shall include a discussion of 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations on offsets in international 
procurement and provide information on the types, terms, and magnitude 
of the offsets.  (USCAN, 1985, Vol. 1, P.L. 98-265, 98 Stat. 152) 
The “Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of the Conference” stated 
that the offset language was a “House-offered provision” and clarified the intent of the 
conferees regarding the specific information to be provided by the executive branch in 
the report on impacts of offsets. (USCAN, 1985, pp. 348-350)  The final language in P.L. 
98-265 retained an annual reporting requirement that included a requirement for reporting 
offset-related negotiations.  The $5,000,000 threshold and reporting requirements 
pertaining to the Secretaries of the Treasury and Defense were removed.   
                                                 
41 In 1985 Neuman observed, “Congressman Vento wrote the amendment to the Defense Production 
Act (section 309), April 1984, directing the president to submit a formal report of its (sic) findings to these 
questions.  The survey currently being conducted by the coordinating committee is in response to this 
mandate.  An earlier study on offsets requested by the committee appeared as: General Accounting Office, 
Trade Offsets in Foreign Military Sales, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, 
Committee on Banking Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, April 13, 1984 
(GAO/NSIAD-84-102).  According to one observer, this report was used by Congressman Vento to 
persuade Congress to pass his amendment to the Defense Production Act.”  (Neuman, 1985, p. 204) 
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Those changes notwithstanding, P.L. 98-265 put offsets in the public eye and 
made them a part of the lexicon of the Congress.  The Subcommittee on Economic 
Stabilization followed up this legislation with hearings on 22 May 1984 entitled “The 
Impact of Countertrade and Offset Agreements on the U.S. Economy” to more fully 
investigate these agreements with witnesses from the DOC, Treasury, and USTR.  Again, 
Congressman Vento expressed concern regarding offsets, “The lack of rational policy, 
data, and coordination on an issue which will affect what trade, defense, and industrial 
paths will be available to us in the future.” (US House, 1984, “Impact,” p. 9) 
By 1986, certain members of Congress had become dissatisfied with the “total 
inadequacy” of the response by the administration to the offset provisions in P.L. 98-265 
and the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization re-energized offset-related hearings on 
18 June 1986 with a broad range of experts from government and industry.  These 
hearings, entitled “Offset Agreements,” included a report from GAO that roundly 
chastised the executive branch for the poor quality of the first “Section 309 Report” 
produced by OMB.  GAO recommended that Congress make specific additions to the 
offset provisions in the DPA requiring that the OMB report include interagency studies 
and that these studies contain particular information. (US House, 1986, “Offset”)  This 
same subcommittee later referenced these June hearings during its 24 July 1986 hearings 
to discuss “Reauthorization of the Defense Production Act.”  The subcommittee chair, 
Congressman Jim LaFalce noted that the Reagan administration opposed the offsets 
reporting requirement and sought to have it repealed.  In the end, however, Congress 
adopted GAO’s recommendations and expanded the DPA to include a new section within 
Section 309 (50 U.S.C. App. 2099(b)) requiring that future “Section 309 Reports” be 
based upon interagency studies and further delineated the specific content of these 
reports. (US House, 1986, “Reauthorization,” p. 2) 
The provisions of Section 309 of the DPA added as part of P.L. 98-265 and 
amended as part of P.L. 99-441 required that the executive branch initiate action to 
produce these required offset reports.  In response to Section 6 of P.L. 98-265, the 
President signed EO 12521 on 24 June 1985.  EO 12521 amended EO 10480 of 14 
August 1953 by adding subparagraph 602(d)(1) which delegated to OMB the preparation 
and submission of the offsets reports to Congress.  In response to P.L. 99-441 Section 4, 
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the President signed EO 12649 on 11 August 1988, further amending EO 10480 by 
adding subparagraph 602(d)(2) to authorize the BEA to collect information in order to 
build a database of information for the Section 309 report. (50 FR 26337, 26 June 1985, 
53 FR 30639, 15 August 1988) 
2. Title 15 and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (OTCA) of 
1988 (P.L. 100-418) 
The purpose of the OTCA of 1988 (P.L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 et. seq.) is to 
enhance the competitiveness of American industry.  Title II of this law addresses several 
measures relating to export enhancement including a brief mention of offsets under 
Section 2205(a) “Barter and Countertrade.”  This section amended 15 U.S.C. App. 4712 
by establishing an interagency group on countertrade to make recommendations to the 
President and Congress regarding countertrade and offsets.  Specifically, this interagency 
group is charged with reviewing and evaluating the policy and use as well as the need for 
and feasibility of negotiating agreements with others on the use of countertrade and 
offsets.   Section 2205(b) established an office of barter within the DOC. (USCAN, 1989, 
Vol. 1, 102 Stat. 1332-1333) 
The rather lengthy legislative history of P.L. 100-418 includes offset-related 
hearings that helped to shape the OTCA. (CIS, 1988, P.L. 100-418)  These include three 
hearings by House subcommittees.  The Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization held 
hearings on “US Trade and Competitiveness” in July 1985 and “Offset Agreements” in 
June 1986.  Two subcommittees of the Committee on Foreign Affairs conducted hearings 
on “Countertrade and Offsets in International Trade” in June 1987.  Significantly, 
Congresswoman Barbara Kennelly (D-CT) provided testimony as part of the June 1987 
hearings.  Congresswoman Kennelly discussed a bill that she had sponsored (H.R. 1652) 
that impacted offsets.  This bill, though not enacted, was referred to in the legislative 
history of P.L. 100-418.  As described in the report of her testimony, H.R. 1652 directed 
the President to enter into negotiations with foreign governments to limit defense and 
commercial offsets. (US House, 1987, “Countertrade,” pp. 1-8) 
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The conference report for P.L. 100-418 provides further background on the 
development of Section 2205.42  The conference report cited Section 309 of the DPA (50 
U.S.C. App. 2099) as germane because of its requirement for a “report on the impact of 
defense-related offsets on U.S. exports” and “an interagency group [that] meets 
infrequently on offset issues.”  This portion of the conference report also discussed two 
sections in the House bill (H.R. 3) and the Senate amendment to this bill.  Section 345 of 
H.R. 3 established an interagency group on countertrade.  Section 912 of H.R. 3 required 
that US exporters provide a report to the DOC on foreign sales exceeding $2 million that 
“pursuant to the authority of the foreign government involved, requires countertrade or 
offsets as a condition for sale.”  Section 4501 of the Senate amendment to H.R. 3 
proposed establishment of an office within the DOC to monitor countertrade and publish 
“information on countertrade and barter opportunities.”  The conference committee 
dropped the proposed reporting requirement, but agreed to establish and expand the 
interagency group for both countertrade and offsets. (USCAN, 1989, Vol. 5, p. 1825) 
The OTCA had little impact on offsets.  While the conference committee agreed 
to establish an interagency group on countertrade and offsets, language in the OTCA 
established an interagency group on countertrade only.  However, the hearings that 
preceded passage of this law sustained offsets as a relevant issue before Congress.  
Furthermore, two offset-related legislative initiatives proposed but not enacted as part of 
the OTCA introduced ideas that became important in other legislation.  Section 912 of 
the bill introduced a provision to require that US exporters provide reports on foreign 
sales involving offsets.  Provisions requiring US exporters to report foreign sales 
involving offsets were eventually enacted into law.  Additionally, H.R. 1652 directed the 
President to enter into negotiations pertaining to offsets.  Although not reflected in the 
relevant legislative history, H.R. 1652 served as a rough draft for similar legislative 
language in the NDAA of FY89 that directed the President to conduct negotiations on 
offsets. 
                                                 
42 Although P.L. 100-418 enacted H.R. 4848, H.R. 4848 was derived from H.R. 3, the predecessor 
bill vetoed by President Reagan on 24 May 1988.  Conference Report 100-576, which accompanies H.R. 3, 
provides the legislative history for P.L. 100-418.  (USCAN, 1989, Vol. 4, p. 1547) 
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The President implemented P.L. 100-418 Section 2205(a) by issuing EO 12661 
Section 2-101 on “Countertrade and Barter” on 27 December 1988.  This order 
established an Interagency Group on Countertrade “composed of the Secretaries of 
Commerce, State, Defense, Treasury, Labor, Agriculture, and Energy, the Attorney 
General, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, the Director of 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the United States Trade Representative and 
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, or their respective 
representatives.”  The Secretary of Commerce or a representative was designated to chair 
this group. (54 FR 779, 9 January 1989)  The absence of offsets from this Executive 
Order is noteworthy.  GAO commented in 1990 that review and evaluation of offsets was 
included as part of P.L. 100-418.  However, GAO found that, “Commerce determined 
that the interagency group would focus on commercial counter-trade issues, not offsets in 
military exports.” (US GAO, 1990, “Military Exports,” p. 2) 
3. Title 10 and National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) of FY 1989 
and FY 1990-FY 1991 (P.L. 100-456 and P.L. 101-189) 
The NDAA of 1989 (P.L. 100-456, 102 Stat. 1918 et. seq.) was enacted during the 
same legislative session as the OTCA of 1988.  The purpose of the NDAA of 1989 was to 
authorize appropriations for military activities of the Department of Defense “and for 
other purposes.”  Section 825, which addressed “Department of Defense Offsets Policy” 
and amended Title 1043, was among the numerous “other purposes” included in this 
legislation under “Part B – Defense Industrial Base.” (USCAN, 1989, Vol. 2)  This 
section had significant effects on US offset policy and practice, adding several significant 
offset-related requirements to both the US Code and notes within the US Code.44   
The US Code listed three requirements.  First, the President was required to 
establish “a comprehensive policy with respect to contractual offset arrangements in 
connection with the purchase of defense equipment or supplies.”  Second, US officials 
were prohibited from entering into an agreement requiring the transfer of US defense 
                                                 
43 P.L. 100-456 Section 825 (102 Stat. 2020-2022) originally amended 10 U.S.C. 2505.  In October 
1992, P.L. 102-484 Section 4202(a) renumbered 10 U.S.C. 2505 as 10 U.S.C. 2532.  (10 U.S.C.A. 2505) 
44 Mr. John Miller of the Office of Law Revision Council, US House of Representatives, stated that 
notes carry the same force of law, but are entered into the US Code as notes for a variety of reasons.  For 
example, Congress may not have assigned a provision from the law to a specific section or chapter in the 
US Code or the note may be of limited interest or duration. 
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technology to a foreign country or firm as part of an offset arrangement if the agreement 
would “significantly and adversely affect” the US defense industrial base and lead to a 
significant financial loss for a US company.  Third, US contractors incurring obligations 
as a result of offset arrangements that exceeded $50 million were required to notify the 
Secretary of Defense. 
The notes to the US Code also listed three provisions.  First, the President was 
directed to enter into negotiations with foreign governments to curb the negative aspects 
of offsets.  Second, the President was directed to submit a “comprehensive report on 
contractual offset arrangements” to the US Congress by 15 November 1988 that provided 
analysis, assessment, and recommendations regarding offsets.  Third, the President was 
directed to submit to the US Congress by 15 March 1990 and at least annually thereafter 
for four years a report discussing the appropriate actions to take with foreign countries 
regarding offsets and the progress of negotiations. 
Senator Dixon authored an earlier version of Section 825.  In November 1987, he 
had introduced S. 1892 as a starting point for conducting legislative discussions to 
address maintaining and improving the US defense industrial base. (Dixon, 1988, 1 
March)  He requested and obtained comments on his proposed legislation and spoke from 
the floor of the Senate on the topic of offsets.  During two separate hearings on the 
NDAA (29-30 March 1988), he heard testimony from numerous government and private 
sector witnesses on the topic of offsets.  Furthermore, Senator Dixon discussed with these 
witnesses a further modification to S. 1892 as a result of his study of offset related issues. 
(US Senate, 1988, pp. 267-268)  On 31 March 1988 the day following these two 
hearings, Senator Dixon submitted the Dixon Amendment No. 1926 to S. 1892, the 
“Defense Base Preservation Act.”  Title III of the modified version of S. 1892 was 
labeled  “Department of Defense Offsets Policy” and consisted of numerous offset 
provisions beyond what was eventually enacted into law.  This proposed legislation 
included provisions on a reciprocal offset requirement, prohibition on offsets, and 
exceptions for coproduction contracts. (Dixon, 1988, 31 March)  Although S. 1892 itself, 
was never enacted it was influential in forming offset provisions that were eventually 
placed into law. 
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Slightly more than one month after the introduction of the Dixon amendment, the 
Senate began deliberating the defense authorization bill for FY89.  Section 806 of this 
bill closely paralleled a number of the provisions of S. 1892, Senator Dixon’s defense 
industrial base bill.  The House version of this bill, H.R. 4264, introduced on 26 April 
1988, did not contain similar provisions on offsets, either when introduced or during 
House consideration. (CIS, 1988, P.L. 100-418)  However, as reflected in the conference 
report, the offset provisions proposed in Section 806 of S. 2355 were incorporated into 
Section 825 of H.R. 4481 as amended and agreed to by the conference committee.  It 
should be noted that Senator Dixon participated as a member of the conference 
committee.  The report shows that the conferees noted the existence of offset reporting 
requirements already contained in Section 309 of the DPA.  Finally, the conferees stated 
that “certain offset arrangements with non-industrialized countries may be of less 
concern.” (USCAN, 1989, Vol. 5, pp. 2560-2561) 
A year later, section 816 of P.L. 101-189, the NDAA for fiscal years 1990 and 
1991, included a minor modification to the statutory note pertaining to negotiations.  This 
modification enjoined the President to undertake positive efforts to reach an agreement 
with the country or countries involved in international agreements to limit the adverse 
effects of offset arrangements. 
The offset-related legislation provisions in the NDAA were significant for a 
number of reasons.  First and most importantly, this legislation prompted the President to 
formulate the USG Policy on Offsets in Military Exports.  Second, it directed the 
President to enter into negotiations on offsets.  According to GAO, this action raised a 
constitutional question whether the Congress could direct the President to enter into 
negotiations with foreign governments. (US GAO, 1990, “Military Exports,” p. 5)  
However, the President did agree to consult with nations regarding the negative aspects 
of offset arrangements.  Third, this legislation was the first to mandate industry reporting 
of offset arrangements exceeding a specified threshold ($50 million).  This particular 
reporting requirement had been included in at least two earlier pieces of legislation that 
were never enacted.  (H.R. 5540 introduced by Congressman Vento in 1982 specified a 
contract reporting threshold of $5 million, and H.R. 3 Section 912, considered during 
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deliberations on the OTCA of 1988 specified a contract reporting threshold of $2 
million.) 
D. POLICIES, REGULATIONS, AND OTHER ACTIVITIES 
The only significant policy change pertaining to offsets articulated during this 
period was the introduction of the USG Policy on Offsets in Military Exports in April 
1990 in response to the congressional mandate in the NDAA of 1989.  FMS policies and 
defense procurement regulations underwent structural changes during this period, but 
were not significantly different from the 1980 version of those policies and regulations. 
Other activities during this period included DOD participation in an offset agreement 
relating to sale of the Patriot to the Netherlands.  Additionally, Udis and Maskus record 
an interesting attempt in 1989 by a DOD agency to regulate offsets demands during the 
Korean Fighter Program competition. 
1. USG Policy on Offsets in Military Exports  
Fifteen months after enactment of the NDAA of 1989, President Bush issued the 
USG policy on offsets in military exports (see Figure 3 below).  According to Udis and 
Maskus, this statement provided a restatement of the Duncan Memorandum, in that the 
USG would not act as “guarantor” of offset commitments made by US industry. (Udis 
and Maskus, 1996, p. 363)  John H. Eisenhour, a long-time observer of offsets and former 
OMB official involved with producing the offset reports, observed that the language in 
this policy statement really did not alter current practices within the DOD particularly 
with regard to using US grant financing to pay for offset costs since this was already an 
established procedure. (Eisenhour, 2003)  The Bush policy statement did elevate the 
approval authority for USG participation in offsets to the President through the National 
Security Council (NSC).  Additionally, this policy called for consultations (vice 
negotiations as already discussed) with allies regarding the use of offsets in defense 
procurement.   
Shortly after publication of this policy, Senator Dixon, a longtime proponent of 
greater offset controls, roundly criticized the President from the floor of the Senate.  He 
stated that the President’s policy did not meet the requirements mandated by Congress.  
He argued that the policy of noninvolvement in offsets was actually a “non-policy” and 
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that the President had failed to enter into negotiations with allies to reduce the negative 
effects of offsets. (Dixon, 1990) 
 
 
 U.S. Government Policy on Offsets in Military Exports 
 
On April 16, 1990, the White House issued the following statement: 
 
 STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY 
 The President announced today his Policy on Offsets in Military Exports.  This responds to the requirement 
under the FY 1989 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 825, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2505. 
 
The President stated that the United States Government is committed to the principles of free and fair trade.  
Consequently, the United States Government views certain offsets for military exports as economically 
inefficient and market distorting. 
 
Mindful of the need to minimize the adverse effects of offsets in military exports, while ensuring that the 
ability of U.S. firms to compete for military export sales is not undermined, the President has established the 
following policy: 
 
-- No agency of the U.S. Government shall encourage, enter directly into, or commit U.S. firms to any 
offset arrangement in connection with the sale of defense goods or services to foreign governments. 
 
-- U.S. Government funds shall not be used to finance offsets in security assistance transactions except 
in accordance with currently established policies and procedures. 
 
-- Nothing in this policy shall prevent agencies of the U.S. Government  from fulfilling obligations 
incurred through international agreements entered into prior to the issuance of this policy. 
 
-- The decision whether to engage in offsets, and the responsibility for negotiating and implementing 
offset arrangements, resides with the companies involved. 
 
-- Any exceptions to this policy must be approved by the President through the National Security 
Council. 
 
The President also noted that the time has come to consult with our friends and allies regarding the use of 
offsets in defense procurement.  He has, therefore, directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the 
Secretary of State, to lead an interagency team to consult with foreign nations with a view to limiting the 
adverse effects of offsets in defense procurement.  This interagency team will report periodically on the 
results of these consultations and forward any recommendations to the National Security Council. 
Figure 3:  USG Policy on Offsets in Military Exports (From Verzariu, 
2000, p. 27)  
 
2. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Policies  
The substantive provisions concerning offsets that were contained in the MASM 
were replaced during the initial publication of the SAMM in April 1984 with a brief 
statement outlining the semi-annual offsets reporting requirement along with a very brief 
statement of the DOD policy regarding offsets. 
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It is DOD policy not to enter into government-to-government offset 
arrangements because of the inherent difficulties in negotiating and 
implementing such arrangements.  Any foreign government requesting 
offset should be informed that the responsibility for negotiating any offset 
arrangements resides with the US contractor involved.  The US 
Government will not commit a US contractor to an offset commitment 
without having its prior concurrence. (DSAA, 1984, p. “14-17”)  
The SAMM was renumbered in 1988, but the information on offsets remained 
substantively the same until 1992. 
3. Procurement Regulations 
Similar to the MASM-SAMM change, on 1 April 1984, the DAR became the 
DFARS and except for minor, non-substantive changes, the DAR sections relating to 
offsets remained intact in subsequent DFARS revisions through 1989.45  (49 FR 38549, 1 
October 1984)  However, certain DFARS subparts, including subpart 225.73 which 
included information on offsets, were targeted for streamlining as the result of the 
Defense Management Review initiative to eliminate unneeded text and clauses and 
reduce or modify unnecessary burdens placed upon contracting officers.  By the end of 
1990, changes to the offset related portions of the DFARS eliminated the distinction 
between FMS/offset and defense cooperation countries, deleted mention of countries with 
which the USG had offsets, removed detailed procedures for offset procurements, and 
deleted reference to the appendix which contained the offset agreements to which the 
USG had agreed.  (This appendix was eventually deleted in July 1991 as part of the 
overarching structural changes to the DFARS.) (55 FR 48730, 21 November 1990)  
4. Other Activities 
DOD directly intervened in international defense sales on two occasions during 
this period, significantly influencing offset policy.  In the first instance, DOD made an 
exception to the Duncan Memorandum by agreeing to accept a $70 million offset as part 
of a $305 million sale of the Patriot Air and Missile Defense System to the Netherlands in 
1984.  Although not a standard practice, DOD agreed to this arrangement as “necessary 
for foreign policy and national security reasons.”  As part of this offset, the US Army 
purchased over 1,900 Patriot missile canisters.  (US OMB, 1987, “Second,” p. II-27-28) 
                                                 
45 The DFARS 1984 version referred to the subparts 25.7310, 25.7314, and 25.7304.  The DFARS 
1988 versions renumbered these subparts as 225.7310, 225.7314, and 225.7304.  The DFARS 1988 
numbering is employed to reduce confusion.  
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In the second instance, DOD attempted to control the level of offsets during 
efforts by the Republic of Korea (ROK) to purchase new fighter aircraft.  By mid-1989, 
the competition had narrowed to two US-built fighters: the F-16 built by General 
Dynamics and the F/A-18 built by McDonnell-Douglas.  At first, the ROK demanded that 
the winning company provide 30 percent offsets, but then raised offset demands to nearly 
60 percent.  “In an unprecedented and somewhat puzzling step,” DSAA intervened with 
the two companies involved and attempted to restrict offsets to the 30 percent level.  
Some observers commenting upon this intervention have indicated that as a result of the 
USG intervention in the quantity of offsets the ROK was able to demand greater quality 
(e.g., technology transfer) of offsets.  Udis and Maskus observe that while the ROK 
agreed to the 30 percent offset level, it could “extract a level of purchases by the seller” 
beyond this level.  (Udis and Maskus, 1996, pp. 363-364) 
The purchase of missile canisters from the Dutch was clearly an exception to the 
Duncan policy.  The intervention in the KFP, while not a departure from established 
policy, did represent an unprecedented intrusion by DOD into industry offset 
arrangements which has not been repeated since that time.  
E. SUMMARY  
Despite a flurry of activity between 1981 and 1990, little changed with respect to 
USG policy and practices towards offsets in international trade.  The legislative branch, 
which had little engagement in offsets prior to 1981, emerged as the primary catalyst in 
efforts to formulate US offset policy during this period.  The executive branch responded 
to new offset-related legislation with Executive Orders and OMB reports.  Interestingly, 
DOD involvement, though still noteworthy, was rather limited during this period. 
In the legislative branch, members of Congress conducted more than ten 
subcommittee hearings in which offset discussions played a prominent part.  These 
members, principally House Democrats, represented states and districts with strong 
unionized, working class constituents: Minnesota (Representative Vento), Illinois 
(Senator Dixon), Ohio (Representative Mary Rose Oakar), and Connecticut 
(Representative Kennelly).  Additionally, four GAO reports published between 1984 and 
1990 provided members with ample information on offset practices.  Members in both 
the House and Senate used these subcommittee hearings and GAO reports to sponsor 
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numerous offset-related bills.  Several of these bills were enacted into law which helped 
to further shape offset-related debate and ultimately led to the formulation by President 
Bush of the USG policy on offsets in military exports in 1990.  
Within the executive branch, the President responded to congressional reporting 
requirements found in Section 309 of the Defense Production Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2099) 
and Section 825 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 (10 U.S.C. 2505) 
with Executive Orders directing OMB to conduct studies and provide reports on the 
effects of offsets.  OMB sponsored two surveys to collect offset information from 
industry and published six offset-related reports during this period. 
DOD curtailed what had been active involvement in offsets engagement and 
policy formulation with the Duncan policy.  Between 1981 and 1990, DOD provided 
offset-related reports and non-substantive modifications to acquisition regulations and 
procedures for conducting foreign military sales.  However, during this period, DOD 
made two exceptions to the Duncan policy, involving itself in two offset arrangements.  
In 1984, DOD agreed to an offset arrangement with the Netherlands in conjunction with 
the Dutch purchase of the Patriot missile defense system.  In 1989, DOD intervened in 
the sale of US fighter aircraft to Korea by attempting to limit offsets to a 30 percent 
threshold. 
Constituents concerned about employment brought offsets as a potential area of 
concern to the attention of certain members of Congress.  These members, in turn, 
conducted hearings, collected reports, and proposed legislation to curb the potentially 
negative effects of offsets on the US defense industrial base, national security, economy, 
trade and employment.  Legislation was enacted which led to a number of studies and 
reports, and, ultimately, establishment of US policy on offsets in military exports.    The 
policy issued by President Bush in 1990 recognized offsets as economically inefficient 
and market distorting, restricted US government agency involvement in offsets, and made 
industry responsible for offset arrangements.  This policy also called for consultations 
with allies regarding offsets.  However, the activities undertaken during this period 
continued the policy of noninvolvement in offsets first articulated in the 1978 Duncan 
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Policy.  Thus, little real change occurred during this period with respect to US policy or 
practice towards offsets in international trade.  
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VI. REFINING US OFFSET POLICY (1991-2003)  
Following the establishment of the US Policy on Offsets in Military Exports, 
legislators continued to change different parts of the law to further modify US offset 
policy through the end of this period.  These laws shifted responsibility for offset 
reporting from OMB to the DOC, provided penalties for making incentive payments 
related to offsets, added reporting requirements for industry, and mandated offset 
notification requirements for government agencies.  Although only two congressional 
hearings directly relating to offsets were held, numerous individuals who provided 
testimony before a broad range of congressional subcommittees raised offset issues.  
Additionally, GAO reports continued to maintain offsets as a relevant issue.  Most 
significantly, during this period, a decade after the Bush policy on offsets in military 
exports and in response to a statutory mandate, President William J. Clinton formed a 
Presidential Commission in December 2000 to examine the use of offsets in defense trade 
and, in parallel, issued an executive order to expand the scope of this commission to 
include a concurrent review of the use of offsets in commercial trade.  Although the work 
of the Commission remains unfinished (US GAO, 2003, p. 2), the status report it 
produced provides a baseline for further understanding of USG offset policy and 
practices.  
A. THE ENVIRONMENT 
Between 1991 and 2002, US GDP grew from $6,676 to $9,440 billion, with 
growth rates ranging from –0.47 (1991) to 4.43 percent (1997).  The real growth of the 
GDP was 3.20 percent. (US DOC, BEA, 2003, “GDP”)  During this same period, 
unemployment ranged between 7.5 (1992) and 4.0 (2000) percent, averaging 5.5 percent. 
(US DOL, BLS, 2003)  The EPI reported that worldwide aerospace employment fell by 
one-third, with US aerospace employment declining significantly during this period, by 
more than 37 percent from 946,000 (1990) jobs to 580,000 (1995) jobs. (US House, 
1999, p. 109) 
Since 1994, the DOC has collected data directly from industry on the value of 
offset agreements entered into as part of international military sales.  DOC data shows 
that between 1993 and 2000, US industry signed offsets for close to $30 billion with 37 
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different countries for military exports valued at almost $49 billion. Additional countries 
with which US industry entered into offset agreements included, in Europe, Austria, 
Czech Republic, Finland, and Slovenia; in the Middle East and Africa, Kuwait, South 
Africa, and UAE; and in Asia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Taiwan. (US DOC, BIS, 2003, 
“Seventh,” p. 6)  Offset value accounted for slightly more than 61 percent of the contract 
value.  The average annual value of these offsets for this eight-year period increased from 
$2.5 billion during an eight-year timeframe in the previous period to $3.7 billion. 
B. US GOVERNMENT PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR ROLES 
At any one time during this period, as many as five major governmental 
participants were involved in offset policy development.  Within the legislative branch, 
the Congress and the GAO continued their engagement in offsets.  Congress conducted  
two hearings, and GAO produced six offset related reports. DOD continued as the most 
active participant from the executive branch and focused primarily on updating 
regulations and policy.  The President continued to issue Executive Orders as necessary 
to implement legislation.  Additionally, the President issued a signing statement in 
response to the DPA Amendments of 1992 which disputed reporting different views from 
the administration on offsets to Congress.  Also, for the first two years of this period, the 
OMB was involved in providing reports in response to section 825 of the NDAA of 1989, 
but changes to Section 309 of the DPA in 1992 resulted in designation of the DOC as the 
lead agency in preparing these reports.  Finally, another agency within the DOC, the 
International Trade Agency (ITA), issued several documents for use by practitioners of 
countertrade and offsets. 
1. Congress  
Much of the important offsets policy work completed by Congress during this 
period was the direct result of bills considered or enacted, GAO reports received, and 
subcommittee hearings held during the previous period.  Between 1991 and 2003, 
Congress focused its activities on refining previously enacted legislation by adjusting the 
focus of reports and changing specific offset-related practices such as the use of 
nonrepayable financing and incentive payments as part of offset transactions.  Congress 
also initiated action to incorporate a number of different offset policies and definitions 
into law.  Most of the work of the Congress resulted from efforts expended by 
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subcommittees.   Despite the fact that subcommittees convened only two formal hearings 
to address offsets between 1991 and 2003, these proved critical in forming policy relating 
to offsets.   
The Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of 
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce convened a hearing on 24 June 1994 to 
receive testimony from the Frank C. Conahan, from GAO’s National Security and 
International Affairs Division (NSIAD).  In her opening statement, the subcommittee 
chair, Congresswoman Cardiss Collins (D-IL), said that she understood the positions of 
foreign governments and US defense contractors regarding offsets, but viewed the current 
offset policy as a “failure” of the USG.  She believed that this policy needed to be 
changed and viewed this hearing as a step toward making that change. (US House, 1994)  
Mr. Conahan’s testimony was a verbal summary of the June 1994 GAO report entitled, 
“Military Exports:  Concerns Over Offsets Generated with U.S. Foreign Military 
Financing Program Funds.”  (In addition to delivering this report to the aforementioned 
subcommittee, GAO also addressed the report to Senator Russell D. Feingold (D-WI) 
who played a significant role in shaping offset-related legislation during this period.)  The 
testimony and report highlighted the absence of legislative restrictions regarding the use 
of nonrepayable funds to pay for offset costs and made recommendations to amend 
various laws to restrict the use of these funds.  Although this hearing was not listed in the 
legislative history of P.L. 104-107, together with the GAO report, it did help to frame 
discussions regarding the use of nonrepayable funds to finance offsets.  (US GAO, 1994, 
“Military Exports”) 
On 29 June 1999, the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and 
Human Resources of the Committee on Government Reform conducted hearings titled, 
“Defense Offsets:  Are They Taking Away Our Jobs?”  Congressman John F. Tierney 
(D-MA) requested these hearings after reading a report on offsets that he had requested 
from the Minority Staff of the Committee on Government Reform entitled, “Foreign 
Offset Demands in Defense and Civil Aerospace Transactions.”  This report was 
incorporated as part of these hearings.  Congressman Tierney became interested in the 
topic after learning that much of the work to build jet engines under a foreign military 
sales contract with Korea would be done by industry in that country as a result of offsets.  
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He viewed offsets as “sweeteners” to induce a buyer’s purchasing decision. (US House, 
1999, p. 5)  The subcommittee also received a statement from Senator Feingold and 
testimony from a number of witnesses representing industry, labor, the DOD and the 
DOC.  This hearing served to highlight the contrasting views from industry that offsets 
are a nuisance to cope with and from labor that offsets are a threat to American jobs.  
This hearing was listed in the legislative history of P.L. 106-113 which provided for the 
Defense Offsets Disclosure Act (DODA) of 1999. 
Although the two hearings discussed above were the only two opportunities 
formally designated for a discussion of offset matters, a scan of other congressional 
testimony demonstrates that offsets were discussed in a wide variety of other hearings 
throughout this period.  For example, offsets were described in the context of 
conventional arms transfer as a threat to US employment.  Also, labor representatives 
discussed the negative aspects of offsets in the context of US trade policies and trade 
relations with China.46  
2. General Accounting Office (GAO) 
GAO produced six reports between 1994 and 2003 that continued to explore 
offsets from a broad perspective as well as address specific issues.  In June 1994, GAO 
produced the aforementioned report pertaining to “Military Exports” which led to 
changes to Section 22 of the AECA in 1996 and the prohibition of the use of 
nonrepayable funds to pay offset costs.  In April 1996, GAO published a broad, balanced 
overview of offsets in a report entitled, “Military Exports: Offset Demands Continue to 
Grow.”  This report was provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the 
House Small Business Committee.  Also included in this report was information on 
selected foreign government offset policies and practices. (US GAO, 1996, “Military 
Exports”)  In August 1997, a GAO report entitled “Military Offsets: Regulations Needed 
to Implement Prohibition on Incentive Payments” stated that the DOS had failed to 
                                                 
46 See for example, 9 November 1993 testimony by Dr. Caleb S. Rossiter, Direct, Project on 
Demilitarization before the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Federal Document Clearing House (FDCH), 
1993); 23 May 1995 testimony by Ms. Lora Lumpe, Director, Arms Sales Monitoring Project for the 
Federation of American Scientists before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee (Federal News Service (FNS), 1995); and, 28 January 1999 testimony of Mr. 
John J. Sweeney, President, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations before 
the Senate Finance Committee (FNS, 1999). 
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implement any regulations to address provisions in P.L. 103-236 and codified in Section 
39A of the AECA at 22 U.S.C. 2279A that related to the prohibition against making 
incentive payments. (US GAO, 1997, “Military Offsets”)  In December 1998, GAO 
provided another report to Senator Feingold.  This report, entitled “Defense Trade:  US 
Contractors Employ Diverse Activities to Meet Offset Obligations,” provided additional 
insight as to the particular practices that contractors employ to meet offset commitments.  
Among the report’s conclusions was this statement: “It is difficult to accurately measure 
the impact of offsets on the overall U.S. economy and on specific industry sectors.” (US 
GAO, 1998, “Defense Trade”) 
As a result of the aforementioned June 1999 hearings, Congressman John Mica 
(R-FL), requested a review of data collection and policy coordination efforts.  In October 
2000, GAO responded with a report entitled, “Defense Trade: Data Collection and 
Coordination on Offsets.”  This report indicated that per the DPA of 1950, the DOC is the 
primary agency responsible to collect offset information and that the DOD and DOS also 
collect and report certain information as required by the AECA.  GAO criticized both the 
DOD and DOS for not having published specific implementing regulations for the type of 
data needed from industry. (US GAO, 2000, “Defense Trade: Data Collection”)   
In this and its 1998 report, GAO also pointed to an office within the DOD known 
as the Office of Foreign Contracting that collects information subject to 10 U.S.C. 2410g 
on contracts that exceed $10 million when more that $500,000 worth of work will be 
performed outside of the US. (US GAO, 1998, “Defense Trade,” p. 10)  However, the 
Office of Foreign Contracting, while concerned with foreign sourcing issues similar to 
offsets, does not collect information applicable to a study of offsets. 
Finally, in May 2003, GAO reported in “Defense Trade:  Report and 
Recommendations of the Defense Offsets Commission Still Pending” that after almost 
three years that the Offset Commission had not completed its work. 
3. The President  
Prior to the November 1992 elections and the close of his term in office, President 
Bush issued a statement upon signing the DPA Amendments of 1992 into law that 
expressed concern regarding the desire of Congress to obtain differing views from within 
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the administration regarding offsets.  President Bush wrote as President he would retain 
the constitutional authority to protect the executive branch deliberative process.   
President Clinton issued a total of four Executive Orders to implement offset 
related provisions in the law.  The first three of these were simple delegations of the 
authority provided to the President as part of amendments to the DPA and AECA.  
Finally at the end of his second term with the controversial election of 2000 still 
undecided, President Clinton signed EO 13177 to establish the National Commission on 
the Use of Offsets in Defense Trade and the President’s Council on the Use of Offsets in 
Commercial Trade.   
4. Department of Defense (DOD) 
Throughout this period, DOD continued to refine policies and regulations that 
pertained to offsets.  DOD updated the offset provisions in the DFARS nine times.  These 
DFARS changes principally focused on the ability of US firms to recover offset costs.  
Also, senior officials involved in defense procurement published policy letters in 1999 
and 2000 that addressed pricing issues, including the treatment of offset costs as 
allowable, in FMS.  Finally, DOD updated the SAMM three times during this period to 
parallel the DFARS changes regarding cost recovery and to implement reporting 
requirements on offsets to Congress. 
5. Other Executive Branch Agencies: The Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), Department of Commerce (DOC), and International 
Trade Administration (ITA)  
a. OMB Participation and Roles 
Through 1992, OMB retained the lead role for the executive branch with 
respect to offsets.  OMB did not provide an offset report for either 1990 or 1991 because 
Section 309 authorities had lapsed with the expiration of the DPA on 20 October 1990, 
and offset reporting under Section 309 authority was not required.47  Although it did not 
provide reports under Section 309, OMB continued to provide reports to Congress in 
response to the requirement of Section 825(d)(3) of the NDAA of 1989 which required 
reports on the progress of efforts with foreign countries to negotiate agreements to curb 
                                                 
47 P.L. 102-193 reauthorized the DPA between 6 December 1991 and 1 March 1992.  Although 
authority technically existed to provide a report, time was insufficient to gather data and write a report 
during this time frame. (Eisenhour, 2003) 
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the adverse effects of offsets.  These two reports, “Negotiations Concerning Offsets in 
Military Exports: December 1990” and “Negotiations Concerning Offsets in Military 
Exports: December 1992,” were published in June 1991 and December 1992, 
respectively.48 (Eisenhour, 1995, App. XVI)  Following publication of these reports and 
with the enactment of P.L. 102-558, OMB no longer had the responsibility to produce 
offset-related reports, but has retained involvement, reviewing reports prior to delivery to 
Congress.   
b. Department of Commerce (DOC) Participation and Roles  
Section 124 of P.L. 102-558 established the DOC as the President’s 
Executive Agent for offset-related matters under Section 309 of the DPA, to include 
preparation of the annual report.  Within the DOC, the Bureau of Export Administration 
(BXA) was provided the authority to collect data and prepare the Section 309 report.  In 
April and December 1994, the DOC published proposed and final regulations, 
respectively, in the Federal Register in order to begin the process of collecting offset data 
from industry. (59 FR 21678, 26 April 1994; 59 FR 61796, 2 December 1994)  BXA 
published its first report in May 1996 and provided subsequent reports in August 1997, 
August 1998, December 1999, May 2001, and February and July 2003.  Early reports 
drew on the OMB reports for background information.  Additionally, these reports used 
the data collected by the DOC to provide statistical information on the quantity and types 
of offsets in defense trade. 
c. International Trade Administration (ITA) Participation and 
Roles  
Within the DOC, the ITA was designated to oversee the implementation of 
Section 2205 the OTCA of 1988, which involved countertrade practices including offsets.  
In accord with the OTCA, the ITA published several documents throughout this period to 
educate those involved with international trade on these types of practices.  In 1992 the 
ITA published two documents that provided information on offset and offset practices, 
                                                 
48 Section 825(d)(3) of P.L. 100-456 required annual reports over a four-year period.   The first report 
was published on 16 July 1990 as part of OMB report, “Offsets in Military Exports: April 16, 1990.”  
(OMB, 1990)  Also, in discussing this reporting requirement, Udis and Maskus observe that these reports 
were provided during 1990, 1991, and 1992 and remarked that these reports were “very much abbreviated 
compared to the economic impact reports” that OMB had previously provided. (Udis and Maskus, 1996, p. 
362) 
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“International Countertrade: A Guide for Managers and Executives” and “International 
Countertrade: Individual Country Practices.”  Additionally, in 2000, the ITA published 
an update to the “Guide” that was entitled, “The Evolution Of International Barter, 
Countertrade, and Offset Practices: A Survey Of The 1970s Through The 1990s.” These 
publications provided comprehensive, historical overviews of offset and countertrade 
practices.  Their purpose was “to focus the awareness of readers on the areas of 
knowledge they will need to further develop as practitioners.” (Verzariu, 2000, p. ii) 
C. LEGISLATION AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
By 1991, provisions pertaining to trade offsets were included in numerous pieces 
of proposed legislation and codified principally in 50 U.S.C. App. 2099 (Section 309 of 
the DPA) and 10 U.S.C. 2505 Section and, to a lesser degree, in 15 U.S.C. 4712.  The 
authorities under Title 10 and Title 15 remained in force and unchanged throughout this 
period.  After a lapse that began in October 1990, the DPA was reauthorized in October 
1992 and Section 309 underwent significant revision, including changes to the 
responsibility for, purpose of, and content in the reports, new reporting requirements for 
US industry, and direction on the use of reports in negotiations. Additionally, the notes to 
Section 309 were modified to include an uncodified statement of policy pertaining to 
offsets.  Although the text of Section 309 remained unchanged during the remainder of 
this period, the notes were again modified in 1999 to add provisions of the DODA. 
During this period, the AECA of 1976 as amended emerged as a new legislative 
tool to monitor offsets.  The AECA provides the authority and general rules for 
conducting foreign sales of defense articles and services, and training on a government-
to-government and industry-to-government basis.  Prior to this period, the AECA did not 
address offsets.  However, beginning in 1994 four separate laws with offset provisions 
amended the AECA during this period. 
1. Amendments to the Defense Production Act (DPA) 
The offset provisions in DPA Section 309 (50 U.S.C. App. 2099) underwent 
substantial modification in 1992.  That same year, an uncodified declaration of 
congressional policy was added to the notes of Section 309.   In 1999, the provisions of 
the DODA, except for those applicable solely to the AECA, were also incorporated in the 
notes of Section 309. 
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a. Defense Production Act Amendments of 1992 (P.L. 102-558) 
The offset-related amendments that became part of P.L. 102-558 (106 
Stat. 4198 et. seq.) originated with efforts beginning in 1988 during the second session of 
the 100th Congress and continuing through both sessions of the 101st Congress.  The 
most vocal proponent of a need to modify offset legislation was Senator Dixon.  In 1989, 
Senator Dixon had introduced S. 1379, containing substantially the same offset 
provisions eventually enacted into law in 1992.  (135 CR 8599 S8604, 24 July 1989)  
However, despite efforts by Senator Dixon and others to enact legislation that would 
extend the DPA, it expired on 20 October 1990.   
During the next two years, the DPA was briefly reauthorized for two brief 
periods, from 17 August to 30 September 1991 (P.L. 102-99) and then again from 6 
December 1991 to 1 March 1992 (P.L. 102-193).  These two 1991 laws that reauthorized 
the DPA made some technical changes, but neither had any effect on offset provisions.  
And, though the reasons for DPA expiration were unrelated to the provisions in Section 
309, offset reporting requirements lapsed.  Finally, on 28 October 1992, P.L. 102-558 
was enacted with two sections of this law containing offset-related provisions, Sections 
123 and 124.   
Section 124 (106 Stat. 4207-4208) completely revised DPA Section 309 
“Annual Report on Impact of Offsets.”  This section made significant changes to the 
responsibility for, purpose of, and content in the reports; added reporting requirements for 
US industry; and provided direction on the use of reports in negotiations.  The Secretary 
of Commerce was designated as the “President’s Executive Agent for carrying out this 
section” and given the responsibility for preparing the DPA Section 309 Report.  The 
legislation also specifically required that, in preparing the report, the Secretary of 
Commerce must consult with the Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, and State and the 
USTR.    
The purpose of the interagency report (50 U.S.C. App. 2099(b)) narrowed 
from a broad examination of the “long-term as well as the short-term effects of offsets,” 
to a more focused review to “identify the cumulative effects of offset agreements.”  The 
revised language in this subsection expanded the scope of reports beyond the effects of 
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offsets on lower tier defense subcontractors” to address “domestic defense productive 
capability” and “the domestic defense technology base.”  The revised language removed 
a requirement to examine the effects of offsets on “nondefense industry sectors.” 
Regarding content, the statute had previously required “a discussion of 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations on offsets in international procurement and provide 
information on the types, terms, and magnitude of offsets.”  The revised language laid out 
specific content requirements pertaining to the offset report, including a “net assessment 
of the elements of the industrial base and technology base,” “recommendations for 
remedial action,” and summaries of any interagency studies, offset arrangements, and 
completed negotiations. 
The most significant change to DPA Section 309 involved a new 
requirement for US firms to notify the DOC of certain offset agreements.  Specifically, 
US contracts now had to report to the DOC any sale to a foreign government or firm of a 
“weapon system or defense-related item” if that sale involved an offset agreement 
exceeding $5 million.  Senator Donald Riegle (D-MI) inserted a statement in the 
Congressional Record explaining the need for “a continuous data collection and analysis 
system” to “better identify and analyze areas of growing US dependence on foreign 
suppliers.” (137 CR 1571, 5 February 1991) 
Finally, the legislation required US negotiators to use the findings and 
recommendations contained in the DPA Section 309 reports during bilateral or 
multilateral negotiations to reduce the negative effects of offsets. 
Section 123 (106 Stat. 4206-4207) included an uncodified “Declaration of 
Offset Policy” that has been incorporated as a note in Section 309 of the DPA (50 U.S.C. 
App. 2099).  This section duplicates the policy provided by President Bush in April 1990, 
but did change the periodicity and recipient of reports on offset consultations with foreign 
nations.  The Bush policy required periodic reporting to the NSC.  The legislative policy 
required annual reporting to the Congress as part of the annual DPA Section 309 Reports.  
Also, the language in this section tacitly acknowledged that the President would conduct 
“consultations” instead of “negotiations” directed by Section 825 of the NDAA of FY 
1989. 
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The legislative history of P.L. 102-558 highlights differences between 
committees of the House involved in reviewing matters related to the DPA.  In Report 
No. 102-208(II) submitted on 25 September 1992 to accompany the House version of the 
DPA legislation (H.R. 3039), the Armed Services Committee noted that it had amended 
the Offset Policy in Section 123 of the proposed legislation to conform with Title 10 
language passed as part of the NDAA of 1989.  The Armed Services Committee found 
the language proposed by the “Banking Committee” as overly restrictive and made the 
change to provide flexibility to the President in discussing offset-related matters with 
allies.  The Armed Services Committee also noted that this legislation goes beyond the 
scope of the DPA and was beyond the jurisdiction of the “Banking Committee.”  
(USCAN, 1993, Vol. 6, p. 3529)    
Upon signing S. 347 into law, President Bush enumerated reservations 
regarding a number of sections, including Section 124.  He wrote, “I sign this bill with 
the understanding that this provision does not detract from my constitutional authority to 
protect the executive branch deliberative process.”  (USCAN, 1993, Vol. 6, p. 3551)  
The President also signed Part IV of EO 12919 to enact the revised 
legislation concerning offsets.  This delegated the President’s responsibility and authority 
relating to offsets to the Secretary of Commerce.  The order also stated that the offset 
report, though prepared by the DOC, remained subject to clearance by OMB prior to 
submission to Congress. (59 FR 29525, 3 June 1994) 
b. The Defense Offsets Disclosure Act (DODA) 
The President enacted the Consolidated FY2000 Appropriations Act (P.L. 
106-113) on 29 November 1999.  The DODA was contained in P.L. 106-113 as Division 
B, Section 1000(a)(7) [Division B, Title XII, Subtitle D (Sections 1241 to 1248)] (113 
Stat. 1536, 1501A-500 to 1501A505).  Except for Sections 1245 and 1246 which were 
incorporated into the AECA, all other sections of the DODA were included, along with 
the aforementioned “Declaration of Offset Policy” as a note in DPA Section 309.  The 
DODA provided another policy pertaining to offsets, defined offsets, established an 
offset commission, and mandated reporting pertaining to a multilateral strategy to address 
offsets.  The DODA “Declaration of Policy” stated, “It is the policy of the United States 
to monitor the use of offsets in international defense trade, to promote fairness in such 
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trade, and to ensure that foreign participation in the production of United States weapon 
systems does not harm the economy of the United States.”  This policy is an extension of 
previously articulated statements on offset. 
The DODA also defined an offset to mean “the entire range of industrial 
and commercial benefits provided to foreign governments as an inducement or condition 
to purchase military goods or services, including benefits such as coproduction, licensed 
production, subcontracting, technology transfer, in-country procurement, marketing and 
financial assistance, and joint ventures.”  This definition recognized that offsets could be 
an inducement offered by industry in order to obtain a foreign sale or as a condition 
imposed by a foreign government.  The “benefits” in this definition are actually types of 
offsets that are described throughout the literature and in government documents. 
The review commission was to be established by the President in 
consultation with the leadership of Congress.  The DODA articulated requirements and 
duties of the commissioners with regard to examining offsets.  Additionally, the DODA 
outlined the requirements for a report once the work of the commission was completed.  
The DODA required that the President submit a report on the feasibility of 
establishing a multilateral treaty on the standards for employing offsets in defense trade.  
The DODA requires that the President submit this report within 90 days after receiving 
the final report of the commission. 
With EO 13177 (65 FR 76558, 4 December 2000), President Clinton 
established the “National Commission on the Use of Offsets in Defense Trade” and a 
parallel “President’s Council on the Use of Offsets in Commercial Trade.”  The 
Commission held hearings on 4 December 2000 and published an interim status report on 
18 January 2001.  This status report discussed the initial proceedings of the Commission, 
provided an initial assessment of the extent and nature of offsets in both defense and 
commercial trade, described the reasons that other countries seek offsets, and identified 
the goals of US firms that provide offsets.  Additionally, the status report placed offsets 
in the context of larger trends in the US aerospace industry, the US economy, and the 
world economy, discussed the impacts of offsets on the US economy and US national 
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security, and described the next steps for the Commission.  The Commission, however, 
never reconvened. 
2. Amendments to the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) 
In the mid-1990s, the AECA emerged as another policy area affected by offsets.  
Between 1994 and 1999, four separate laws with offset-related provisions were enacted 
that modified three different portions of the AECA.  AECA Section 36 (22 U.S.C. 2776) 
pertained to reports of foreign sales, Section 39A (22 U.S.C. 2779A) focused on 
incentive payments and Section 22 (22 U.S.C. 2762) addressed financing for foreign 
military sales. 
a. AECA Section 36 (22 U.S.C. 2776) 
This section of the AECA pertains to “Reports and certifications to 
Congress on military exports.”  Under this section, DOD (for government-to-government 
military sales) and DOS (for industry-to-government military sales) provide specified 
information in a notification to Congress of potential foreign sales of military articles that 
exceed specified dollar thresholds.49  On 30 April 1994, Section 732 of P.L. 103-236 (108 
Stat. 503-504) amended AECA Section 36 to add a requirement for offset information as 
part of this pre-sale notification.  This offset information included a certification that 
offsets either were or were not proposed in connection with the sale, and, if proposed, a 
description of the offset was required.  Along with this new offset notification 
requirement, Section 732 added a subsection that provided a definition of “offset 
agreement.” 
The term “offset agreement” means an agreement, arrangement, or 
understanding between a United States supplier of defense articles or 
defense services and a foreign country under which the supplier agrees to 
purchase or acquire, or to promote the purchase or acquisition by other 
United States persons of, goods or services produced, manufactured, 
grown, or extracted, in whole or in part, in the foreign country  in 
consideration for the purchase by the foreign country of defense articles or 
defense service from the supplier. (22 U.S.C. 2776(e)) 
 
                                                 
49 At the time the law was passed, notification was required for sales containing major defense 
equipment (MDE) exceeding $14 million, for sales not containing MDE exceeding $50 million, and for 
construction sales exceeding $200 million.  These thresholds continue to apply to non-treaty Allies, but on 
30 September 2002, Section 1405 of P.L. 107-228 (116 Stat. 1456-1458) raised thresholds for treaty Allies 
(e.g., NATO, Australia, etc.) to $25 million for sales containing MDE, $100 million for sales not containing 
MDE, and for construction sales that exceed $300 million.  (USCA, 2003) 
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This section was further amended on 21 July 1996 with the enactment of 
Section 155 of P.L. 104-164 (110 Stat. 1440).  This law added a requirement for the 
administration to publish the unclassified portions of these pre-sale notifications in the 
Federal Register.  A second subsection pertaining to offsets was added to AECA Section 
36.  A review of the Federal Register database indicates that the DOS has not yet 
implemented this provision of P.L. 104-164 for commercial sales; however, DOD has 
complied for government sales since 1996.  As part of its notification of potential FMS 
transactions to Congress, DOD includes an offset certificate and declaration that offsets 
either are not included or may be included as part of the potential sale.  In any case, the 
details of any proposed offset transaction are included in the classified notification to 
Congress.   
Finally, Section 1245 of the DODA (P.L. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-502) 
inserted language clarifying the type of information that was to be included in the 
congressional notifications.  Most significantly, the DODA added language pertaining to 
the confidentiality of offset agreement information.  Thus, a third subsection pertaining to 
offsets was added to AECA Section 36.  
EO 11958 (42 FR 4311, 18 January 1977) had already been amended to 
delegate responsibility for making pre-sale notifications to Congress.  However, in 
response to Section 155 of P.L. 104-164, the President issued EO 13091 to amend 
Section 1.k. of the executive order to delegate to the Secretaries of Defense and State the 
responsibility for publishing unclassified information pertaining to these pre-sale 
notifications in the Federal Register. (63 FR 36153, 29 June 1998) 
b. AECA Section 39A (22 U.S.C. 2779A) 
This section of the AECA addresses the “Prohibition on incentive 
payments.”  On 30 April 1994, Section 733 of P.L. 103-236 (108 Stat. 504) added 
Section 39A to the AECA (22 U.S.C. App. 2779A).  P.L. 106-113 (113 Stat. 1501A-502) 
added some clarifying language in 1999.  A memorandum signed by President Clinton on 
26 July 1994 delegated new functions from this legislation to the Secretary of State. (59 
FR 40205, 26 July 1994)  Senator Feingold authored what became Section 733 of P.L. 
103-236.  This legislation was in response to a constituent who had been negatively 
affected by offsets.  In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
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Drug Policy, and Human Resources on 29 June 1999, Senator Feingold provided insight 
pertaining to the background on Section 733 of P.L. 103-236. 
I first became involved in the offsets issue in February 1993, when I 
learned that a Wisconsin-based company, the Beloit Corp., a subsidiary of 
Harnischfeger Industries, Inc., had been negatively affected by an apparent 
indirect offset arrangement between an aerospace contractor, the Northrop 
Corp., and the Government of Finland. Beloit was one of only three 
companies in the world that produce this particular type of large 
papermaking machine. In its efforts to sell one of these machines to the 
International Paper Co., Beloit became aware that Northrop had offered 
International Paper an incentive payment to select, instead the machine 
offered by a Finnish company, Valmet, not the Wisconsin company. 
Northrop was promoting the purchase of the Valmet machinery as part of 
an agreement that would provide dollar-for-dollar offset credit on a deal 
with Finland to purchase 64 F–18 aircraft.   
 
This type of payment had the flavor of a kickback, distorted the practice of 
free enterprise, and I think, threatened U.S. jobs.  By lowering its bid, and 
thereby only barely breaking even on the contract, to take into account the 
incentive payment offered by Northrop, Beloit still did succeed in winning 
the contract. Nevertheless, for me, the incident demonstrated the potential 
for offset obligations to have an impact on apparently unrelated domestic 
industries, as the chairman mentioned. I became concerned that this could 
happen anywhere, in any industry, in the future without being recognized, 
much less remedied. 
 
Mr. Chairman, one of the first things I did as a new Member of the Senate 
in 1993 was to offer an amendment to the Arms Export Control Act to 
prohibit incentive payments in the provision of an offset credit. I wanted 
to clarify the congressional disapproval of an activity that appeared to fall 
through the cracks of various existing acts. Neither the Anti-Kickback Act 
nor the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act seemed clearly to address the 
payment being offered to International Paper in the Beloit case. My 
provision, which was enacted into law in 1994, prohibits the use of third-
party incentive payments to secure offset agreements in any sale that is 
subject to the Arms Export Control Act. The measure also expanded the 
requirements for congressional notification of the existence and, to 
the extent possible, the details of any offset agreement at the time of 
notification of a pending arms sale under the Arms Export Control Act. 
(US House, 1999, pp. 67-68) 
The statement made by Senator Feingold suggests the strong linkage between offsets and 
US jobs.  Offsets are also viewed by some as unfair trade practices that must be 
eliminated.  Senator Feingold worked to enact offset legislation prohibiting incentive 
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payments and increasing congressional notification requirements that he believed would 
serve the interests of his constituents. 
c. AECA Section 22 (22 U.S.C. 2762) 
This section of the AECA addresses “Procurement for Cash Sales.”  
Section 531A of P.L. 104-107 (110 Stat. 731) stated that pricing of nonrepayable funds 
for foreign military sales should be done on the same basis as used for DOD-purchased 
items.  Therefore, since DOD does not pay offset costs for its own contracts, offset 
charges are not allowable costs for FMS contracts paid for with nonrepayable (i.e., grant) 
funds appropriated from the US Treasury.50 
3. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-87) 
Legislative interest in offsets continued through the end of this period.  On 17 
July 2003, Senator Christopher Dodd51 (D-CT) introduced amendment number 1276 to 
the Defense Appropriations Act of 2004 that added a requirement for the President to 
review offset arrangements.  The amendment required the Secretary of Defense to 
provide a report to Congress on the result of this review by 1 March 2005.  This 
amendment was incorporated into the Defense Appropriations Bill as Section 8138, 
enacted on 30 September 2003 as P.L. 108-87 (117 Stat. 1054 et seq.).  Senator Dodd 
cited the sale of F-16 fighters to Poland and associated offset arrangements that 
transferred jobs overseas as his reason for introducing this amendment.  He indicated his 
view that this amendment would add a measure of government accountability for these 
offset contracts.  (149 CR S9516-9520, 17 July 2003)   
                                                 
50 In 1996, the largest recipients of nonrepayable or grant funding, referred to as Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF), included Israel, Egypt, Greece, and Turkey. (US GAO, 1996, “Military Exports,” p. 4)  
Eisenhour notes that the US began as early as 1984 to to phase out Israeli use of grant funds to pay for 
“directed offsets.”  He writes, “Through a series of negotiations, limitations were place on Israeli use of tax 
money to pay for offset although the total amount of foreign aid was not affected by this action.  The 
ceilings were $225 million (1984), $200 million (1985), $150 million (1986, 7, 8 and 9), $100 million 
(1990), $50 million (1991), and $25 million (1992).  The so-called ‘directed offsets’ program for Israel 
ended in September, 1992.” (Eisenhour, 1995, p. 96) 
51 On 8 August 2003, Senator Dodd’s office issued a press release regarding a letter signed by the 
senator to the Secretary of Commerce regarding the questions on offsets in defense trade.  (See 
http://www.senate.gov/~dodd/press/Releases/03/0808.htm accessed 22 October 2003.) 
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4. Other Legislation Under Consideration 
As of December 2003, the DPA was under consideration for a five-year extension 
to 30 September 2008 by the 108th Congress.  Section 7 of this bill, S. 1680, called for 
offset reporting in addition to that already required in Section 309 of the DPA.  This 
reporting requirement specifically extended studies of offset impacts to “at least the first 
3 tiers of domestic subcontractors during the 5-year period beginning on January 1, 
1998.” The report would be due one year following enactment of S. 1680.  As originally 
introduced in the Senate, S. 1680 did not include Section 7.  It was inserted during 
consideration by the House as part of an arrangement worked out with Senator Dodd. 
(149 CR H9416, 15 October 2003)  On 8 December 2003, S. 1680 was agreed to by both 
the House and Senate. (CIS, 2003, S. 1680) 
D. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON OFFSETS 
On 4 December 2000, the National Commission on the Use of Offsets in Defense 
Trade and the President’s Council on the Use of Offsets in Commercial Trade convened.  
A number of witnesses from industry, labor, academia, and government provided 
testimony.  The Commission approved publication of a status report on 18 January 2001.  
This report provided an overview of the extent and nature of offsets in both defense and 
commercial trade; described reasons foreign countries and industry enter into offsets 
agreements; provided a preliminary assessment of the impact of offsets on the US 
economy and national security; and listed the next steps for the Commission to undertake. 
(US President, 2001, p. A)  However, as of November 2003, the Commission has not 
held further meetings. 
In 2003, disagreement regarding the status of the Commission emerged between 
the executive and legislative branches.  In February 2003, the DOC reported, “However, 
because of the change in administration and the resignation of a large number of 
Commission members, it was decided that the interim report would serve as the final 
report of the Commission.” (DOC, 2003, “Sixth,” p. 57)  In May 2003, GAO, fulfilling 
its mandate under Section 1248(d) of the DODA of 1999 to “monitor and periodically 
report to Congress on the progress in reaching a multilateral treaty,” stated that the 
Commission report and recommendations were pending.  GAO explained the reporting 
delay in terms of the “2001 change in presidential administrations” which “resulted in 
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vacancies in the five executive branch positions on the Commission, which have yet to be 
filled.” (US GAO, 2003, p. 2) 
GAO indicated that another Presidential Commission, “The Commission on the 
Future of the United States Aerospace Industry,” called for the President to reactivate the 
Offset Commission and to pursue “a multilateral solution to curtail offset demands in 
defense trade.” (US GAO, 2003, p. 1)  As of October 2003, no further action had been 
initiated to either re-establish the Offset Commission or to pursue multilateral solutions.  
E. POLICIES, REGULATIONS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES 
1. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Policies 
Substantively, the offsets section in the 1984 SAMM remained through March 
1992 as a consequence of the introduction of the 1988 version of the SAMM.  In 1992, a 
new paragraph was introduced to address incorporation of a note on “Offset Costs” in “all 
LOAs52 which include industry offset administrative costs.”  Furthermore, the current 
section was expanded to include specific conditions for contractors recovering offset 
costs.  These conditions paralleled those already outlined in DFARS 
225.7304(c)(1)(iii)(C)53. (DSAA, 1992, Change 4, pp. 701-11 and 1401-14-15) 
In January 1996, DSAA made significant changes to the offset policy section of 
the SAMM that corresponded to the DFARS by replacing reference to the DOD Policy 
with the President’s Policy on Military Offsets, adding a restriction on the use of USG 
funding to finance offsets,54 and deleting the semi-annual offset reporting requirement.  
Procedurally, the specific conditions for recovering offset administrative costs in an LOA 
were deleted and the requirement to include a note pertaining to offsets was extended to 
include all LOAs. (DSAA, 1996, pp. 701-9 and 1401-14-15)   
In 2000, the renamed Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) published a 
letter making extensive modifications throughout the SAMM to incorporate offset-related 
provisions of legislation, changes to the DFARS, and modification of DOD procurement 
                                                 
52 The “LOA” is the common name for the Letter of Offer and Acceptance employed by DOD as the 
government-to-government agreement employed in FMS. 
53 On 2 November 1992, DSAA issued SAMM Change 5 which updated the DFARS reference to 
225.7307-2(a)(2)(iii).  (DSAA, 1992, Change 5) 
54 The SAMM restriction on the use of US funds to finance offsets preceded enactment of P.L. 104-
107 in April 1996. 
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policy.  (DSCA, 2000)  And, in February 2002, DSCA issued additional changes to the 
various portions of the SAMM relating to offsets to clarify and amplify previously 
approved DOD policy and legislative requirements. (DSCA, 2002)  Finally, the SAMM 
was revised in October 2003, but no substantive changes were made to offset policies. 
2. Procurement Regulations 
During the early part of the 1990s, the DFARS underwent substantial 
modification in an effort to streamline business practices.  In February 1991, as part of 
this DFARS transition, DOD published a proposed rule (56 FR 6056, 14 February 1991) 
in Subpart 225.7304 addressing “Pricing acquisitions for foreign military sales.” The rule 
explicitly stated that “Costs associated with the implementation of an offset agreement 
directly between a contractor and a foreign government are not allowable.”  However, on 
July 15, 1991, the DOD issued Departmental Letter 91-015 enabling defense contractors 
participating in FMS contracts to recover the costs associated with administering offset 
agreements between contractors and the foreign government.  (56 FR 67208, 30 
December 1991)   
Until this change, only offset costs associated with a DOD-approved offset 
agreement were allowable.  This change resulted from a recommendation made by the 
DPACT. (56 FR 34030, 25 July 1991)  Finally, a revised and renumbered DFARS that 
put this interim change into place was published at the end of July with an effective date 
of 31 December 1991. (56 FR 36280, 31 July 1991) 
Two subparts in the revised DFARS pertained to offsets.  Subpart 225.7303 
addressed “Pricing acquisitions for foreign military sales” and Subpart 225.7307 
addressed “Implementation of offset arrangements negotiated pursuant to foreign military 
sales agreements.”  The renumbering and revisions made little difference between the 
1991 and 1990 versions.  Subpart 225.7303 (1991) had already incorporated the interim 
rule change that permitted contractors to recover administrative costs of offset 
arrangements that were part of foreign military sales.  Subpart 225.7307 (1991) did not 
differ substantially from Subpart 225.7310 (1990), except to the extent that the 1991 
DFARS referenced the April 1990 Presidential Policy instead of the May 1978 DOD 
Policy. 
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Subpart 225.7303 underwent further clarification and revisions in 1994, 1995, 
1996 and 1999.  The initial Subpart 225.7303-2 revision published in October 1994 
emphasized that recovery of offset administrative costs was permitted if “financed wholly 
with customer cash or repayable foreign military finance credits.”  This revision 
reinforced the notion that the USG would not play a role in satisfying offset 
arrangements.  The point is clearly made in the statement that “The U.S. Government 
assumes no obligation to satisfy or administer the offset requirement or to bear any of the 
associated costs.” (59 FR 50511, 4 October 1994) 
Between 1994 and 1996, several other changes were made to subpart 225.7303-2.  
As reflected in the Federal Register on June 5, 1995 (60 FR 29491, 5 June 1995), DOD 
withdrew the condition that required specific offset information in the DOD Letter of 
Offer and Acceptance.  In September 1995, DOD proposed and removed specific 
examples of what constitutes an offset administrative cost. (60 FR 49358, 25 September 
1995)55   In February 1996, DOD changed the operable phrase from “offset 
administrative costs” to “offset implementation costs.” (61 FR 7739, 29 February 1996)   
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, was the addition of subsection 225.7303-
5 in April 1996.  This subsection addressed the topic of acquisitions wholly paid for from 
nonrepayable funds (e.g., US appropriated grant funds, etc).  Recovery of offset costs was 
no longer permitted for acquisitions paid for with nonrepayable funds.  This April 1996 
revision also included a change to 225.7303-2.  Both amendments were in response to 
Section 531A of the Fiscal Year 1996 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-107). (61 FR 18987, 30 April 1996)  This law 
stated that pricing of nonrepayable funds for foreign military sales should be done on the 
same basis as used for DOD-purchased items.  Therefore, since DOD does not incur 
offset costs for itself, DOD contractors that accept nonrepayable funds as payment for 
defense sales to foreign customers are not permitted to recover offset costs if these offsets 
and related costs are required by the foreign government involved.  (P.L. 104-107) 
                                                 
55 This proposed rule, although incorporated in Subpart 225.7303-2, was never published as a final 
rule.  The author confirmed this situation with members on the staff of the DFARS Council on 29 
September 2003. 
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Pertaining to subpart 225.7307, in June 1997 DOD simplified the title to “Offset 
Arrangements.”  Additionally, the general and procedural information contained in this 
subpart was replaced with a simple but succinct summary of USG policy on offset 
arrangements: 
In accordance with the Presidential policy statement of April 16, 1990, 
DoD does not encourage, enter into, or commit U.S. firms to FMS offset 
arrangements. The decision whether to engage in offsets, and the 
responsibility for negotiating and implementing offset arrangements, 
resides with the companies involved. (62 FR 34114, 24 June 1997) 
 The most recent modification to the DFARS involving offsets occurred in 
September 1999 when subparts 225.7303-2 and 225.7303-5 were updated to replace 
“offset implementation costs” with “offset costs.” (64 FR 49683, 14 September 1999)  
Eliminating the word “implementation” now opened the door for contractors to recover 
all costs resulting from offset transactions.  
3. Procurement Policies 
During this same period, Eleanor Spector, the Director for Defense Procurement, 
issued a memorandum on 13 July 1999 addressing “Pricing Issues in Foreign Military 
Sales Contracts.”  This memorandum was intended to clarify for contracting officers 
certain pricing issues, particularly those relating to competitive versus noncompetitive 
procurement and offsets that involved FMS contracts.  Significantly, she wrote, 
“Contracting officers should treat all offset costs as allowable FMS contract costs.” 
(Spector, 1999)  Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) 
Jacques Gansler reiterated this policy in a 27 September 2000 memorandum. (Gansler, 
2000)  Both of these memoranda are reflected in language published at DFARS 225-
7303(b) and DFARS 225.7303-2(a)(3). 
4. Other Activities 
During this same period, the USG undertook a number of other significant actions 
that touched upon offsets.  These actions included efforts by the USG to obtain 
international agreements to limit offsets, to develop a national trade strategy that 
addressed offsets, and to conduct workshops to gain consensus on managing offsets in 
defense aerospace trade.  
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a. E.C.-US Interpretation 
In July 1992, the US and European Community “agreed to interpret the 
Civil Aircraft Code as prohibiting offsets.”  Under this agreement, the signatories agreed 
to use price, quality, and delivery terms in making purchase decisions and that 
government-mandated offsets were not permissible. (US House, 1998, pp. 27-28) 
b. NATO Code of Conduct 
Between 1992 and 1993, the US attempted to further limit defense offsets 
within the NATO as part of a “Code of Conduct” pertaining to “Principles for Improving 
Defense Trade Among the Allies.”  The language pertaining to offsets stated that 
“countries will progressively reduce, towards timely elimination, their offset 
requirements, once they have noted real progress in the opening up of markets.”  
However, for a variety reasons that transcend offsets policy, the establishment of this 
Code failed. (US DOC, BXA, 1996, p. 68) 
c. Workshops to Gain Consensus 
In February 1997, the White House National Economic Council (NEC) 
requested the National Research Council Board on Science, Technology, and Economic 
Policy (STEP) “to examine the impact of offsets on the US aerospace industry.” In 
response the STEP Board convened two workshops at the National Academy of Sciences, 
one on 9 June 1997 and another on 14 January 1998.  These workshops brought together 
experts on offsets from academia, government, industry, and labor.  The purpose was to 
deepen understanding of offset issues, identify areas of consensus, place offsets in 
context, and “advance…the national dialog on aerospace offsets.”  The results of these 
meetings were published in 1997 and 1999 as “Policy Issues in Aerospace Offsets” and 
“Trends and Challenges in Aerospace Offsets,” respectively. (Wessner, 1999, pp. xi-xiii) 
F. SUMMARY 
Between 1991 and 2003, overall activity of the USG remained, as measured by 
the number of interactions, at the same level as the previous decade with respect to 
development of USG policy and practice towards offsets.  Offset-related activity in 
Congress declined when compared to the previous decade (e.g., fewer Congressional 
hearings), but became more directly focused and actually resulted in change to specific 
offset-related policies and procedures.  Executive branch activities increased with 
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numerous changes to offset-related regulations, particularly within the DOD.  
Additionally, the executive branch continued to study and report on offsets.  The most 
promising activity during this period was formation in December 2000 of a US 
Commission to study defense offsets and a parallel Council established by the President 
to examine commercial offsets.   
Within the legislative branch, the House conducted only two hearings during this 
period (as contrasted to ten between 1981 and 1990), but the GAO published six offset-
related reports that maintained the debate on offsets.  As in the previous period, those 
Members exhibiting the most interest in offset issues were Democrats representing states 
and districts with strong unionized, working class constituents from Wisconsin (Senator 
Feingold), Illinois (Representative Collins), Massachusetts (Representative Tierney), and 
Connecticut (Senator Dodd).  However, Senators effected the most change to offset-
related policies and practices.  Most significantly, GAO provided no fewer than three of 
its six reports on offset practices to Senator Feingold who was responding to concerns 
raised by one of his constituents with legislation that would curb negative effects of 
offsets.  Specifically, amendments introduced by Senator Feingold were enacted that 
modified the AECA to prevent third party incentive payments and to eliminate the use of 
nonrepayable, appropriated funds to finance offset arrangements.  Senator Dodd initiated 
action during 2003 that was enacted into law requiring yet another study of the effect of 
offset arrangements on specific subsectors of the US industrial base and mandating 
another report to Congress by March 2005.  
In the executive branch, reporting requirements continued to be met.  OMB 
provided reports in 1991 and 1992 in response to earlier requirements from the NDAA of 
1989.  However, in response to a 1992 amendment to the DPA, executive branch 
responsibility and reporting transferred from OMB to the DOC.  The DOC, which had 
produced information relating to offsets in 1992 as a result of the OTCA of 1988, 
produced its first offset report in response to the DPA in 1996.  By July 2003, the DOC 
had produced a total of seven reports.  The 1992 amendment to the DPA also caused the 
DOC to change the National Industrial Base Regulations requiring US industry to provide 
an annual report on offset agreements and transactions.   
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DOD had no further direct involvement in actual offset arrangements during this 
period.  However, DOD regulations pertaining to foreign sales were adjusted numerous 
times to reflect legislative changes.  Also, more than ten changes were made in defense 
procurement regulations via the DFARS and memoranda from senior defense 
procurement officials.  These procurement changes recognized offset costs involving 
nonrepayable funds as an allowable cost of doing business with a foreign government and 
enabled US contractors to recover these costs. 
As early as the DPA 309 report produced in 1996, the DOC had called for a 
national dialog to discuss the various impacts of defense offsets.  The DOC, along with 
DOD and the White House National Economic Council, sponsored workshops in June 
1997 and January 1998 by the National Research Council that initiated a dialog between 
government, industry, labor, and academia on issues related to aerospace offsets.  This 
dialog continued in 29 June 1999 hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the Committee on Government Reform on the 
topic, “Defense Offsets:  Are They Taking Away Our Jobs?”   
The Defense Offsets Disclosure Act of 1999 established a National Commission 
on the Use of Offsets in Defense Trade that would continue this dialog between 
government, industry, labor, and academia.  President Clinton established the Offset 
Commission during the last month of his term in office.  The Commission met in 
December 2000 and provided an interim report in January 2001.  However, the 
Commission faded from view, as no executive branch participants were named by the 
Bush administration to continue the dialog.  Further efforts to reconstitute the Offsets 
Commission have failed. 
As in the previous period, constituents concerned about employment continued to 
bring offsets as a potential area of concern to the attention of Members of Congress.  Like 
the activities in previous periods, the number of studies and reports increased.  However, 
unlike the prior decade, activities between 1991 and 2003 resulted in real changes in 
offset-related policies and procedures that allowed contractors to recover offset costs, 
restricted the use of nonrepayable financing, and imposed stiff penalties for making 
offset-related incentive payments.   
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VII. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
This chapter provides a summary and conclusions regarding the determinants of 
US offset policies and practices developed during each period, as well as an overall 
summary of offset policy development.  It provides a comparison of the economic 
environment and offsets; reviews principal USG participants and their roles with respect 
to offsets; and identifies offset-related activities and the development of offset-related 
legislation, policy and regulations.  Table 2 provides a chronology of significant USG 
offset-related events that occurred from the inception of offsets following World War II 
through 2003. The summary concludes with insights into the primary and secondary 
causes of offset policy development and suggestions for further research.  
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Offsets are another mechanism through which governments seek to manage or 
control trade in certain international transactions.  These offset practices challenge the 
principle of comparative advantage and create barriers to free trade.  Offsets can be seen 
as governmental strategies designed to protect national interests as well as to enhance the 
transactional value of traded goods or services – particularly within economic sectors 
related to defense and national security.  Offsets are one of the many practices that 
governments use to protect as well as promote development of domestic interests and one 
of the tools that industry uses to respond to increasingly competitive markets. 
Market structure is one reason that governments choose to use offset mechanisms.  
Offset use is minimal to nonexistent in market structures that approach perfect 
competition (i.e., markets with many buyers, many sellers, no barriers to exit or entry, 
complete information, etc.).  Conversely, governments conducting business within 
imperfect market structures, e.g., those that have few buyers, few sellers, entry/exit 
barriers or incomplete, asymmetrical information, often employ offset mechanisms. 
In addition to market structure, three distinct features mark offset transactions: 
purchasing government involvement, supplier reciprocity, and preferential treatment of 
suppliers providing reciprocity.  Offsets are also characterized, in certain cases, by dollar 




Post WW II Licensed production arrangements in Europe and Japan. 
1961-1976 US-German “offset” arrangements for maintaining US troops in Europe. 
April, 1974 First Offset Agreement signed between DOD and Australian MOD.   
June, 1975 Coproduction/Offset Agreement “Deal of the Century” signed between DOD and European 
Participating Governments for F-16. 
July, 1975 Offset Agreement signed between DOD and Swiss Federal Military Department for F-5. 
November, 1976 DEPSECDEF Clements Offsets Policy published, discouraging DOD participation in offsets. 
May, 1978 DEPSECDEF Duncan Offsets Policy published, withdrawing DOD participation in offsets 
except in exceptional circumstances. 
May, 1981 
September, 1981 
First mention of offsets in congressional document. 
First congressional subcommittee hearings to address offsets. 
April, 1984 Section 309 of the Defense Production Act (DPA) enacted (50 U.S.C. App. 2099).  First 
legislation on offsets (required publication of offset reports). 
1984 Offset Agreement between DOD and Dutch MOD for Patriot. 
October, 1986 Section 309 of the DPA amended, changing content of offset reports. 
September, 1988 Section 2505 (subsequently renumbered as 2532) of Title 10 enacted (10 U.S.C. 2505), 
requiring establishment of US policy on offsets and additional reports. 
August, 1989 DOD intervention in offset agreement for Korean Fighter Program. 
April 1990 Publication of President’s policy on offsets in military exports. 
15 July 1991 DOD interim rule change to DFARS enabled contractors to recover offset costs. 
October, 1992 Section 309 of the DPA amended, incorporating President’s policy on offsets as 
congressional policy.  Also changed content of offset reports and made Department of 
Commerce the executive agent for offsets and offset reports. 
April, 1994 The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) was amended to add offset requirements.  Section 36 
of the AECA  (22 U.S.C. 2776) was amended to add a requirement to inform Congress of the 
existence of offsets via pre-sale notification.  Section 39A of the AECA  (22 U.S.C. 2776A) 
was added to prohibit incentive payments resulting from offsets. 
February, 1996 Section 22 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2762) eliminated the payment of offset costs involving 
foreign sales wholly involving nonrepayable funds. 
July, 1996 Section 36 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2776) was amended to require publication of unclassified 
pre-sale notification data in the Federal Register to include publication of whether an offset 
sale did or did not exist. 
November, 1999 The Defense Offsets Disclosure Act was enacted. 
• Section 309 of the DPA amended establishing a National Commission on Offsets. 
• Section 36 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2776) was amended to clarify the level of offset 
information in notifications to Congress.  
December, 2000 National Commission on Offsets convened. 
September, 2003 Title 10 amended to require additional offset reports from DOD. 
Table 2:  A Chronology of Significant Events Associated With USG Policy and 
Practice Relating To Offsets in International Trade  
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1. Level of Offsets Activity and Summary of the Economic Environment  
Level of activity provides a quantifiable characterization of offset policy 
development, taking into account the number of enacted laws, significant bills, 
congressional hearings, regulatory or policy changes, and studies and reports associated 
with offsets.  Figure 4 along with Table 3 provides a summary that illustrates the 
development of USG offset-related activities between 1973 and 2003.  To account for the 
fact that the time periods are not identical, the author divided the number of activities by 
the number of years in each time period to provide an average number of offset activities 
for each time period. The author then arbitrarily assigned a valuation of “Low” for 
periods with fewer than two interactions per year; “Medium” for periods with between 
two and four interactions per year, and “High” for periods with four or more interactions 
per year.   
For the eight-year period between 1973 and 1980, the USG engaged in at least 14 
different offset-related activities, mostly DOD offset agreements or issuance of policy 
statements or regulations.  This period is regarded as “Low” in terms of offset policy 
development activity.  For the ten-year period between 1981 and 1990, offset policy 
development activity was “High,” with more than 40 interactions.   While DOD activity 
declined to a half-dozen interactions, overall participation by USG agencies in offset-
related activities tripled during this period, primarily as a result of direct congressional 
interaction (mostly hearings) and reports issued in response to congressional demands.  
 For the thirteen-year period between 1991 and 2003, direct congressional activity 
declined, but executive branch responses to Congress on offsets increased.  Therefore, the 








































Code Title Date Code Title Date
A1 BEA Survey 1988 DP12 DFARS Offset Costs Sep-99
A2 ITA Guide/Practice Aug-92 DP13 USD(DP) Policy Memo Jul-99
A3 Offset Regulation Dec-94 DP14 USD(AT&L) Policy Memo Sep-00
A4 1st DOC Report May-96 DS1 Introduction into MASM Jan-73
A5 2nd DOC Report Aug-97 DS2 MASM Incorporates Clements Policy Jun-77
A6 3rd DOC Report Aug-98 DS3 MASM Incorporates Duncan Policy Jun-80
A7 4th DOC Report Dec-99 DS4 MASM becomes SAMM Apr-84
A8 ITA Evolution Mar-00 DS5 SAMM:  Offset cost recovery allowed Mar-92
A9 5th DOC Report May-01 DS6 SAMM:  Implement non-use of repayable funds Jan-96
A10 6th DOC Report Feb-03 DS7 SAMM:  Implement minor changes from DODA Jan-00
A11 7th DOC Report Jul-03 DS8 SAMM:  Minor, nonsubstantive change May-02
B1 OMB Report Dec 1985 Feb-86 G1 Trade Offsets Apr-84
B2 OMB Report Dec 1986 Feb-87 G2 Military Exports Apr-86
B3 OMB Summary Dec-87 G3 Defense Authorizations Act Apr-90
B4 OMB Report Dec 1987 Jan-88 G4 Offset Implementation Dec-90
B5 OMB Report Dec 1988 Jan-89 G5 FMF Concerns Jun-94
B6 OMB Report Apr 1990 Jul-90 G6 Demands Grow Apr-96
B7 OMB Negotiations Report Jun-91 G7 Incentive Payments Aug-97
B8 OMB Negotiations Report Dec-92 G8 Diverse Activities Dec-98
C1 House Report 97-48 May-81 G9 Data Collection Oct-00
C2 Revitalization Hearing Sep-81 G10 Status Report on Offsets Commission May-03
C3 Trade Offset Hearing May-84 L1 H.R. 5540# May-82
C4 US Trade Hearing Jul-85 L2 P.L. 98-265 (DPA) Apr-84
C5 FMS Offsets Hearing* Oct-85 L3 P.L. 99-441 (DPA) Oct-86
C6 Offsets Agreement Hearing Jun-86 L4 P.L. 100-418 (OTCA) Aug-88
C7 Countertrade Hearing* Jul-87 L5 P.L. 100-456 (NDAA) Sep-88
C8 GAO Offsets Brief Apr-89 L6 P.L. 101-189 (NDAA) Nov-89
C9 House Hearings on DPA May-89 L7 H.R. 486# Jan-89
C10 Senate Hearings on DPA* Nov-89 L8 S. 1379# Jul-89
C11 Military Sales/FMF Hearing Jun-94 L9 P.L. 102-558 (DPA) Oct-92
C12 House Minority Report Oct-98 L10 P.L. 103-236 (AECA) Apr-94
C13 Taking Away Jobs Hearing Jun-99 L11 P.L. 104-107 (AECA) Feb-96
DA1 Australian Offset Agreement Apr-73 L12 P.L. 104-164 (AECA) Jul-96
DA2 DOD Audit Report May-74 L13 P.L. 106-113 (DODA amended: DPA and AECA) Nov-99
DA3 EPG Agreement Jun-75 L14 P.L. 107-47 (DPA) Oct-03
DA4 Swiss Offset Agreement Jul-75 L15 P.L. 108-87 (Defense Appropriation) Sep-03
DA5 DOD IC/IPA Report Aug-83 L16 S. 1680# Dec-03
DA6 DPACT Report Dec-83 O1 GATT/TCA Jan-80
DA7 Dutch Patriot Agreement 1984 O2 GATT/GPA Jan-81
DA8 DSCA KFP Intervention Aug-89 O3 USITC Analysis 1982
DD1 DOD Policy (Clements) Nov-76 O4 Treasury/AIA/EIA Report May-83
DD2 DOD Policy (Duncan) May-78 O5 USITC Survey 1985
DD3 DOD Instruction 2010.6 Mar-80 O6 E.C.-US Interpreation Jul-92
DP1 Introduction into ASPR Sep-76 O7 NATO Code of Conduct 1993
DP2 Initial DAR Oct-80 O8 NRC Workshop I Jun-97
DP3 DFARS 225.73 Revision Nov-90 O9 NRC Workshop II Jan-98
DP4 DFARS Proposed no offset  recovery Feb-91 O10 Offset Commission Hearing/Report Jan-01
DP5 DFARS offset cost recovery allowed Jul-91 P1 EO 12521 (DPA) Jun-85
DP6 DFARS Offset Admin Costs Oct-94 P2 EO 12649 (DPA) Aug-88
DP7 DFARS info not in LOA Jun-95 P3 EO 12661 (OTCA) Dec-88
DP8 DFARS examples removed Sep-95 P4 Offsets Policy Apr-90
DP9 DFARS Offset Implement Costs Feb-96 P5 EO 12919 (DPA) Jun-94
DP10 DFARS no-nonrepayable funds used Apr-96 P6 Presidential Memo (AECA) Jul-94
DP11 DFARS offsets data reduced Jun-97 P7 EO 13091 (AECA) Jun-98
* Denotes multiple hearings conducted P8 EO 13177 (DODA) Dec-00
# Denotes legislation not enacted into law Bold indicates significant offsets event
 
 Table 3:  List of USG Offset Activities Between 1973 and 2003 
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Table 4 provides a summary for each time period studied in this thesis, comparing 
available56 economic, employment, and offsets data to the type and level of activity in US 
offset policy development.  For the entire period between 1950 and 2002, the US GDP 
remained strong, growing from $1,687 billion to $9,440 billion, reflecting an annual 3.37 
percent rate of real growth.  Though the negative impact of offsets on the US economy is 
frequently cited as a reason for examining them, the available data do not demonstrate a 
correlation between GDP and offset activity.  With an increase in both GDP and offsets, 

















































Data either not germane or unavailable  
1973-
1980 
2.50% 6.6% Growth from  








3.52% 7.1% Growth from  








3.20% 5.5% Decline from 

























Table 4:  Summary Comparison of Economic, Employment, Offsets, and 
Policy Development 
 
On the other hand, increases in overall unemployment rates and the actual 
declines in aerospace employment demonstrate a relationship with the high level of 
activity in US offset policy development.  Between 1981 and 1990, overall aerospace 
                                                 
56 Between 1950 and 1960, licensed production and coproduction programs were not recognized as 
offset transactions, per se; therefore, data pertaining to offsets information was unavailable.  Similarly, the 
“offset agreements” during the 1961 through mid-1970 period actually constituted an allied burden-sharing 
arrangement; therefore available data pertaining to these offset agreements is not included.   
57 Economic and employment data is for the period 1991-2002; aerospace data is available for 1995; 
offset values, values of associated contracts, and number of countries is provided for 1993-2000.  
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employment was high which would logically correlate with a low level of policy 
development activity; however, overall unemployment for this period was higher than 
any other period.  Since employment was cited as a key congressional concern, this could 
be pointed to as one reason for the high level of policy development activity.  
Conversely, between 1991 and 2002, overall unemployment was dramatically reduced, 
which should have led to decreased offset policy activity.  However, the dramatic decline 
of employment in the aerospace sector helped to maintain a high level of offset policy 
development. 
Regarding offset data, three different studies were conducted by three different 
agencies using three different methodologies to obtain offset-related data.  Recognizing 
that disparities between different sets of data are highly likely, this data is used to provide 
a rough comparison of offset activity during the period covered by the studies to develop 
overall trends.  No attempt has been made to normalize the data across the various 
periods.  The value of offsets as a percentage of contract value appeared to decline 
slightly.  Overall, the annual average value of offsets with US companies and the number 
of countries participating with US companies both increased.  There does appear to be a 
correlation between these two areas and a high level of offset policy development.  In 
other words, as the value of offsets and the number of countries demanding offsets 
increased, so did the level of offset policy development.   
2. Principal USG Participants and Their Roles with Respect to Offsets 
From 1973 to 1980, few non-DOD government agencies were involved in offsets.  
During this time, DOD actively participated in offset agreements, developed policy and 
regulations relating to offsets, and provided offset-related studies and reports.  Principal 
entities within DOD involved with offsets included offices involved with defense 
procurement regulations and FMS.  Both the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense 
were engaged in all aspects of offsets and were instrumental in establishing the first high-
level offset-related policy determinations. 
During the period 1981 to 1990, Congress emerged as the principal protagonist on 
offset related matters.  Legislators representing states and districts where organized labor 
was strong led efforts to mandate reporting requirements.  House legislators were most 
active, and within the House, members of the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization 
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of the Committee on Banking, Financing, and Urban Affairs were the most active, 
conducting the first offset-related hearing in 1981 and four additional hearings on offsets 
by 1989.  Most importantly, though, an executive branch interagency group formulated 
the USG policy on offsets in military trade that President Bush signed in April 1990. 
 From 1991 to 2003, the Senate became active, as certain Senators responding to 
concerns raised by constituents worked to impose stiff penalties for making incentive 
payments related to offsets, to restrict appropriated grant funds from use in offset 
transactions, and to increase offset reporting and study requirements.  The legislation 
involving third-party incentive payments for offsets, while original, was also 
characterized by ambiguity and the absence of implementing regulations.  Legislation to 
restrict the use of appropriated funds ratified an earlier decision by DOD to phase out use 
of these types of funds to pay for offset costs in foreign sales transactions. 
DOD was also actively involved during this period, adjusting procurement 
regulations to allow recovery of offset costs incurred by US contractors.  The Offsets 
Commission, which was established and met in 2000, appeared to offer a promising 
avenue for a robust dialog on US offset policy.  However, the Commission was unable to 
move beyond providing an initial status report due to changes in Presidential 
Administrations. 
3. Activities that Influenced US Offset Policy Development 
This subsection provides a summary of the broad array of offset-related activities 
in which the USG was involved since 1973 that influenced the development of US offset 
policy.  These activities are grouped into four areas: participating in offset arrangements, 
studying and reporting on offsets, addressing offsets in international forums, and 
conducting domestic dialog on offset practices.   
a. Participating in Offset Arrangements 
DOD participated in at least four major offset arrangements between 1973 
and 1984 and intervened to limit a commercial offset arrangement in 1989.  The early 
offset arrangements between 1973 and 1975 with Australia for guided-missile frigates, 
with the EPG for F-16 aircraft, and with Switzerland for F-5 aircraft, led DOD to make 
exceptions to “Buy America” restrictions allowing industries from these and other 
countries to bid on DOD procurements.  Later, the friction resulting from the failure of 
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prime contractors to meet Swiss offset obligations in a timely manner led to formulation 
of the Duncan Policy which stated that DOD would not participate in offsets, but allowed 
for exceptions limited to US national security interests.   
Two activities in the 1980s tested DOD offset policy.  In 1984, DOD 
participated in an offset agreement with the Netherlands to purchase Patriot missile 
canisters, and, in 1989, DOD intervened with US competitors to limit the level of their 
offset commitments made as part of the Korean Fighter Competition.  Ostensibly, both 
activities were undertaken in the interest of US national security.  Both activities 
demonstrated that exceptions could be made without wholesale changes to offset policy. 
b. Studying and Reporting on Offsets 
Studies and reports proved to be the most popular activity to help form 
offset policy.  Executive branch reports prepared by DOD, Treasury, and the USITC were 
originally self initiated, but subsequent reports prepared by OMB and DOC responded to 
congressional reporting requirements.  Except for a single House study, GAO provided 
all legislative branch reports.  A common finding of these reports was that the use of 
offsets in international trade was occurring with increasing frequency, expanding to new 
countries, and growing in terms of dollar value.  They also recognized the extreme 
difficulty of eliminating offsets altogether and that, given a choice, trade without offsets 
was preferable, but that trade with offsets was preferable to no trade at all.  Most 
government studies also reported that offsets per se did not have a negative effect on 
national security.  Additionally, most government studies concluded that overall US 
employment and the US economy were stronger because of the use of offsets, but that 
offsets may have negative effects on the economy and employment in specific subsectors.  
Interestingly, findings from the first known government report on offsets are echoed 
throughout subsequent government reports.  In particular, this 1974 DOD report stated 
that no single activity in the US is responsible for engaging in offsets and that no standard 
system exists to track and report on progress in fulfilling offset obligations. 
c. Addressing Offsets in International Forums 
Though beyond the scope of this thesis, offset discussions in international 
forums certainly played a role in helping to shape US offsets policy.  These included US 
efforts in worldwide forums such as the GATT and WTO intended, in a broad sense, to 
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reduce and eliminate barriers to trade such as offsets.  Also, US trade negotiators made 
efforts to address offsets directly in other GATT/WTO agreements, specifically the GPA 
and TCA.  US trade negotiators achieved some success with the E.C.-US Interpretation of 
the TCA in eliminating offsets in trade involving civil aircraft.  The NATO Code of 
Conduct served as another opportunity for negotiators to address offsets in a multilateral 
forum.  In regional trade, US negotiators addressed the use of offsets with Mexico and 
Canada in NAFTA, but allowed offsets for purchases involving defense and national 
security. 
d. Conducting Domestic Dialog on Offset Practices 
Within the US, public dialog on offsets began with congressional hearings 
in 1981.  Congressional subcommittees conducted more than ten hearings between 1981 
and 1999 to address offset-related matters.58  During and since that time, some witnesses 
have taken the opportunity to decry the use of offsets as part of testimony addressing 
other issues (e.g., proliferation of US arms sales, unfair practices in world trade etc.).  
The executive branch also conducted workshops in 1997 and 1998 to continue dialog and 
gain consensus on the use of offsets.  Again, the one group of activities that held the most 
promise to further offset policy development was the hearings conducted by the Offset 
Commission, although, as of December 2003, no action has resulted from these particular 
hearings.   
All of these hearings and workshops were used to gain a better 
understanding of offset-related issues from experts within government, industry, 
academia, and labor.  A common theme emerging from these discussions is the absence 
of solid data on the impact of offsets to enable decision makers to determine and take 
appropriate actions.  Additionally, this public dialog called for and resulted in further 
studies, reports, and more discussions on offsets.  Of these domestic dialogs, 
congressional hearings were the most prolific.  Legislators, in particular, used 
congressional hearings to discuss proposed legislation and to demonstrate that they were 
taking action on matters important to their constituents and the nation.  Of the nine laws 
                                                 
58 Congress did not hold any hearings to specifically address offsets between 1999 and 2003. 
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enacted between 1984 and 2003 that directly introduced or amended offset-related 
provisions, seven had their foundation in subcommittee hearings on offsets.59 
4. Offset-related Legislation, Policy and Regulations 
Numerous pieces of legislation were proposed between 1981 and 2003 that 
directly or indirectly affected offsets.  Offset policy was initiated first at senior levels 
within DOD and then at the presidential level.  Congress adopted the President’s offsets 
policy and added legislation to set some minor policy pertaining to offsets as well.  Also, 
senior procurement officials in DOD affirmed procurement policy relating to offsets. 
Except for one regulation published by the DOC, DOD published all offset-
related regulations.  The regulations addressed offsets relating to defense procurement 
and foreign sales made via government-to-government channels. 
a. Legislation 
Because offsets touch upon issues relating to the defense industrial base, 
armed forces, and foreign military sales, legislation pertaining to offsets is included in a 
number of different parts of the US Code.  Early legislation found in Section 309 of the 
DPA (50 U.S.C. App. 2099) focused upon a requirement for the executive branch to 
collect, study and report specific information related to the impact of offsets.  Legislative 
attempts to move beyond reporting failed until September 1988, when Section 825 of the 
NDAA of 1989 was enacted (10 U.S.C. 2505).  In addition to reporting requirements, 
Section 825 directed the President to develop a US policy on offsets and to begin 
negotiations with trading partners to limit offsets and required industry to report on 
offsets that exceeded a specific monetary threshold.  With the renewal of the DPA in 
October 1992, Congress incorporated the President’s Offset Policy into law.  Various 
portions of the AECA were also amended to adjust offset reporting and notification 
requirements (22 U.S.C. 2776), to impose stiff penalties for any contractor engaged in 
providing third party incentives (22 U.S.C. 2779A) for offset programs and to restrict the 
use of appropriated funds to pay offset costs as part of a foreign sales (22 U.S.C. 2762).  
The DODA of 1999 (P.L. 106-113) established the Offsets Commission and inserted new 
                                                 
59 The exceptions were the offset provisions included in the 1994 Feingold Amendment P.L. 103-236 
and the 2003 Dodd Amendment P.L. 108-87.  Additionally, other laws discussed throughout this thesis that 
had either an indirect or little impact on offsets included 1996 amendments to the AECA resulting from 
P.L. 104-107 and P.L. 104-164 and a 2001 change to the DPA resulting from P.L. 107-47. 
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language regarding the policy of the US to monitor offsets, to promote fairness in 
international trade and to ensure that foreign participation in building US weapon systems 
does not harm the US economy.  In addition to the Commission, the DODA called upon 
the President to develop a multilateral strategy to address offsets.   
On 30 September 2003, the DOD Appropriations Act for 2004 was signed 
into law (P.L. 108-87).  Section 8138 of this law continues to seek solutions to the offsets 
problem through studies and reports by requiring that the Secretary of Defense issue a 
report to the President regarding the use or administration of offsets.  As of December 
2003, Congress continues consideration of additional legislation that further details the 
level of reporting under DPA Section 309. 
b. Policy and Regulations 
With the exception of the President Bush’s offset policy in 1990, the 1994 
DOC change to the National Industrial Base Regulations incorporating industry offset 
requirements, and the inclusion of offset policies in legislative language, DOD has 
published all offset-related policies and regulations between 1973 and 2003.60   
Important offset policies for DOD and the USG emerged in 1976 
(Clements Policy) and 1978 (Duncan Policy).  The Duncan Policy, in particular, is 
generally regarded in academic literature and government documents as a point of 
departure for offset agreements.  Prior to this time, DOD actively participated in offset 
agreements.  However, believing that offsets created unnecessary friction with allies and 
were difficult to implement and negotiate and recognizing that offsets were economically 
inefficient, Secretary Duncan curtailed DOD involvement in offsets except for interests 
of national security.  His policy also provided for semi-annual reporting on offsets. 
Within DOD, FMS policies and procurement regulations were amended to 
incorporate first DOD and then USG policies on offsets.  FMS policies and procurement 
regulations paralleled one another and incorporated further changes in response to 
legislation.  In 1991, defense procurement regulations instituted a substantive change in 
response to a DPACT recommendation that recognized offset costs as an allowable 
                                                 
60 The DOS has not made required regulatory changes as a result of offset-related provisions in P.L. 
103-236. 
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charge for doing business with a foreign government.  Prior to this change, contractors 
had been unable to easily recover offset costs incurred as part of a contract resulting from 
FMS.  Policy memoranda signed by senior DOD procurement officials in 1999 and 2000 
affirmed offsets as allowable costs. 
The President’s statement on offset policy was essentially a restatement of 
current practices within the DOD, restricting offset policy considerations to military 
exports.  However, the 1990 Bush policy statement did elevate the approval authority for 
USG participation in offsets to the President through the NSC.  Additionally, this policy 
called for consultations with allies regarding the use of offsets in defense procurement. 
Legislation also incorporated offset policy into the DPA, AECA, and Title 
10.  Often this policy paralleled executive branch policy; however, different laws 
established slightly different policies and offered different definitions of what constituted 
offset practices. 
5. Conclusions 
Within the executive branch, DOD offset policies first arose from friction with 
foreign customers, management complexities and resource drains that arose from direct 
involvement in offsets.  DOD recognized economic inefficiencies and had first-hand 
experience with problems resulting from offsets, but tolerated offsets and similar 
practices in order to protect its interest in requiring domestic production of equipment 
designs procured abroad.  However, in 1991 as a result of DPACT-recommended 
changes to defense procurement regulations, DOD accepted responsibility for collecting 
offset costs from foreign customers and passing these along to contractors involved in 
FMS contracts. 
At the federal level, a similar rationale applies for supporting the President’s 
Offsets Policy.  Here, too, the USG recognizes that offsets are inefficient and market 
distorting.  Like the DOD policy, USG policy did not want to undermine industry or 
relinquish domestic managed trade practices (e.g., set-aside programs, etc.).  Hence, 
similar to DOD, federal officials opted to tolerate, but not participate in offsets, keeping 
them at “arms length.” 
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While initially articulated in a wide variety of areas (e.g., economy, national 
security, defense industrial base, etc.), legislative branch concerns with offsets are 
primarily due to perceived employment impacts.  Legislators consistently highlighted 
concerns for jobs, primarily in the aerospace industry, when investigating the impact of 
offsets.  Legislators added reporting requirements for offsets to the law and later passed 
legislation to enhance reporting to gain more and better information. 
Offsets, themselves, add complexity to international trade.  With slightly different 
offset policies between the executive branch and legislative branch, distinctions between 
various offset-related statutes and somewhat dissimilar definitions found in these 
policies, US offset policy is somewhat ambiguous.  The laws, policies and practices that 
developed between 1973 and 2003 are complex and ambiguous because they were 
developed by different executive agencies with unique missions and by numerous 
congressional committees having various jurisdictions and varying constituencies.  Taken 
as a whole, these policies are best described as laissez-faire, striking a rough balance 
between those who want to do away with offsets due to the perceived threat to US 
employment and those who tolerate offsets as an integral and necessary part of complex 
business transactions in the global economy. 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The research conducted for this thesis investigated the determinants of USG 
policy and practice towards offsets in international trade.  Further research in the area of 
USG involvement in offsets is warranted, particularly with respect to trade involving 
offsets that are not military exports, both those that are related to government purchases 
and those that may be commercial in nature.  This research would provide insight as to 
the extent of offset arrangements that exist outside of the defense sector as well as those 
that exist beyond the bounds of government procurement. 
For example, the literature discusses the use of offsets for large projects such as 
telecommunications systems and power plants.  In another example, GAO reported on 18 
June 1997 to the Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space of the 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation that the National Aeronautical and 
Space Agency (NASA) was negotiating offset agreements as part of the International 
Space Station.  GAO reported that NASA was working with “foreign partners and 
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another foreign participant to build hardware for the United States in return for free or 
reduced costs access to and use of the station, or other consideration.” (US GAO, 1997, 
“Space Station,” p. 6)  
Identifying alternatives to offsets within defense acquisition would also prove 
valuable.  For example, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and 
International Relations of the House Committee on Government Reform conducted 
hearings in July 2003 entitled, “Is DOD Meeting Joint Strike Fighter [JSF] International 
Cooperative Program Goals?”  Administration witnesses stated that JSF was pursuing 
“best value sourcing” as a “fundamental departure from offsets.” (US House, 2003, p. 9)  
The “best value sourcing” approach for acquisition programs such as JSF could be 
compared and contrasted with the offset approach taken by programs such as the F-16.   
Another important area of offsets worthy of research would be to determine costs 
associated with implementing offset agreements.  This should encompass the magnitude 
of costs incurred by both the buyer and the seller.  Additionally, this research would 
identify how these costs are paid and identify who pays these costs.  This research would 
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